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This research studies the violent conflict between Bengali Muslims, who mostly migrated from 
the former East Bengal during colonial times, and the Bodo Tribe, who mostly follow the 
Bathou religion in the Bodoland region of Assam. This conflict is often seen through the pre-
existing lens of communal violence between Hindus and Muslims in India. Here, conflict 
between a religious minority and an ethnic one is investigated in its locality and this 
investigation highlights the complex history of the region and its part in shaping this 
antagonism. It does so by looking into the colonial archive which introduced the category of 
‘immigrant’ to the region, together with Urdu and English press coverage of four violent events 
that essentialize the categories ‘Muslim’ and ‘immigrant’, respectively. Defying simple 
categorization, the Bengali Muslims in the Kokrajhar district have devised their own strategy 
for narrating time. Through archival and ethnographic research this study shows the shifting 
meaning of the concept of an ‘immigrant’ and its implication for social and political realities. 
This research addresses some less studied dynamics of the clash between two minorities and 
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We live in a time when screens large and small flash scenes of horror at us and terrorize 
us, but now, additionally, our hands feel the tremors as the news relentlessly breaks in our 
palms. Amidst the flow of the news of suffering we may perhaps be moved, or our attention 
caught by one subject which draws empathy. Sights of children being separated from parents 
at the Mexican-U.S. border, boats capsizing in the Mediterranean, Rohingya refugees running 
from the terror of the state with their fearful faces, refugees at the gates of borders waiting 
hopelessly to enter a new territory, and the lesser known sight of people locked in detention 
centres because their  Indian citizenship is doubted in Assam,  waiting to be deported to an 
unknown country. These are headlines that make   the 21st century look grim. We certainly 
know these stories because  the media have communicated them to us, but similar pictures 
perhaps disguise many different circumstances.  
 
Painful news address certain sensibilities and feelings, it arouses emotions and 
connections but often tears generated by these images “inevitably turn attention away from the 
causes of the tears”, and do  not reflect on the particular history of the pain, as Jean Seaton 
notes: “more political realities are transformed into emotional narratives” (Seaton, 2005: 
p.133). The pertinent question she asks “Is ‘news’ blood influenced by changing mores around 
‘entertainment’ blood - the gore that features in fiction? The blood effect must be calculated as 
it should “fit an aesthetic” and is not there “to mimic reality” (Seaton, 2005, p.21). This 
featuring of fiction and the need for news to grab attention and entertain mask the history, and 
the making of rational judgments by contextualizing the news within its particular history 
becomes difficult. 
 
The debate around migration has become a major policy and political issue that is re-
shaping political cultures, policy and countries’ future direction, causing anxiety to people 
worldwide. Of course, there are differences, different responses in different places with varying 
degrees of state efficiency. In a place like India, which has failed to serve its people adequately, 
raising feelings against minorities is an effective strategy with which to distract attention from 
fundamental injustices.  More widely, there is the discontent of those people who are left in 
communities from which industries have left (either because they have been superseded or, 




labour). They may be encouraged to turn against those who are more marginalized and deprived 
in the world of development. Our history of the present is perhaps as an age of anger, since 
Pankaj Mishra concludes that “in general, there has been an exponential rise in tribalist hatred 
of minorities, the main pathology of scapegoating released by political and economic shocks, 
even as the world is knit more closely by globalization” (Mishra, 2017, p.328). On the contrary, 
David Goodhart has tried to understand this anti-immigrant sentiment in the wake of Trump’s 
election and Brexit as a great divide between ‘Anywhere’ and ‘Somewhere’. Goodhart writes:  
 
The anywhere world of the geographical, and often social, mobility of higher education 
and professional careers was once the preserve of a small elite; it has now become 
general, though not universal. For Somewheres, meanwhile, post-industrialism has 
largely abolished manual labour, reduced the status of lower income males and 
weakened the national social contract - neither the affluent nor employers feel the same 
obligation towards ‘their’ working class that they once did” (Goodhart, 2017, p.6). 
 
These Somewheres, whom Mishra may consider tribalist, with their own grievances and 
particular history, have begun to speak, as Goodhart points out, through new and established 
parties. It is insufficient to blame a political or business class, or the media, for stoking the 
hatred. Indeed, in some societies, like the UK, all of these three institutions have worked, 
imperfectly, inadequately, but nevertheless to some effect to diminish such inequalities and to 
integrate groups into education and achievement.  Mishra argues that   every individual has to 
take responsibility and a moment of introspection to reflect “on our complicity in everyday 
forms of violence and dispossession, and our callousness before the spectacle of suffering” 
(Mishra, 2017, p.329). 
 
Are we living in a more violent age?  Domestic violence has in many western countries 
and some Asian ones been reduced remarkably over the last 50 years. People are less frequently 
murdered, casual violence has been diminished, famines are less common because there are 
responses to them. Yet, in other places and times, there is what may be described as a new 
violence that breaks ‘normal’ codes. Extreme violence against groups, genocide and ethnic 
cleansing do not happen without the normalization of hatred.  Violence everywhere is made 
possible through certain acts of communication and the reinvention of a history. Everywhere, 
there is anxiety that the breaking of the formal and informal restraints that govern political and 
communal action may be being weakened. In his reading of Herbert Kelman (1989), Zygmunt 
Bauman found three conditions that, once they are met singly or together, weaken moral 





…the violence is authorized (by official orders coming from the legally entitled 
quarters), actions are routinized (by rule-governed practices and exact specification of 
roles), and the victims of the violence are dehumanized (by ideological definitions and 
indoctrinations)” (Bauman, 1989, p.21). 
 
Ethnic cleansing starts from the ordinary, slow, and possibly hard to discern or fight, 
erosion of values, norms, behaviour, rules, and something vulnerable is exploited in the 
‘ordinary’, which then subtly routinizes violence in a society. Without the dehumanization of 
the victim community the psychological numbing that makes the action of violence and its 
acceptance is impossible. The routinization of a certain language against a set of people to 
dehumanize them is the key to making hatred and violence ordinary acts. As Ashis Nandy 
notes: 
 
Such dehumanization is usually brought about through hate propaganda, manipulation 
of history to set up the victims as intrinsically dangerous or contaminating, and the use 
of scientific or pseudo-scientific categories, such as eugenics, demography and social 
evolutionism.” (Nandy, 2013, p.68) 
 
The Holocaust was a discrete, distinct event that occurred in a particular place over a 
particular period of time with an absolutely particular machinery of destruction, but that was 
also,  as Bauman reminds us, an event that should be “traced back to the only-too-familiar 
record of the hundreds of years of ghettos, legal discrimination, pogroms and persecutions of 
Jews in Christian Europe – and so revealed as a uniquely horrifying, yet fully logical 
consequence of ethnic and religious hatred” (Bauman, 1989, p.2). ‘Ethnic’ conflict has erupted 
more recently in Bosnia, Rwanda and Burma, and can quickly change from being small scale 
to being huge and genocidal.  
 
A rapidly growing economy, like India’s. has nevertheless failed  to address the 
anxieties of smaller groups, as the urgent train of development has trampled over (as it had 
done everywhere that industrialisation took place) local issues and traditions. The salaried 
masses need to be kept busy in offices, as the GDP should keep climbing and the idea of India 
needs to be recast to paint a picture of economic growth and the success of the ‘majority’. This 
needs an ideological adjustment and a new project for writing history. On his deathbed, the 
revered Kannada writer and critic, U.R. Ananthamurthy, wrote a book with a spirit of 




to clash at the beginning of the twentieth century, and these ideas were entering into a final 
battle. The result of this contest will determine the country’s fate. In Hindutva or Hind Swaraj 
(2016) he saw two visions of India - that of Gandhi, inspired by religion and non-violence, 
which is of an inclusive India driven by self-governing villages, the other that of Savarkar, 
whose ideology inspired Godse to kill Gandhi, and whose vision of India for Hindus has 
inspired generations. In this ideological battle, good and evil, citizen and alien, future and past 
were opened up for debate and a ‘final’ definition.  
 
The idea of exclusive citizenship is now at the core of the Hindu nationalist vision of 
India which Savarkar and his compatriots envisaged. A new citizenship (amendment) bill was 
introduced to the parliament (in 2016, and it has yet to become law) by the existing government, 
which is run by Bharatiya Janata Party, and this categorically removes any potential citizenship 
for a Muslim from neighbouring countries. The bill makes it clear that “illegal” migrants “who 
are Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and 
Pakistan” are eligible for citizenship (India, n.d.). In the light of the proposed amendment, the 
category of ‘illegal immigrant’ is reserved for a Muslim from the region. The citizenship of 
millions of people is  already in doubt due to the new draft of the National Register of Citizens 
in July, 2018, which excluded four million people in Assam.  
 
 Assam, the largest north-eastern state of India, is the site of many conflicts and 
conversations and this perhaps constitutes a defining feature of the post-colonial condition. The 
modern project of nation building and the underlying conflict it brings and exposes is very 
evident in the state of Assam. It is the site of the contestation of the meaning of history and 
belonging. This is where arguments about the definition of ‘foreign’ and ‘native’, ‘national’ 
and ‘anti-national’, ‘ethnic’ and ‘non-ethnic’ are in a perpetual struggle to define and claim 
many boundaries which they can legitimize and own. It is a fuzzy space where the broad 
distinction between majority and minority is confused. Assam is an exemplary case study 
through which to examine the making and unmaking of citizenship: people find themselves 
arbitrarily assigned to the wrong side of a binary – and it exposes the limits of the project of 
contemporary nationhood construction in India. 
 
 For decades, the history of this region has been written by protest and agitation, 
violence and riots, and debates about belonging and alienation. The region has seen many 




demanding the expulsion of ‘foreigners’ from their state. The question of ‘illegal immigration’ 
has long shaped the public debate and polity of the state. The ‘migration’ question is deeply 
entwined with the South Asian history of partition, dis-possession, movement and injustice. 
The debate about migration in the region cannot just be understood in terms of law and border, 
but it demands a broader understanding of the narratives that shape the history of community 
and nation.  
 
This thesis not a history of Assam, of which there are many, neither is this a history of 
migration, of which there are few. Rather, this is a study of those who are trapped between 
these two histories (the histories of migration and Assam). This is story of the ‘one’ who is a 
‘Muslim’ and an ‘Immigrant’. The ‘one’ who is wedged between the politics of exclusion and 
the politics of victimization. The idea of this research is to locate the everyday violence in its 
microcosm. It attempts to circumvent the clamour of an ahistorical reading that is shaped by 
the ‘Power – Knowledge’ discourse and that attempts to show history in its own distinct time 
and with its own peculiarity, as well as seeing the micro-history of local people. This work has 
been an attempt to see the changing concept of  ‘immigrant’ and to historically analyse the 
context that is produced by the media that make news intelligible to audiences.  
 
I have looked at four episodes of violence in the Bodoland region of Assam. So this 
research is an attempt to understand and explain the mechanisms of repetitive violence: how 
each episode resonates with the next and needs to be looked at through the problem of time.  
This demonstrates how our Now-Time, or Historical Time, shapes the world around us, builds 
conceptual and imaginary borders, delineates one from the other, alien from citizen, and helps 
make new and possibly escalating violence possible. People’s memories and official memories, 
official and informal narratives, interact to produce legitimations and fear. In turn they stoke 
(or conceivably, if handled in different ways, may de-escalate fear) new action.  
 
Chapter One engages with some of the writing on violence that was produced around 
the Second World War period, which showed the tyranny of a totalitarian regime but also its 
ingredients and signs. The shock of the Holocaust that produced debates around violence and 
the processes that led to it have enduring value. Despite being decades away from the period, 
the research of Benjamin and Arendt that considers the insightful conceptualizations of 
violence remains chillingly apposite in our times, and to India in particular, where the law is 




minorities in Indian media and its implication for Indian politics.  Here, I also deal with the 
methodological aspects of this research. In this thesis, I have triangulated three methods to look 
into the question of time and memory and their effect on the present. Through work in the 
historical archive, using Colonial and contemporary papers, I looked into the deep time. Later 
I looked into English and Urdu Press coverage of violence and this revealed how the categories 
of ‘Muslim’ and ‘Immigrant’ are produced by these newspapers. 
 
In Chapters Two and Three I have located the violence in history and archive. I have 
explored the context in which a different nationalism started to emerge and different ethnicities 
started to evolve their politics of difference. In Chapter Three, I have opened a small window 
into the past by offering a glimpse into the colonial archive which made the ‘immigrant’ a 
sociological and epistemological category. Through the information collected and produced 
about the immigrants, their social formation was made possible. This is in no way an exhaustive 
archival work on the term ‘immigrant’, but it provides enough insight to make the 
understanding of the definitional history of migration in the region, and the ‘original’ usage of 
the term, richer. Of course, much more could be said and explored about this archive, but it 
adds a different dimension of time and an explanation of the problem that the research was 
attempting to unravel. 
 
Chapter Four considers the coverage of violence in the English language regional 
newspaper of Assam, The Assam Tribune. I have looked into the category of ‘immigrant’ that 
is discussed in the newspaper and how it locates the immigrant community in the regional 
history. This chapter explores the way the news reports violence and the editorials interpret it. 
This has also explored the anxieties of the Assamese community and the politics of fear.  
 
In Chapter Five I have examined two Urdu newspapers, published from Kolkata, and 
their coverage of four episodes of violence in the region. Just finding the papers and 
constructing an ‘archive’ of their coverage was itself an example of creating an archive: I had 
to work to find what they no longer held or knew, but which I presumed had an effect. The 
newspapers’ reporting demonstrates how Muslim identity is essentialized and a homogenous 
time of Muslim ummah was produced. I have introduced the term ‘Bare moment’ to denote the 





The last chapter of this thesis discusses the fieldwork which was conducted in the 
villages of the Kokarjhar district of Assam. Chapter Six shows how vivid and real the memory 
of violence is, and how routine violence, and the attempt to negotiate and limit it, shapes 
people’s subjectivity. This chapter explores how people defy the historical categories and 
define themselves through their own space of experience. This also shows the relationship 
people have with time as an immigrant and reveals how violence has become a system of social 
organization and demarcation in that area. This chapter focuses on the present, lived experience 
of the categories that were produced by the earlier research. 
 
The different components used in this work have all contributed to an attempt to 
understand the anxiety of a particular place, Assam, among a particular group of people who 
share the space, but who are in conflict over resources and definitions of rights.  It is a particular 
history with specific interactions between memory, law, changing political circumstances, 
media narratives, local gossip and fears, and the instrumentalization of discrimination and the 
use of the raised sentiments of groups against each other. However, it may also raise wider, 
more general questions about how these complex interactions work and play out in real, 
everyday life. Is modern India, in this place and in this set of practices that are dangerously 
teetering on the edge of a more authoritarian future? If the routinization of misunderstanding 
(present and past) is not challenged, then the routinization of violence will never be questioned 





























Understanding endemic, communal, repetitive violence and the sudden and unexpected 
fracturing of civilised behaviour, not war but the continued threat of violence, has puzzled 
thinkers in all ages. Violence has not only been inscribed in States’ political and social 
structures and institutions, but also in everyday communication. Although the symbolic aspects 
of violence: ideology, myth, rumour, victimization and visual images are present in the modern 
age, contemporary media technologies have made violence an everyday news event. These 
new technologies have made violence ever present in individuals’ daily life; often as 
information that is embedded in sensationalised presentations. The identity-based politics of 
modern times and the emergence of ‘population’ as a quantifiable category, have opened up a 
series of violent confrontations between ethnic categories, and these have written the history 
of most of the modern world’s nations. The last century has, in fact, seen many horrific episodes 
of violence that has been based on identity; whether in post-colonial nations or in the socialist 
states of Russia and China.  
 
Charles Taylor, a Canadian philosopher, has dedicated much of his scholarship at 
understanding modern society, multiculturalism and the tension created by the formation of 
modern identities. Taylor (2011) makes a distinction between categorical violence, a violence 
directed towards a particular category of people, from every other form. He further 
distinguishes between biological and metabiological factors of violence. As he continues to 
explore the theme of categorical violence, he finds that metabiological factors play a very 
crucial role in the emergence of this type of violence. Taylor sees the notion of categorical 
violence as a “throwback” phenomenon which, according to him, is the condition in which the 
past returns into the present.  To understand the violence unfolding in modernity, through new 
institutions and the modern project of identity, I explore some key literature on the 
understanding of violence in general and, later, the cause and history of ethnic and communal 





The Violence of the law  
 
In his insightful essay, ‘On the Critique of Violence’, written in 1921, the German critic 
Walter Benjamin opened up a new front in understanding the nature of violence. Benjamin’s 
essay is at times penetrating and at times elusive; lurching from the domain of the political to 
that of the theological, as informed by ‘today’ as it is by a ‘religious past’. Benjamin, hence, 
introduces religious or Judaic conceptual semantics, making the problem of violence much 
more complicated. What lies at the heart of Benjamin’s writing, however, is the question of 
violence as it relates to the questions of law and justice; and not only law and justice, but a 
“tension between natural law and positive law - violence as natural or the product of 
history” (Benjamin, 2009, p.3).  
 
Benjamin inaugurates the argument by looking into the problem of natural law, and any 
discourse on violence remains incomplete without tackling the question of means and end. 
Natural law, for Benjamin, “seeks through the legitimacy of ends to ‘justify’ means; positive 
law seeks through justified means to ‘guarantee’ the legitimacy of ends” (2009, p.3). Such an 
analysis causes ut to look also into the historically recognized categories of sanctioned and 
non-sanctioned violence. The essay does not go more deeply into exploring these categories, 
but it definitely leaves a trace which allows us to read it through the lens of the means-end 
debate. Violence is legitimized through the claim of a legitimate end, the means to attain such 
an end must be found in a legitimate means which is, in fact, contrary to positivist law that 
concerns itself with the legitimacy or question of justification in order to obtain a particular 
means. Benjamin declares that “it has been suggested already that positive law demands that 
any violence produce proof of its historical origins, which in certain conditions will constitute 
its legitimacy, its sanction in law” (Ibid., p.4) 
 
It is at this point that Benjamin draws one’s attention to the problem of legal violence; 
the kind of violence that had taken grip of Germany, leading to fascism through establishing 
legal ends. This emergence of law, or legal violence, forces one to consider the question of 
justice separately from law, at the same time annihilating the force of this violence of law, “one 
may have to consider the surprising possibility that the interest of law in monopolising violence 




safeguarding legal ends, far more by the intention of safeguarding law itself” (Benjamin, 2009, 
p.5).   
 
The interest of law is, then, in protecting itself, which necessitates that only law has the 
power to do violence. This monopolization of violence suggests that law alone carries the duty 
of violence, stripping everyone else of such power, or making them so weak that the use of 
violence becomes impossible for anyone but the law. This method, in legitimate systems, 
constitutes the protection of the individual citizen from arbitrary violence, but if states are taken 
over and legitimate law is subverted, then the state becomes the enemy of the very individual 
citizen it is meant to protect. In his reading of the class struggle in Europe, and particularly in 
Germany, Benjamin makes a link between the right to strike, including workers’ use violence 
in order to attain certain ends and the law resorting to violence in order to counter such a strike. 
This, in turn, potentially establishes the modification of the legal relations by which a class 
struggle, or any possibility of violence by the working class, is destroyed by law. Even in a 
very general sense, a strike can be termed illegal, making the use of force against strikers 
legitimate.  
 
Benjamin then explores the similarity between martial and strike law, presenting the 
argument that “the legal subjects sanction instances of violence whose ends, for those doing 
the sanctioning, remain natural ends and as such may, in an emergency, clash with their own 
legal or natural ends” (Ibid., p.8). By removing all kinds of violence from anyone but the State 
or, more specifically, all possibilities for violence, modern law establishes itself. Benjamin 
underscores this by calling it ‘laying down the law’, by which he indicates that within violence 
there always lies a potential or character to establish law. He then draws attention to two 
functions of violence which, in Benjamin’s thinking, appear as a theoretical foundation or zone 
of operation. The first function of violence, in his work, is ‘law establishing’ and the second is 
‘law upholding’(Benjamin, 2009).  
 
Derrida, in his deconstructive reading of Benjamin’s critique of violence, maintains that 
when we speak of Gewalt, it is not natural physical violence about which we speak, rather, in 
Derrida’s meditation, a calamity or natural disaster does not qualify as Gewalt, but instead what 
comes to determine justice and law can only be seen in another sense, one which “gives rise to 





Hence, for Derrida, the “concept of violence belongs to the symbolic order of law, 
politics and morals - of all forms of authority and of authorization, of claim to authority, 
at least. And it is only to this extent that it can give rise to a critique. Up to this point 
this critique was always inscribed in the space of the distinction between means and 
end” (Derrida, 2002, p.265).  
 
Benjamin notices the twofold function of violence in establishing law, in the context of 
which he claims that:  
 
… while this operation seeks to achieve what is established as law as its end, using 
violence as its means, in the moment of establishing what it is aiming at as law it does 
not repudiate violence but only now, strictly speaking, turns it (directly, this time) into 
a law-establishing agency (Benjamin,2009, p.22). 
 
which, for Benjamin, results in the establishment of law that is neither independent nor free of 
violence but for which violence is necessary. Law, in other words, “intimately bound with 
violence, calling it power”. Benjamin does not reflect, then, on what power is, or why it is 
calling itself power.  
 
Benjamin makes it clear that, “Establishing law equates to establishing power, and to 
that extent it is an act of the direct manifestation of violence” (Benjamin,2009, p.22). Hence 
“Justice is the principle of all divine end-establishment, power the principle of all mythic law-
establishment” (Ibid., p.22). Here, Benjamin enters into the field of theology or Judaic law, at 
the same time invoking the question of the ethics of law. The introduction of the mythic and 
the divine is derived from the reading of religious and mythological texts, however, Benjamin 
distinguishes between the mythic and the divine and proposes that mythic violence establishes 
law, whilst divine violence destroys law. Mythic law is myopic, it is very lowly or earthly, in 
the sense that the job of the Messiah, or any messianic intervention, is to liberate people from 
the tyranny of law, a law which assumes power for itself through commanding violence.  
 
Now, the law, through which violence operates, makes itself a force which embroils 
those whose blood it is seeking or, in a manner of speaking, claims those lives which have been 
left to be decided by this mythic violence, by this force of law. Only this force of law, by 
maintaining an un-decidability, decides the very subject of law. A bare life is, then, imagined 
through a mythic violence that is left bare by the law. In the case of an ‘illegal immigrant’, who 
is termed an ‘infiltrator’ or (given) other names, it carries and then encounters this very 




law, in the face of violence, very paradoxical or contradictory in its existence or emergence 
“all law-upholding violence itself eventually weakens the law-establishing aspect represented 
in it by suppressing all inimical counter-violences.” (Benjamin, 2009, p.27)  
 
What kind of belief is vested in that authority, which is neither ontological nor rational, 
(it is rational if created rationally)? One which only demands pure belief or trust or, in fact, a 
belief which can offer obedience. If this authority, which can enforce law, is mythic through 
its very presence, what will emerge, what is suspended, is it divine authority or one which is 
too obscure and hence divine? This is what emerges from a western tradition of law and 
rationality. If we relocate to the East, for example, we may find that law is then only moral 
law, and authority too is only moral, but this reading of history is a history of singularity. The 
Divine is, in the East, is encapsulated in moral laws, and a moral authority cannot enforce a 
law, thus the authority disintegrates.  
At this point, when mythic violence is clearly separated from the ‘divine’ kind, 
Benjamin descends into a religious or elusive plane, which then urges him to expect that only 
the intervention of divine violence will save people, perhaps by destabilizing authority or 
shaking its very foundations. The general strike, revolution, or an unseen intervention, the 
teleological presence of a messiah, might then be calling for divine violence, hence a “pure 
divine violence is free once again to adopt any of the everlasting forms that myth has 
bastardised with law” (Benjamin 2009, p.28).  
 
It is important to note that Walter Benjamin wrote at a time of crisis, although it may 
be argued that there is no time without crisis, but Benjamin wrote this critique when Germany 
had lost the First World War and the class struggle, or the workers’ movement, was becoming 
intense and the country was on the verge of another war. The authority , was enforcing itself 
through law and what was emerging was the violence of power producing industrial killing 
that was unmatched in the history of mankind to that time.  
 
The critique of law should not be taken for lawlessness, but a critique of law should be 
located in a context where laws are not just and the enforcement of law is arbitrary. Benjamin 
is not proposing a lawless state, rather, he is critiquing the law which is bordering on 
lawlessness. The importance of this critique has not faded over time, as may be witnessed in 




weaponized by the state to marginalize people. In one of the most globally known incidents of 
violence recorded in India,   widely covered by the media and publicized, the anti- Muslim 
riots of Gujarat (often referred to  as the Gujarat pogrom), the Supreme Court of India expressed 
its lack of confidence in the legal system of the state of Gujarat and asked that cases relating to 
the riot be transferred out of the state. Justice V. N. Khare, of the Supreme Court of India, was 
quoted as saying: ‘I have no faith left in the prosecution and the Gujarat government.’ Evidence 
showed a clear case of the subversion of the justice system, as the state government 
manipulated the machinery of law to suit its own ends. Banaji writes: “The spinelessness of 
the judiciary and its overt or covert sympathies with the extreme Right was a major part of the 
story of success of German fascism. We (Indians) have not reached that state of judicial 
disintegration yet” (Banaji, 2013, p.227). The presence of laws relating to illegal immigration 
and their implementation, in Assam, show the arbitrariness of the law and its weaponization, 
which has lead to violence. 
 
Distinguishing Power from Violence: Arendt ‘On Violence’  
 
In her work on violence, Hannah Arendt  explicates the theory of violence, to separate 
violence from power, not just from power but also from force, strength and authority. In doing 
so, she critically looks into the ideas presented by Fanon (1963) and Sartre which, in a sense, 
justify violent means for a just end. Sartre rationalizes the same in introducing the theory 
expounded in Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth (Fanon, 1963). Arendt raises the 
question of violence in the realm of the political, and she tries to propose a new conceptual 
definition of power and violence, maintaining its difference or opposition. Reading through 
Bertrand De Jouvenel’s book On Power, Arendt concludes that power, “is an instrument of 
rule, while rule, we are told, owes its existence to "the instinct of domination” (Arendt, 2014, 
p.36). 
 
Arendt founds her argument on the very distinction between power and violence. 
Alexander Passerine d’Entreves, in her opinion, is the only author aware of this distinction, as 
evidenced, she suggests, in The Notion of the State, in which she claims,  "We have to decide 
whether and in what sense 'power' can be distinguished from 'force', to ascertain how the fact 
of using force according to law changes the quality of force itself and presents us with an 




however, that not even Passerine d’Entreves reaches the heart of the matter and tends to define 
violence, “as the most flagrant manifestation of power” and, in her view,  “as a kind of 
mitigated violence”, leading her to believe, to her disappointment, that he reaches almost the 
same conclusion  as everybody from right to left who agrees on the basic crux of the nature of 
power. I will return in the end to Foucault, who also moves away from the traditional 
understanding of power, but whose conclusion is not that of Arendt..  
 
In modern day democracy, control manifests itself through bureaucracy; it is the “rule 
by nobody”. It is what Arendt calls an intricate system of ruling, in which nobody is responsible 
for ruling and, in that sense, the “rule by nobody” is the most tyrannical of all. The Eichmann 
Trial, further, re-constructed the problem of the ‘banality of evil’, in which the crime is 
committed by nobody, or nobody is responsible for the most heinous of crimes.  
 
In an attempt to fix the definition of basic terms to furnish ‘authentic diversity,’ Arendt 
defines power as the “human ability not just to act but to act in concert” which is not the 
property of the individual but, rather, belongs to a group and remains intact so long as the group 
stands together, unlike the case of strength, which is singular and a mere individual entity. "It 
is in the nature of a group and its power to turn against independence, the property of individual 
strength.” (Arendt, 2014, p.44) And force, "which we often use in daily speech as a synonym 
for violence, especially if violence serves as a means of coercion, should be reserved, in 
terminological language, for the "forces of nature" or the "force of circumstances" (la force des 
choses), that is, to indicate the energy released by physical or social movements (Arendt, 2014, 
p.45).  
 
Ricoeur (2010) argues that Arendt seems to be associating the idea of domination with 
authority more than power.  He notes that, “the qualifiers of recognition and respect, to the 
exclusion of constraint and persuasion, shift authority to the side of power” (Ricoeur, 2010, 
p.30) which not only opens up a paradoxical tension for a concept of power, but also the correct 
place for authority. If, in a very political sense, contempt threatens authority, then does it 
logically mean that it makes the increase in the enforcing capacity of authority weaken power? 
Reading through the theoretical discussions on power, Ricoeur notes that, “the concept of 
authority is badly founded from the start, since it transcends the terrestrial sphere of power” 
(Ricoeur, 2010, p.30). If this proposition is considered then, in a modern power, where 




case of the police, which Benjamin was trying to highlight, since a police force is less a 
representation of power and more an authority, an authority which is protected by law and has 
the right to exercise violence. The other problem worth noting is when power, in its territorial 
sense, cannot exert authority and authority emerges from outside power. The case of violence 
becomes more complicated when modern power and its agencies are present, but communities 
are primordial and share those ties, authority is present outside the realm of the established 
political sphere.  A further complication is created when the modern press starts representing, 
in modern language, this primordial tension, further opening up a space for violence.  
 
Arendt highlights an important point in that the disintegration of power does  make 
revolution possible or successful naturally. It may, in fact, lead to something more gruesome. 
It is not possible to run a government only through violence, as “no government exclusively 
based on the means of violence has ever existed. Even the totalitarian ruler, whose chief 
instrument of rule is torture, needs a power basis - the secret police and its net of 
informers” (Arendt, 2014, p.50). It is also important to note that what Arendt is doing is not 
denying all possibility of violence, or of absolute non-violence, as non- violence is not the 
exact or only opposite to violence, rather, she is trying to prioritize power over violence by 
making the two different, if not exactly opposite. She postulates that even many despotic 
regimes rely on the superior organization of power and not on superior means of coercion. For 
Arendt, even in very conceptual language, “Power is indeed of the essence of all government, 
but violence is not. Violence is by nature instrumental; like all means, it always stands in need 
of guidance and justification through the end it pursues” (ibid., p.51). This is fundamental to 
Arendt’s thought this distinction between power and violence; violence is a mere means, but it 
cannot stand on its own, nor can it sustain itself forever. Power can only sustain itself on 
legitimacy, which it derives through ruling, and in the absence of which it is not possible to 
rule. Here, Arendt introduces one more philosophical or conceptual distinction between 
legitimacy and justification, and how violence and power diverge based on legitimacy and 
justification. She asserts that, "Legitimacy, when challenged, bases itself on an appeal to the 
past, while justification relates to an end that lies in the future. Violence can be justifiable, but 
it never will be legitimate” (Ibid., p.52). It is, at this point, that all violent forces to enact power 
need legitimacy and if these forces fail to achieve this legitimacy they will “always destroy 
power; out of the barrel of a gun grows the most effective command, resulting in the most 
instant and perfect obedience. What never can grow out of it is power” (Ibid., p,53). So, an 




commanded without even involving his opinion or will, but power cannot find itself in such 
circumstance; it may, even, end itself at this point. Power resorts to violence when opinion in 
its favour starts to dwindle; a shrinking power always gives rise to violence. 
 
In conclusion, and strong assertion of difference, “Power and violence are opposites; 
where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy 
but left to its own course it ends in power's disappearance” (Ibid., p.56). Arendt, however, 
seems to assume that the State’s exercise of power is always legitimate, and:  
 
… the all-powerful author of violence and indeed holds the monopoly on it. So, while 
Arendt rightly puts massacre and decolonization together, she fundamentally mistakes 
it is as a historical choice and that too for one actor alone, namely, the weakened 
imperial state. As such, the choice of killing and violence is seen to be the prerogative 
of the state either for action or for restraint. (Kapila, 2013, p.178) 
 
Communal Violence in Modern India  
 
Communal violence, or communalism, has become such a significant aspect of modern 
India that we cannot write a history of the Indian sub-continent without reflecting upon it, nor 
can we understand the state of affairs within India without studying it, as  Paul Brass asserts, 
“Hindu-Muslim communal riots have been an integral part of the political process in modern 
India since the 1920s” (Brass, 2003, p.366). The history of colonial India and its post-colonial 
politics is riddled, not just with the communal conflict between Hindus and Muslims, but also 
with other forms of conflict, however, the conflicts between the two major religious 
communities “have a special status” in the Indian subcontinent because “of the degree to which 
they go to the root of the identities of the two largest categories of the population” (Brass, 2003, 
p.356). The identities, of these religious groups are shaped on such communal conflicts and 
inform the politics of each group.   
 
 Historians have argued that the period of the late 1930s until the end of the Second 
World War in 1945, saw a period, in colonial India, of the rapid growth of communalism in 
the country. Bipin Chandra (1990) notes that this period saw the rise of communalism, not just, 
among Muslims and Hindus, but also among the Sikhs and Muslims He also argues that the 
partition of India did not end the communalism in the Punjab, rather, Hindu and Sikh 




out that this period, which saw the rapid growth of communalism, results from a number of 
factors, which include the “fragile and quickly collapsing imperial power”, and also economic 
depression combined with the “collapse of agriculture and the expansion  of Indian industry”, 
which forced people to migrate to cities. Wilson notes that “Calcutta grew from 1.2 to 2.1 
million between  the census of 1931 to 1941 and Ahmedabad from 270,000  to 590,000” 
(Wilson, 2016, p.434). Along with other factors, the victory of the Congress Party in the 
“entirely Indian-run provincial ministries”, in January and February, 1937, did not improve the 
situation among different communities, as the “all inclusive” Congress became a greater threat 
to Muslim identity. Wilson quotes a critic of the Congress Party’s attempt to include (or 
assimilate) “rivals and annihilate the different religion and identity of Muslims”, as claiming 
that the Congress aim is “that the Muslims should walk into the parlour of Hinduism and be 
swallowed up” (Wilson, 2016, p.445).  
 
  Communal riots which  spread throughout most of northern, western and eastern India, 
scripted the fate of partition of India. Chandra (1990) argues that one needs to maintain a 
difference between communalism (an ideology) and communal riots (a form of violence) and 
that communal ideology can grow for a long period before taking the form of violence. One 
might argue that communalism, as an ideology and a political weapon, grew in the colonial 
period and continued to have an impact upon identity formation, social relations and polity in 
post-partition India, but that incidents of communal violence were just not recorded in the 
colonial period. Omar Khalidi notes that the first reported incident of Hindu-Muslim communal 
rioting took place in 1714 in Ahmedabad, and this was followed by similar incidents of 
violence in Kashmir in 1719, in Delhi in 1729, in Bombay Province in 1786 and in different 
parts of Uttar Pradesh in the first half of the nineteenth century (Khalidi, 1995). In what he 
calls the ‘Pre-history of Communalism’, the historian Christopher Bayly presents the cases of 
religious conflict between 1700 and 1860 and he underlines the distinction between ‘religious 
conflict’, which constitutes “disputes over  symbols, rites and precedents”, and ‘communal 
conflict’ in which “ the broader aspects of a group’s social, economic and political life were 
perceived as being unified and marked off from others by religious affiliation.” (Bayly, 1985, 
p.179) Bayly highlights that the importance of pre-conditions which can lead to such forms of 
violence as being that “religious differences were more likely to become communal conflicts 
when they coincided with shifts in political and economic power” (Bayly, 1985, p.203).  
Maintaining the distinction between ‘precondition’ and ‘causes’, Bayly argues that the severe 




nineteenth century India, or the depression of the 1930s in Colonial India, might have exposed 
the social fractures which could trigger the violent events. 
 
Bayly’s historical case studies of religious conflicts in pre-colonial India may be read 
as being in contrast to the work of historians or social scientists, who see the emergence of 
communalism as a modern phenomenon rather than as a mere ‘pre condition’ which leads to 
such an event. For Ashish Nandy (1990) , communalism emerges from modernity. In 
questioning the importation of the idea of secularism to India, he maintains that “secularism 
has little to say about cultures; it is definitionally ethnophobic and frequently ethnocidal” 
(Nandy, 1990, p.71). Problematizing the idea of secularism and its politics in India, Nandy 
emphasizes the relationship between modernity and communalism. Gyanendra Pandey, in his 
extensive work on the construction of communalism in colonial India, also asserts that 
“communalism in India is another characteristic and paradoxical product of the age of reason 
(and of capital) which also gave us colonialism and nationalism” (Pandey, 1990, p.5). Richard 
Fox, critiquing this position, argues that communalism is not a pathology of modernity, but is 
rather a local instance, in the case of India, of the “hyperenchantment of religion”, just as 
“racism is the hyperenchantment of biology” and by ‘hyperenchantment’ he means the 
disenchantment with the pre-modern world which gives rise to new identities. He asserts that 
these emergent enchanted identities, with new means of communication and transportation, 
became much more powerful, “much more extensive (or “massive”) and therefore potentially 
much more destructive and violent” (Fox, 2005, p.239)  
 
Nandy, however, looks for tolerance outside  modernity in tradition and invokes Gandhi 
by arguing that he is “an arch anti-secularist” who is not just looking for tolerance of religions 
“but also a tolerance that is religious” (Nandy, 1990, p.91). It is important to note that Gandhi 
saw truth as something which should constantly be realsised and endlessly pursued, for which 
reason the taking of certain action is absolutely imperative. Gandhi’s political struggle, hence, 
in his own terms, is a satyagarah and those who follow him in this struggle are non-violent 
activists called satyagarahis - seekers of truth.  Gandhi’s concept of non-violence, which, was 
central to his mobilisation of the masses against British rule in India, was essentially situated 
in religious temperament, however, as Akeel Bilgrami notes, this concept was also located in 
a “thoroughgoing critique of ideas and ideologies of the Enlightenment and of an intellectual 
paradigm of perhaps a century earlier than the Enlightenment.” (Bilgrami, 2015, p.103) 




revolutionary action. There was a realisation that “violent revolutionary action could not 
possibly carry the mass of people with it” and, in Gandhi “there was not a trace of this vanguard 
mentality of Lenin.” (Bilgrami, 2015, p.104) 
 
For Ghandi, the question of non-violence was not just limited to the anti-colonial 
struggle but extended to the co-existence of two major communities in his nation -Hindus and 
Muslims – this was a challenge to his political action and philosophy. Since the history of 
modern India was transformed by violence and created deep division between the two 
communities as a result, Kapila (2013) argues that, often, this dichotomy between 
Hindu/Muslim is understood as being a self/other distinction, owing to liberal, colonial and 
Hindutva tradition. For Gandhi, the relationship between Hindu and Muslim was not founded 
on otherness but was, rather, a fraternal relationship. According to him, it was not otherness 
but sameness which made them one, and “Significantly and precisely, the fact that Hindus and 
Muslims were not merely relational, but were essentially the same, posed the most potent 
conceptual and political problem regarding violence and sacrifice. Gandhi transformed this 
fraternal relationship into one of “neighbourliness”, in which Hindus and Muslims could 
coexist with their differences held intact” (Kapila, 2013, p.180). Tilak, who was widely 
accepted as being the mass leader of the Self-Rule movement (Lokmanaya), before Gandhi 
entered onto the scene, also denies this otherness. Tilak, too, posited that the relationship 
between Hindus and Muslims was a fraternal one but, unlike Gandhi, did not equate this 
relationship as one of neighbourliness, and went further to describe it as one of the presence of 
a brother in the same house. As Kapila notes, “Tilak, on the other hand, focused on the fraternal 
itself and therefore the nature of the political for him was premised in terms of brothers within 
a house. Thus, the spectre of fratricide that the Gita addressed was central, since it overtly 
posed the problem of the conversion of kinsmen into enemies.” (Kapila, 2013, p.180) 
 
For Nandy, the source of Gandhi’s tolerance was traditional Hinduism whilst, in the 
case of his killer, a Hindu nationalist, the murder was committed in the name of secular 
statcraft. In whatever manner one diagnoses the reasons for the emergence of communal 
violence in Modern India, the impact of such violence on India remains extremely significant. 
The partition of India in 1947 not only divided the country into two along religious lines, but 
also had a bearing on the “formulation of the polity’s posturing on individual rights, citizenship 
concerns and, most evidently, on the contentious issue of group rights for cultural minorities” 




crush, “not only secessional movements but also any demands for concrete institutional 
recognition of ethnic-religious identities” (Maiello, 1996, p.101). The Hindu-Muslim conflict 
not only influenced the individual groups’ civil and citizenship rights but also provided a 
template from which to understand other forms of conflict in the region.   
 
Media, Communal violence and minority status in India  
 
 The debate around communal violence and modernity is not only about emerging 
identities and contestations between different groups and amongst themselves, but also about 
how the emergence of the press helped communities to come closer. Benedict Andersen’s 
frequently cited and extensively discussed text on the emergence of Nationalism, Imagined 
Communities, demonstrates the importance of the press in forging a national identity. The case 
of modern India may not be differentiated from this phenomenon of modernity. As different 
groups within India started to assert themselves politically, the press helped them in their 
respective identity formation. The historian, Gyanendra Pandey, notes that: 
 
From the last decades of the nineteenth century, improved communications, the growth 
of the vernacular press and, not least, the colonial government’s drive to record 
‘custom’ quickened the pace of these attempts to recapture history, as more and more 
local groups sought to establish their identity and status by obtaining a public 
recognition of their genealogies, their ‘traditions’ and their rights in given territories . 
(Pandey, 1990, p.113).  
 
 Contemporary scholarship regarding the partition of India, and its pre-conditions, also 
demonstrate the extent to which the press played a key role in constituting and mobilizing a 
certain identity. It is through the communicative process that one group asserts its claim over 
a certain history or territory. Each group tries to create its own meaning, and to create one that 
is conscious of its group identity through interpreting events of violence. As Paul Brass, 
highlights: 
 
In modern times, local acts of violence have also been commonly placed in political 
contexts depending upon the ethnic identities of the persons involved in them. Indeed, 
inter-ethnic relations have become such a pervasive concern in contemporary societies 
that the interpretation of virtually any act of violence between persons identified as 
belonging to different ethnic groups itself becomes a political act. But the interpretive 
process is not only political, it also generates competing systems of knowledge 




groups, the causes of discrimination and prejudice, their social and economic bases, 
and the like. (Brass, 1996, p.1)  
 
Historians and social scientists of colonial and post-colonial India have shown how the 
press represented different ethno-religious groups in their journalistic output, and also played 
a key role in framing the narratives of the various conflicts taking place between these groups. 
The news produced as a result of such conflict was routinely exploited by Indian political 
parties to further their own aims during colonial times. News of communal violence in that 
period of the 1940s was reported in such a way that “people only heard about atrocities carried 
out against their own community” (Chattha, 2013, p.612). The violence in the United Provinces 
and Bihar was kindled by deliberate false reporting; Francis Tuker writes, in While Memory 
Serves, that: 
 
Terrible and deliberately false stories were blown all over the world by a hysterical 
Hindu Press, and these stories did infinite harm in India by kindling in Bihar and the 
United Provinces the Hindu desire for revenge. This, in turn, after the Bihar and United 
Provinces outbreak, kindled the indignant and violent emotion which flung the Muslims 
of the Punjab into their civil war of reprisal. (Tuker, 1950, p.142) 
 
All of the parties involved in politics were actively using the press to get their message 
out and to maintain unity within their own constituencies.  The press, in singularly supporting 
one community over the other to achieving political ends was charged with partisan reporting, 
and during partition “Each Indian newspaper presented Partition violence almost exclusively 
from the perspective of its co-religionists, holding the ‘other side’ more responsible for the 
disturbances in 1947” (Chattha, 2013, p.612). Regardless of actual incidents or facts, 
newspapers continually presented their own, biased position (in support of their chosen 
political group) and engaged in contradicting charges brought forward by newspapers 
supporting the rival political groups. In providing examples from amongst pro-Muslim 
newspapers like Ihsan, Chattha writes:  
 
the Urdu-language daily Ihsan ran a series of articles blaming the disturbances on the 
Sikhs who, it said, had been preparing for communal warfare for months. These were 
dismissed as ‘baseless pieces’ by the Punjabi authorities. In its issue of 18 March, the 
paper published casualty statistics which alleged that more Muslims had been killed 
than non-Muslims. (Chattha, 2013, p. 614) 
 
Chattha’s work demonstrates, or rather confirms, what had been chronicled by Tuker 




Punjab (2006): that partisan reporting in this period was commonplace. This kind of reporting 
was not merely an attempt to characterize the other community in a bad light, but also to assure 
the minimization of retaliatory action (Chattha, 2013). As mentioned earlier, communalism did 
not, in fact, end with partition, rather, it became further institutionalized and the role of the 
press in reporting communal violence in post-colonial India, cannot be emphasized enough.  
 
  Before conducting an overview of violence reportage and minority representation in 
India, post partition, it is important to introduce a crucial element without which we cannot 
understand the politics of the Indian media. Hindu Nationalism, according to the 
Anthropologist Thomas Blom Hansen, who states that the “agendas, discourses, and 
institutions have gradually penetrated everyday life” and one of the most remarkable feature 
“is the relative ease with which it has fitted into most of the authorized discourses on India and 
more generally on politics and culture in the postcolonial world” (Hansen, 1999, p.5). For 
Christophe Jaffrelot the 
 
Hindu nationalism, like Muslim separatism (a movement which in India was formed 
around the same time), rejected both versions of the universalist view of nationalism 
articulated by Congress. This ideology assumed that India’s national identity was 
summarized by Hinduism, the dominant creed …  Indian culture was to be defined as 
Hindu culture, and the minorities were to be assimilated by their paying allegiance to 
the symbols and mainstays of the majority as those of the nation. (Jaffrelot, 2007, p.5) 
 
For Jaffrelot, Hindu nationalism fulfills the criteria of the definition of ‘ethnic 
nationalism’ (Jaffrelot, 2007), however, John Zavos (2000), in his work on Hindu nationalism, 
considers Jaffrelot’s position problematic. For Zavos, Jaffrelot draws his definition of ethnic 
nationalism from the conception of ideology that was theorized by Clifford Geertz, which is “a 
restricted notion of ideology”, since Geertz’s notion of ideology does not clearly explore its 
relationship with class or colonialism. Without dwelling too much on the conceptual 
categorization of this phenomenon, we may safely point out that the penetration of the ideas of 
Hindu nationalism1 in every day national discourse, and the influence of its politics, cannot be 
emphasized enough. There are two key areas of ideology in Hindu Nationalism which, in the 
contemporary sense, are at the core of the Hindu Nationalist agenda and politics – firstly, the 
 
1 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which was founded in 1925, is the main exponent of the idea of Hindu 





cultural dominance of Hinduism over other groups, and, secondly, redefining the concept of 
citizenship based on religious affiliation.  
 
Paul Brass’s work on Hindu-Muslim violence talks about an ‘institutionalized riot 
system network’ and he demonstrates the role of “news” and reporting in deliberately 
provoking violence. This relationship between the press and  the network is exhibited, for 
example, in the form of the spreading of false information or presenting news out of context 
by not providing reliable, adequate background information, thus resulting in the press 
becoming complicit “in the enactment phase of riot production by the attention it gives to the 
statements of the riot’s producers” (Brass, 2003, p.346).  The bias in reporting, in Brass’s work, 
expounds upon two concerns: how it Started and who started it. He shows, using the riots in 
Aligarh as an example, how these two biases emerged in press coverage coupled with the often 
baseless rumors that were propelled by the media, which prolonged the violence. Brass’s work 
seeks to demonstrate the common prejudice about Muslims that prevails in the press, and how 
the press have made them responsible for starting riots. The role of the vernacular press has 
been much more negative, and their reporting less objective in regard to violence, if compared 
to the English Press, as shown in Brass’s work, and this is consistent with what has been shown 
in other research on various occasions of communal violence.  
 
It is important to mention at this juncture two major events of violence that took place 
in India, events which influenced the course of Indian politics and that have generated plenty 
of scholarship due to their impact and significance.  These events are: the nation-wide eruption 
of violence following the demolition of Babri Masjid in 1992 by Hindu Nationalists, and the 
Gujarat Riot of 2002, which many believed to have been a pogrom, in response to which the 
state government showed complacency in ending the violence (Vardarajan: 2002, Ghassem-
Fachandi: 2012 ). These two violent events boosted the agenda of the Hindu Nationalists in 
India, and this had a wide-ranging effect. This also shows the way politics is enacted through 
media and how a context for certain politics is created through the communicative process, as 
evidenced in the intensive work of Arvind Rajagopal’s Politics After Television (2004), in 
which he notes: 
 
Hindu symbolism had not been absent from public life by any means, but its presence 
now took on a different, and to many a sinister meaning, signifying a claim to rule 





Hindu Nationalism used the symbol of Hinduism to give itself new meaning and this captured 
the imagination in the case, for example, of the Ram Janambhoomi Movement, which 
culminated in the demolition of  the Babri Masjid in 1992. The movement utilized the image 
of the chariot of Ram as an icon with which to create and bestow historical meaning upon its 
endeavor. This movement, however, was not merely satisfied with promoting a positive Hindu 
narrative, but also aimed, through its iconography and mobilization, to “frame[ing] Muslim 
identity around a history of medieval conquest and iconoclasm embodied in the persons of 
Mughal rulers, rather than the social state of contemporary Muslims, rendering the Indian 
Muslim community much more of a threat.” (Davis, 2005, p.49)  
 
 The rise of media output in India in the 1980s and 1990s led to a vast increase in 
programming, unfolding a certain vision of the nation in the mainstream media in which the 
“middle class family forms the core of a community and a nation-space of plenty, and 
consumption provides the primary mode of enfranchisement.” and “a Hindu Indianness, often 
defined against Muslims, provides the cultural coding of the nation and its dominant identify”  
(Chakravarty & Gooptu, 2013, p.104). This attempt to define a nation by excluding what was 
seen as being ‘other’ to the nation, has influenced the news reporting on violence, especially 
in the vernacular press, to this day. The role played by the Hindi press in inflaming the violence 
during the 1990s has often been the subject of scholarly discussion (Farmer, 2005; Charu & 
Sharma, 1991; Brass, 2003). In their work on the reporting of violence after the demolition of 
the Babri Masjid, Gupta and Sharma, conclude that the stereotyping and manufacturing of 
consent in the light of the Hindu right wing has reached a new stage, in which Muslims are not 
just responsible for the riots and violence, but violence against them has become legitimate, as 
“ a certain degree of consent has been built for the Hindu recourse to violence and riots: 
teaching Muslims a lesson has acquired a certain legitimacy among a substantial section of the 
Hindu intelligentsia” (Gupta & Sharma, 1996, p. 10). 
 
 Whilst the press reporting on the events of violence, sparked by the Ram Janambhoomi 
movement, have largely been problematic and have played a negative role through producing 
animosity, the coverage and reporting of violence in Gujarat in 2002 (which was the first 
instance of a riot that was covered in real time by television channels) has demonstrably been 
“a sea change in the attitude of the press” (Narayana & Kapur, 2011). Some of the national 
English press in India took a strong stand against communal forces and a difference was noted 




and communal riots (Narayana & Kapur, 2011). The vernacular Gujarati Press’s role, however, 
was one of inflaming violence, and this was aptly observed by Manoj Mitta in his work on 
Modi & Godhra ,which aims to show how Gujarati newspapers, including Sandesh and Gujarat 
Samachar, intensified the situation by publishing sensational headlines and baseless news, thus 
acting as “one of the key contributory factors” in inflaming passions during the post-Godhra 
riots in Gujarat (Mitta, 2014, p.238).  
 
Other scholarly work further confirms that the framing of Muslims in the Indian media, 
in general, is problematic, and the public discourse relating to Muslims as a group, quite 
exclusionary (Muralidharan, 2012), as is the representation of true narratives of other minority 
and marginalized groups in India. There lies the further issue of the representation of minority 
voices within mainstream Indian media, which is, for the most part, non-existent. This kind of 
under-representation has especially been observed with regards to the Dalit community2, which 
constitutes almost a fifth of the nation’s population but is barely visible in terms of employment 
in the Press. Robin Jeffrey’s work on Dalits and the Indian newspapers reflects upon this under-
representation and aims to understand the causes for the community’s absence from the 
newsroom, which he compares with the rapid development of black newspapers and 
journalism, and he concludes that the contrast is striking (Jeffrey, 2001). The exclusion of 
Dalits from the majority of Indian newspapers and television broadcasting is indicative of the 
community’s marginalization and speaks of their deprivation and the prejudice they face at the 
hands of Upper caste Hindus (Jeffrey, 2001). In the words of a Dalit journalist, the “Indian 
media wants Dalit news, but not Dalit reporters” (Mondal, 2017). In a 2019 report, released by 
Oxfam India, on the representation of marginalized caste groups in the Indian newsroom, it 
was found that of 121 newsroom leadership positions, 106 were occupied by journalists from 
upper castes. Similarly, three of four anchors in flagship debates were found to be of the upper 
casts and not Dalit or Adivasi (Oxfam, 2019). Jeffrey argued that the inclusion of Dalit 
employees within television and major print ventures would not be a possibility until they 
became “a valuable category of potential customers in the eyes of advertisers” (Jeffrey, 2001, 
p.237). The Oxfam report suggests that although problematic coverage and the under-
representation of marginalized groups mostly affects Muslims and Dalits, it also extends to 
various other minorities, including those tribal groups that are scattered across India.  The 
 




North-Eastern part of India, similarly, remain largely neglected in the news media unless 
something explosive needs reporting (Arya & Sharma, 2008; Dutta, 2012) 
 
Routine Violence and Media Events  
 
Susan Sontag (2003) writes that “being a spectator of calamities” taking place at a 
distance from us is a “quintessential modern experience.” Everyday news of suffering and 
violence is fed to people in their living rooms. Bad news constitutes the everyday of news, but 
news also shapes our understanding of violence. The reporting or misreporting, naming and 
un-naming of violence, affects our perception, not only of our surroundings, but of 
others/neighbours. Violence routinely appears on the television screens and printed pages of 
broadsheets, serving amongst others the function of rationalization.  
 
The questions under the theme of the rationalization of violence must begin with what 
domesticates violence today. It is the media which now perform this function:  it is the modern 
function of the media to archive events of violence (apart from other events) and to rationalize 
them and give them meaning. By ‘headlining’ the reason for violence, the news creates a moral 
world for the receiver in which the ‘immoral’ is identified as a source of violence.   
 
Jean Seaton, in exploring the theme of carnage in the media, by looking at the history 
of suffering, particularly in Europe, asks the question, “How do you communicate pain? Why 
are we willing and eager to observe suffering at certain times, while at others we are more 
resistant to it?” (Seaton, 2005, p.103). She adds that “attitudes towards pain mutate - and must 
surely determine the audience’s experience of it. Whilst news covers many other aspects of 
life, nevertheless it trades in pain the whole time - one of the defining features of news has 
come to be that somebody, somewhere, is suffering” (Seaton, 2005, p.103).  
 
Now, if we presume that the elementary function of the media was to produce news, 
disseminate news, or to inform, its ultimate function, or ideal function, is to rationalize 
everyday life, the everyday world. As suggested above, "news is not just about external events, 
it is about placing ourselves in the world - understanding ourselves in the context of the fate of 
the other” (Seaton, 2005, p.xvii). By informing us of the everyday, by archiving the now, the 




everyday violence is archived.  
 
It is not that certain deaths are mourned and others are not, based only on the discourse 
of preference, rather, there is a quality to everyday rationalization which makes it possible to 
pay attention to the news of certain violence and not to consider another episode. The meaning 
of a place or a person is discursively formed by this every day production of news language 
and media.   
 
The media scholar, Neil Postman, in critically looking at the impact of television, 
particularly in American society, makes an effort to analyse the agenda of social change that is 
embedded in technology. He dismisses the argument of the neutrality of technology as plain 
stupidity. Postman then argues, 
 
…that technological changes in our modes of communication are even more ideology-
laden than changes in our modes of transportation. Introduce the alphabet to a culture 
and you change its cognitive habits, its social relations, its notions of community, 
history and religion, introduce the printing press with movable type, and you do the 
same (Postman, 1987, p.162).  
 
Postman, combining pun and critical insight in his further argument, sees the belief in the 
‘inevitability of progress’ as being central to the problem but, here, if we simplify this 
ideological aspect of communication, we can argue for two things: a) the impact of 
communication technology is very different from other technological development, as it creates 
communicative space, which then impacts upon  the way subjects and objects are rationalized, 
and; b) communicative technology affects the social relationship and cognitive and perspective 
fields of any societal members. Here, I would argue that this is not merely a  problem of the 
‘ideological’ but, rather, it encompasses the reign of the rationale. From myth to news media 
(produced by sophisticated communication technology), the rationalization process continues, 
what changes is the speed, communicative space and transitions from the metaphysical to the 
physical, as in myth or the sacred, the object of myth was metaphysical (absent) from where 
the morality or politics was derived, whilst in the process of creating news stories the objects 
are physical (present), yet myth retains itself.  
 
In explaining the complex historical and sociological conditions which have made 




a social fact, is “involved in the construction of naturalized nations, of natural communities 
and histories, majorities and minorities” (Pandey, 2006, p.8). Through the violence on a 
quotidian level, different categories are made possible and violence starts to work as a system 
and a demarcation. Violence is a condition of life and we must recognise that. It is not always 
present in its  
 
…spectacular, explosive, visible moments, but also in its more disguised forms – in our 
day-to-day behaviour, the way we construct and respond to neighbours as well as 
strangers, in the books and magazines we read, the film we see, and the conversations 
and silences in which we participate (Pandey, 2006, p.8).  
 
Routine violence is, then, always at work within different layers of our everyday life, the 
everyday politics which constructs the enemy and justifies this violence is inscribed in daily 
newspapers, films, various cultural forms and even in school textbooks. The prejudice and 
discrimination which a nation nurtures within itself “is daily reinforced by school textbook and 
media stories, by box office hits and the no longer noticed vocabulary of everyday national 
politics, shared by left and the right alike” (Pandey, 2006, p.8). It is the continuous saga of 
routine violence which constitutes certain groups as majorities and others as minorities. A 
certain routinization of violence creates a special category of a targeted minority whose loyalty 
and citizenship are always in question. In the case of Assam, as we will see in the following 
chapters, it relates to how routine violence operates in everyday news, and questions the 
existence and legitimacy of a minority group.  
 
An episode of violence may also be understood as a ‘Media Event’. In their celebrated 
work Media Events, published in 1994, Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz theorized the idea of 
‘Media Events’ in the context of public ceremonies, which are broadcast live on television. 
Since the publication of their work, this has remained an important concept in Media Studies 
which has gathered sustained commentary and interest. The theory was initially inspired by the 
event of the Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, travelling to Israel in 1977, generating a lot of 
expectation of peace and reconciliation. The phenomenon of media events is a way to look at 
the live broadcast of ceremonies and how televised events shapes reality. Dayan and Katz 
(1994) provide over a dozen reasons for the study of media events, some of which may be 
questioned 25 years after the book’s publication, whilst others remain as relevant as they were 
at publication. Although the concept owes its emergence to television events, it may be equally 




experiences, Chandrika Kaul demonstrates how the idea of media events developed in the late 
twentieth century, but may be used to interpret imperial events in the early twentieth century. 
In exploring the Coronation Durbar event during the colonial period, she insists on the 
significance of media events in understanding media coverage in an imperial context. She 
highlights the similarity between the two periods, and writes that, “Modern media events are 
preplanned and advertised in advance, giving  
 
…time for anticipation and preparation’ for both broadcasters and audiences, ‘abetted 
by the promotional activity of the broadcasters.’ Likewise, in 1911, the media built up 
anticipation for the Durbar in the weeks and months preceding the ceremonies  (Kaul, 
2014).  
 
Of thirteen points noted by Dayan and Katz (1994) for the exploration of the phenomenon of 
media events, I would like to highlight four which may be useful in understanding events 
reported by newspapers and not only broadcast live.  One, they note that, “media events may 
create their own constituencies” (p.15) and it is the power of the media that it not only inserts 
messages into a social network, but is also able to create networks that design or re-design 
social structures. Second, media events not only capture but conquer time, not only in the sense 
of declaring a holiday, but also, in the midst of an event, narrating the time, in such a way that 
an alternative history, or the time of an event, is re-created. Third, they note that, “Reality is 
uprooted by media events” (p.17), in the sense that the event is taking place elsewhere and is 
immediately reported to the audience. The audience remains detached from the origin of the 
event and the event remains inaccessible to the audience/reader. In other words, reality may be 
relocated, displaced from its original location and transplanted somewhere else. Fourthly, “The 
process of producing these events and telling their story relates to the arts of television, 
journalism, and narration,” (p.17) and the power of narrative scripts the politics of difference 
and the politics of fear. These four characteristics of media events may be utilized to understand 
the reportage of events of violence in print media, despite the fact that this theory has 
conventionally been applied to the understanding of ceremonial events.  
 
There have been several critiques (Sonnevend, 2018; Hepp and Couldry, 2010) of the 
concept of Media Events which urge that this concept needs to be updated in the context of 
globalization, and should take into account the emergence of events like terror, disaster and 
war, which should also be included within this broader concept. Katz and Liebes (2007) have 




Events then and now. The importance and significance of Media Events, however, cannot be 
emphasized enough within media scholarship.  
 
 
The migrant and historical time: The case of violence in Assam 
  
In terms of Hindu-Muslim communal violence, Ashutosh Varshney’s research 
demonstrates that this violence remains a largely urban phenomenon, and within urban India 
he identifies eight cities where it is highly concentrated (Varshney, 2002). Consequently, 
scholarship pertaining to communal violence is also more concentrated on urban phenomena. 
For example, a large body of scholarship has been dedicated to the study of the violence that 
was sparked by the Ram Janambhoomi Movement in India and the post-Godhra riots in Gujarat 
in 2002, as they were seen as  national phenomena, and the impact of Hindu nationalism on 
Indian politics generated that focus. The violence perpetuated in the North Eastern states of 
India, on the other hand, has not received the same kind of attention or generated the same 
volume of scholarly examination. The ethnic violence between Bengali Muslims and Bodos, 
which is the focus of this work, exemplifies the ways in which Assam is distinct. Here, the 
occurrence of violence has been more rural, unlike the majority of the violent outbursts in the 
rest of India, and it is multi layered, as different tribal and ethnic groups are in tension with 
each other for control over resources and for recognition from the government. Bengali 
Muslims, who are largely considered immigrants, have been continually subjected to these 
cycles of violence and the arbitrary use of laws against them. Regional media, in general, have 
not been very hospitable to their plight and, on the contrary, have been found to be using a right 
wing, xenophobic narrative, against them  (Crush & Ramachandaran, 2010), largely framing 
their existence in terms of  a security threat as, “the security argument is used in the discourse 
to frame the relationship between Bangladeshi migration and Assamese identity” (Glebova, 
2011, p.20). Whilst communal violence between Hindus and Muslims is the general framework 
within which ethnic violence in India is usually understood, so the violence in Assam may not 
be studied in such straightforward terms and is, in fact, much more complicated. A simplistic 
‘majority’ versus ‘minority’ framework would not suffice in understanding the complexity of 
the situation, since various minorities, not just Hindus and Muslims, are in conflict with each 
other. Anther distinction, in the case of Assam, is the question of time, which excludes or 




historical time which determines the legitimacy of an immigrant as a citizen makes the question 
of time very central to the discourse of immigration in Assam. 
  
Since the question of time, and narrating time, is central to the question of immigration 
and the (inclusion/exclusion) of citizenship, it is therefore important to observe how the time 
of the immigrant is narrated and how they have themselves narrated their own time. This 
implies that the concept of the ‘immigrant’ is entangled with temporality and that the change 
in context has a bearing upon the usage of the term itself. I will be using two theoretical 
concepts: “Narrative Time” and “Historical time”, not entirely in their philosophical 
understanding but, more as an analytical tool by use of which to reflect upon the question of 
time and to explore how narrative shapes our time. Paul Ricoeur, in his philosophical work, 
explores the relationship between Narrative and Time and proposes  
 
…temporality to be that structure of existence that reaches language in narrativity and 
narrativity to be the language structure that has temporality as its ultimate reference. 
Their relationship is therefore reciprocal” (Riceour, 1980, p.169).   
 
The core of Ricoeur’s idea suggests that the “narrative is the guardian of time” (Wood, 2007, 
p.31) and the temporality in Ricoeur’s narrative produces a sense of “narrated world as moral 
or ethical whole” (Dowling, 2011, p.12). Ricoeur uses the example of novels and the fictional 
plots to reflect on the relationship between time and narrative, however, I would like to displace 
this relationship from its location in fiction and explore this relationship through the telling of 
any kind of story – in our case, a news story – which has a moral and ethical bearing.  The plot, 
which for Ricoeur is the “intelligible whole that governs a succession of events in any story” 
(Ricoeur, 1980, p.169), may, easily be imagined as one of migration, within the larger narrative 
or story of a nation. ‘Narrative time’, for Ricoeur, is a ‘public time’ and a “story’s public is its 
audience”, and through the reading or recitation of the story it is “incorporated into a 
community which it gathers together” (Ricoeur, 1980, p.176). Whilst maintaining the 
difference between narrative time and chronological time, Ricoeur outlines two dimensions of 
every narrative – chronological and nonchronological – one is made up of events which 
characterize the story and is the episodic dimension of a narrative, whilst the other offers a 
configurational dimension through “which the plot construes significant wholes out of 
scattered events” (Ricoeur, 1980, p.176). Ricoeur’s characterization of narrative may be 





Reinhart Koselleck, a major exponent of conceptual history, also insists on the vital 
relationship between language and historical events, asserting that any experience gained from 
historical experience, “cannot be communicated except through language”, which does not, 
however, mean that he does not acknowledge that there are “levels of experience that escape 
linguistic determination” (Koselleck, 2004, p.222). Koselleck’s work is also an attempt to 
explore the relationship between language and temporality, between history and language, and 
in so doing he theorizes the notion of historical time which, for him, was explicitly defined or 
identified in a post-enlightenment world. In modernity, he locates historical time as being 
distinct from “mythical, theological, or natural chronological origins” and the distinction of 
this modern time is its conception of an open future without boundaries (Koselleck, 2002, 
p.119). Modern, historical time, for Koselleck, is in the interplay of ‘expectation’ and 
experience’ as “through the medium of certain experiences and certain expectations concrete 
history is produced” (Koselleck, 2002, p.119).  Koselleck draws his notion of historical time 
from two anthropological categories: the ‘space of experience’ and the ‘horizon of 
expectation’, since historical time lives against a spatial background. These two categories 
remain metahistorical categories with anthropological meaning. (Koselleck, 2002; 2004) 
  
Koselleck’s attempt to situate historical time between the future and the past, or 
between experience and expectation, demands closer examination of the historical concepts 
realized through anthropological experiences. I will be exploring the construction of the term 
‘immigrant’ from Koselleck’s approach to the history of concepts, as his method oscillates 
between linguistic and non-linguistic approaches (Ifversen, 2011). He sees conceptual history 
as being very much tied to social history (Koselleck, 2012), and to trace a linguistic concept 
one needs not only to contextualize it, but also to have true anthropological insight into the 
context. The experience of the individual may not be dissociated from its linguistic expression.  
For Koselleck,  
 
The concept is connected to a word, but is at the same time more than a word: a word 
becomes a concept only when the entirety of meaning and experience within a 
sociopolitical context within which and for which a word is used can be condensed into 
one word (Koselleck, 2004, p.85).  
 
So, “the existence of concepts does not depend on words only. Concepts appear in particular 
contexts in which they perform a key role” (Ifversen, 2011.) It is, then, not only important to 




which the concept is located. Concepts define context and through that context they reinvent 
themselves. The contextual aspect of meaning is, then, very determining in defining the 
concept. It is only through the “condensation of a wide range of social and political meanings” 
that a word becomes concept and this condensation necessitates an abundance of meaning and 
the experience of making that concept an ambiguous territory opens up a space that is a 
semantic battlefield (Andersen, 2003). It is argued that, “Concepts, as their historical analyses 
have shown over and again, do not depend on definitions alone but carry with them the heritage 
of their past use” (Pernau and Sachsenmaier, 2016). The relationship of experience and 
language in a certain time is also scripted in the concept, as Koselleck explicates, “It is 
precisely the internal temporal structure of some concepts that generates temporal differences 
in the consciousness of speakers” (Fernández, Fuentes & Koselleck, 2006, p.109). The concept 
which captures or explains the event always remains distant from that event and has a different 
time structure to such events.  
                                      
 
Aim of the Research 
 
Like a jigsaw puzzle, I attempt to piece different components together to make sense of a 
specific history and to examine the ongoing nature of its impact on the present. Consequently, 
in this research I apply different methods to the same problem, thus attempting to capture the 
creation and agency of memory in the accumulative experience of different protagonists in an 
ongoing situation. The different methods employed reveal different aspects of a complex 
picture. The focus of this study is to understand episodes of violence,  not through the isolation 
of such events as ruptures and discrete moments but, rather, to locate them within a larger 
historical and political plot,  constructing a method with which to consider a longer, repetitive, 
folding in of events into the mis-constructions and into the new violent possibilities in the 
present and the future. This research looks into the violence in the Bodoland region of Assam 
through its coverage in newspapers published in two different languages and through the 
memory of those people who endured it, attempted to deflect it, tried to understand it, and, at 
times, participated in it. The violence, as an event, is deeply connected to the construction of 
the identity of immigrants. Identity-based violence in the region is an everyday reality which 
is often triggered, not by an eruption of injustice but which, rather, may be provoked by an 




such a phenomenon must be questioned, and the purpose of the spectacle of violence be 
methodologically assessed. 
 
This research aims to explore, analyse and determine the role played by the press in 
archiving events of violence, over time, in Assam. The aim is to consider the role that 
newspapers published in different languages may have played in reinforcing, eliciting or 
diffusing emotion in the communities concerned, and the way in which this has contributed to 
a repetitive cycle of violence. The local press is where the history of such events is archived 
and then rehearsed. These accounts will be compared with oral evidence collected from four 
particular incidents of conflict in the Bodoland region of Assam in 1993, 1994, 2012 and 2014. 
The aim is to explain the role of the press in representing and indeed misrepresenting events, 
and the identity of different groups within the region.  Although this will be a detailed case 
study of the press in a particular period, in a particular region, based on detailed textual, 
historical and linguistic research, it will nevertheless explore wider and more general problems 
about the media’s representation of violence and the way in which the history of violent 
episodes becomes part of identity. 
 
The main research questions at hand are : 
• How is violence, as an event, represented in two newspapers published in different 
languages?  
• How do violent events, in a particular context, play an instrumental role in constructing 
the identity and the time of the ‘immigrant’? 
 
The question of migrants and their time, and their belonging, takes center stage when the 
event, i.e., violence, unleashes itself. There is an intricate relationship between the construction 
of the identity of the immigrant and the violent event in the media and in people’s lives. The 
relationships between cyclical violence, competing narratives and memory in the politics of 
identity are explored through the main question in this research.  
 
The complexity of the questions above has led me to utilise multiple methods and to 
bring them into conversation with each other. To explore the link between present day violence 
and the migration of decades ago, I needed to research both times – that saved in the archive 




have thus used triangulation to reflect on the history of violence in the Assam region in India, 
bringing together the colonial archive, the press coverage of episodes of violence, and the 
memories of people who endured the violence, gathered through use of the ethnographic 
method. This triangulation gives both horizontal and vertical understanding of the events of 
violence that are studied. It helps to see the complexity as a whole, and not just any incident or 
its coverage in isolation.  
 
How is the identity of a Bengali Muslim in Assam imagined by two different language 
newspaper operating in two different kinds of media spheres?  How do they locate violence in 
the context of their own political imagination? Earlier, we studied how violence is being 
understood in general scholarship, and this present study seeks to answer the question relating 
to the ethnic violence and discourse of migration in the Indian context.  
  
Further, I wish to ask the question: How does the narrative of the experience of violence 
act as an interpretation of the meaning of their space and narrative of time? I aim to look into 
the perception of time from a migrant’s position and to explore it with the modern 
understanding of historical time which Koselleck (2004) puts into the historical categories of 
the ‘space of experience’ and the ‘horizon of expectation’. Utilizing the narrative in the archive 
and reporting on direct conversations from within the oral narrative or direct experience are 
key to this research. 
 
 
Archive: This Deep Time 
 
 Working with the colonial archive was not part of the original research plan, but during 
my field work in Assam, I found colonial records in the oldest college (now a university) in 
Assam. Guwahati’s Cotton College was founded in 1905 by Sir Henry Cotton, and it is a centre 
of higher learning for the people of the North Eastern state of India. The library’s archive 
section has a lot of records from colonial times and there I found various reports related to 
migration in Assam, written by previous Commissioners of Assam. Engagement with the 
material in the archive, soon led me to realize that the violence in the state, in the name of anti-
migration, may not be understood without studying the category ‘immigrant’ itself, and how 





Cotton College’s library included holdings of copies of the ‘Report on Labour 
Immigration into Assam’ for several years, starting from 1897, and the archive section also 
held copies of the annual ‘Resolution on Immigrant labour in Assam’. The colonial archive 
reveals the constitutive elements of the category of ‘immigrant’. The archive demonstrates the 
colonial care taken with labour – care in the sense of attentiveness to how they were governed 
and observed. Their bodies and movement were carefully monitored and meticulously recorded 
in these archives. The concept of ‘immigrant’, as a population, their mortality and nationality, 
are very minutely recorded. These reports show how the immigrant formed a category of labour 
for colonial administration and gives a glimpse into the formation of colonial knowledge. 
 
Whilst not every year’s report was available in the Cotton College Library, I found 
more such reports in the India Office Section of the British Library. Along with these annual 
reports on immigration in Assam, I also examined old Bills and laws about emigration and 
immigration for the region.  
 
During the research, I was intrigued to explore more about such reporting, since 
colonial power mobilized/imported-exported labour from different parts of the world. 
However, I did not manage to look into the similarity and dissimilarity of the reporting systems 
in the different colonies governed by British Empire. In the context of Assam, however, I would 
like to note that during colonial times there were overlapping reports, about immigrant 
labourers. I found an annual report on the health of tea gardens in Assam which also talked 
about the labour employed on these gardens. Assam constituted a unique economic geography 
for the British colonial administration with a special focus on tea gardening. It was tea and its 
economy that made the administration populate the region with migrant labour, but the 
immigration of the labour was carefully administered. I have used the archival material to 
supplement my historical reading of Assamese migration, and have used as a method through 
which to better understand the region and its historical development.  
 
I would  also like to mention another limitation that I came up against whilst working 
in the archive: These archives contain a lot of technical terms and categories and also terms 
whose meanings have changed over time. Some terms, like ‘nationalities’, in the archive cannot 
be clearly explained. A proper exploration would have needed more time and perhaps more 




richness. However, I used the archival method to better inform my work, to observe how the 
category ‘immigrant’ was archived in colonial times and, indeed, how these reports recorded 
incidents of violence in those times. Since these reports are focused on immigrant labour which 
was imported for tea gardening, and does not mention labourers who were not coolies (under 
no contract and who could move freely), we cannot get a complete sense of the category and 
its management. The archival method can, then, be a bit limiting, but it still provides us with a 
good grounding from which to understand the time that is trapped deep inside the archive. I 
have, further, not used all the reports in the archive, but have selected a few reports from which 
to provide a glimpse into the past and to illuminate the period in terms of the origins of 
immigrants in the region. It is my limitation, in terms of the time and scope of study, that I was 
not able to fully explore all the material I uncovered.  
 
Press: Background Time 
 
The second method I utilised was to look into newspapers to understand how the 
‘immigrant’ is constructed in post-colonial India, and how stories about violence against 
immigrants were constructed. Since anti-immigrant violence has largely been anti-Bengali 
Muslim, I have endeavoured to explore how the Muslim question became prominent in the 
clash of ethnicities. I have chosen one regional newspaper from Assam, The Assam Tribune, 
to see how the Assamese press views the migrant and how it reports on violence; how the 
migrant is constructed as the ‘other’, and how regional sentiment / Assamese nationalism plays 
a role in framing the news. To contrast with the English newspaper, I selected two Urdu 
newspapers through which to explore the same themes, but in print media with contrasting 
language and politics. In India, the local press is still popular, and people gather around to read 
newspapers in small cities, villages and ghettos. Urdu newspapers are very common amongst 
the Muslim minority, and most of the newspaper reading takes place in groups, and people 
borrow newspapers from each other. In fact, an analyst of Urdu media argued that the Urdu 
language newspapers’ economy is weak due to its readers’ habit of sharing and borrowing 
newspapers rather than not buying them for themselves (Lakdwala, 2005).  
 
One of the reasons for studying newspapers in two languages (English and Urdu) is to 
look at how contrasting politics of memory and semantic differences reflect on the matter of 




play differently in both newspapers.  All three newspapers were published in black and white 
in 1993 and 1994, whilst, in 2012 and 2014, they were appearing in colour and with a larger 
number of pages. 
 
The Assam Tribune, which was first founded as an English weekly on 4th August, 1939, 
was transformed into a daily in 1946 by the Barooah Press, and it has been an important media 
outlet for the region. The newspaper  
 
…was jointly owned by Someswar Baruah, a tea planter of Dibrugarh, and Radha 
Govinda Barooah. It was edited by Lakshminath Phukan” and “it was R. G. Loyal, the 
superintendent of Maijan Tea Estate and Vice-Chairman of the Assam branch Indian 
Tea Association, who suggested the name of the paper” (Barua, 1994, p.128).  
 
From the beginning, the newspaper was more centrist and its first editor, Phukan, claimed it 
was “an independent paper with congress leanings” (Barua, 1994, p.128) but, nevertheless, it 
went through some troubled times with Congress. The Assam Tribune is considered the leading 
newspaper of the North-Eastern region and is also considered to be of national importance. The 
study of The Assam Tribune shapes our understanding of how the regional/local politics of 
migration are understood and projected into a larger framework, since the English readership 
has a broader range of interests than a local language readership would have. The concerns for 
national security, borders and migration are not regional but national/international issues, and 
this regional newspaper contextualises these issues from a regional-leaning point of view.  
 
The other language newspaper I have chosen is an Urdu, one since it is widely 
considered to be the language of Muslims, and even more so of poor Muslims (Jeffrey, 1997).  
Urdu newspapers are largely consumed by Indian Muslims who, despite their poor quality of 
reporting and content (Jeffrey, 1997), still enjoy a consistent growth in readership in the 
country. The 58th Annual Report, of the registrar of newspapers for India suggests that, in 2013-
14, Urdu language dailies were the third largest in publication after Hindi and English ones. 
There are 929 dailies published in India in Urdu (Registrar of Newspapers for India, 2017).   
The Urdu newspaper is more concerned with the Muslim minority in India than with 
the objective reporting of any event. Its emphasis is largely on minority politics, international 
news (mostly focused on the Muslim world or the implications of events for Muslims’ lives 




Urdu newspapers published from Kolkata, West Bengal, to explore whether these papers are 
looking into the identity of Bengali Muslims in Assam through a religious lens, rather than 
through an ethnic one. The aim was to see how Urdu newspapers cover the violence against 
the ‘Bengali Muslim’ in the Assam region. How is the narrative of victimization articulated 
and (re)produced? How is the Muslim identity communicated? Is there any consideration of 
the ambivalence of Muslim identities? 
              I selected Akhbar e Mashriq and Azad Hind to investigate their coverage of violence 
in the Bodoland region of Assam. Azad Hind, which started publication a year  after the Indian 
Independence, in 1948, has now ceased to exist.  Mired by controversy and poor management, 
it has not been able to publish since 20163. For decades it was the most important newspaper 
published from Kolkata, and it was under the editorship of Ahmad Saeed. Maleehabadi. Akhbar 
e Mashriq started in the 1980s and now circulates seven editions from different Indian cities. 
Both newspapers are published in Kolkata, which makes them, essentially, Bengali Urdu 
newspapers, and thus the identity question of the ‘Bengali Muslim’ in an Urdu newspaper is 
an intriguing one. Akhbar e Mashriq also have a digital presence and their e-paper was 
available daily, whilst the archive was not.  
 
Both these newspapers dedicate a daily page toUrdu speaking regions of India (like 
Delhi, Bihar, Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh), but they do not include any regular reporting from 
Assam (where Muslims make up over 30% of the population, but speak either Bengali or 
Assamese). Locating the archives of these two newspapers was the most difficult aspect of the 
archival part of this research.  
Difficult Archive 
 
I found the archive for the coverage of The Assam Tribune, from 1993 and 1994. In the 
National Library, Kolkata, and for 2012 and 2014 I accessed the archive in the newspaper’s 
office at Guwahati. The Assam Tribune has a digital presence and the e-paper is available daily, 
however, the archive section does not offer much. The section’s ‘back issues’ were not very 
 
3 Kunal Ghosh, a politician from the ruling party of West Bengal, and who acquired many media groups, also 
took control of Azad Hind. He was enlisted in the Saradha group, which came under the scanner as a chit fund 
scam was exposed, Azad Hind had to suffer due to his proprietor. The newspaper since didn’t publish very 
regularly and changed many offices since 2013. Saradha chit fund was a Ponzi scheme which lured investment 





helpful when I started my research, since these were mostly missing, although now it does 
provide headlines from older issues, but not the entire paper. In the National Library of Kolkata, 
gaining access to archives is a tedious job. One has to first fill out a form every day for access 
to those newspapers that are needed, and then has to further fill out two different forms in order 
to take pictures and make photocopies. After going through the newspapers, one is able to 
select ten news items for the day of which to make either a copy or a photograph. To make a 
copy, one has to visit another building, pay the amount due for photocopying, get a receipt for 
payment before 2 p.m. and then access the copies by the end of the day or the next day. Most 
of the time, the cashier is not to be found and one has to come back the next day. This entire 
process makes the acquiring of material very time consuming and slow. The English section of 
the archive is functional enough to offer this service, whilst the Urdu section is almost defunct, 
and a lot of the archive is left to rot. One must find Urdu newspapers from amongst a pile of 
papers covered in dust.   
 
My initial idea was to work on one English and one Urdu newspaper, but tracing the 
archive of the newspaper turned out to be so difficult that I had to switch from working on 
Azad Hind to Akhbar e Mashriq, and eventually decided to work on both. The archive of Azad 
Hind is not very well preserved in the newspaper’s offices in Kolkata, and due to some constant 
issue at Azad Hind, the office could not offer any archive material except for 2014, and claimed 
that even the back-up of the newspaper files had been destroyed. I could not find newspapers 
from 2012, which were intermittently published, and no local library in Kolkata had them. I 
found newspapers from 1993 and 1994 in the National Library, Kolkata, with great difficulty, 
and newspapers for several days during that period were missing.  Most of the community 
libraries don’t hold old Urdu newspapers; one librarian reported that they sell all newspapers 
older than six months as scrap, and, hence, they had nothing to offer.  
 
Akhbar e Mashriq does not have a very good archiving system either. The office could 
not offer their 2012 archive since it could not be found. I located different months’ issues at 
different local libraries in Kolkata. The scattered archive certainly reflects on the carelessness 
of the newspaper’s management, but also shows how the Urdu newspaper business is run in 
India. The editor at the newspaper was not much concerned by the missing archive, as was the 
case with most editors at the Urdu language newspapers. This carelessness is related to the 
newspapers’ poor economy and their lack of professional functioning. To obtain copies of the 




the Press Information Bureau (PIB), and found no record, United News of India (UNI), which 
had no record, the National Library, which holds the archive of the newspapers but was shut 
due to strike action, the National Library (another branch), had some copies, but no Azad Hind 
from 2012, the Urdu Academy Library, had some records from 2012, but nothing before 1996 
and no Azad Hind, Mohammad Ali Library sells the newspapers for scrap every six months,  
the Muslim Institute Library had no newspapers, the Humayun Kabeer Institute Library held 
newspapers only for a year. The Azad Hind 2012 record could not be found anywhere.  
 
. Reading these two language newspapers shows how insecure communities look at 
each other, report on each other, understand and repel each other. Two different politics of 
identity that emerge from events of violence may be traced back through the reading of Urdu 
and English newspapers. This method also shows how the semantics of ‘immigrant’ are used 
in contemporary times by The Assam Tribune. I performed a historical analysis of both 
language newspapers to locate their reporting in the larger history and politics of the nation, 
and to understand the cycle of violence in a more contextual sense 
 
Time Period  
 
 I have considered four violent events against Bengali Muslims in the Bodoland region 
of Assam which took place in 1993, 1994, 2012 and 2014.The violence that erupted, in 1993 
and 1994, was part of a ‘project ethnic-cleansing’, as reported in The Assam Tribune. 1993 was 
when the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) Accord was signed. The years 1993 and 1994 
constitute a crucial period in the history of the Bodo struggle and their confrontation with other 
ethnic groups. This period gave rise to a series of violent events that resulted in a change in the 
demography of the region. This shifting demography may hold some insight and provides us 
with an historical understanding of the emergence of the struggle for Bodo statehood through 
these episodes of violence. Whilst the violence in 2012 and 2014 took place after a renewed 
Accord, which lead to the formation of Bodoland Territorial Districts (BTAD), and it was 
signed in 2003, the violence of 2012 was one of the most significant in the history of communal 
clashes in India and captured the attention of the entire country, the repercussions of which, 
were felt across the nation. I have considered the actual month of violence and the months 
preceding and following it, to analyse how the events in these areas were covered, and the 




newspapers’ coverage of:  September 1993- November 1993, June 1994-August 1994, July 
2012–September 2012 and April 2014–June 2014. These time periods open up various layers 
of conflict and politics of identity. These periods show the cleavage between identities and the 
conflict in the ambitions of different ethnicities. The violence of these periods helps us 
understand the larger question of communal history in the region and also how insecure 
minorities clash with each other in order to find a place in a majoritarian driven country. The 
research seeks to understand only four events of violence in the selected region, and although 
we may not generalize, we are able to observe a pattern in reporting. A longer period might 
give us a more general view, but this study is limited in terms of the time period selected and 
the number of events it seeks to study.  
 
Ethnography: The Lived Now Time  
Since the memory of violence is a key theme in my research, I wanted to explore it 
through the oral narratives of those people who witnessed the violence and who have lost 
family to these episodes. I am particularly interested in how people narrate themselves and 
wish to be identified. What constitutes their own sense of time in relation to resisting the 
category of immigrant? I wanted to see how, in oral history, a competing narrative emerges, as 
opposed to that in the press and archives, and what we achieve when we bring together both 
narratives. I used the ethnographic method to address this aspect of my research.  
During November 2015, I stayed in the Kokrajhar District of Assam in order to conduct 
my fieldwork. This district is the headquarters of the Bodo Territorial Council (BTC) and has 
been the epicentre of many episodes of ethnic and militant violence. My stay in Guwahati in 
October 2015 helped me to contact people working in that region, amongst them were lawyers 
and civil rights activists who were aiding the people of the region in fighting the state (for 
citizenship and rehabilitation) and arbitrary violence. I joined them in a fact-finding mission 
during my stay, hoping also to build trust and confidence in them concerning my research and, 
in due course, I was invited to the office of a local NGO to present a lecture on media theories. 
My stay in Guwhaati prepared me for further research and brought me in contact with 
community leaders and activists in the Kokrajhar district. For the first half of my visit I moved 
to Salakti village and operated from there. I visited different villages and various people, and I 
observed everyday life by staying in this village, where I was hosted by a local minority leader 




high-level enquiry has been demanded from the authorities and the investigation is still on-
going. Even when first I met him, he told me that his life was at risk due to his political activism. 
Since the research is focused on the category of ‘immigrant’ and people who are targeted 
because they are ‘immigrants’, I placed myself in Bengali-Muslim villages. Most of the 
villages are clearly demarcated between Bodos and Muslims, and some of this delineation has 
taken place through episodes of violence. I was not allowed to conduct my research without 
administration and Police permission. Since the region is an active conflict zone, both Bodo 
militants and the Indian military are quite active in the region. Further, abductions carried out 
by NDFB (the Bodo Militant Organization) are quite common there. I was told, during my 
fieldwork, that the organization abducts people and takes them to the forest along the border 
of India and Bhutan (which is not far from where I was located). Local administration and 
police, both separately conducted meetings with me and asked that I would not conduct any 
research without police clearance. After a ‘background check’, I was allowed to move freely 
in the district and to conduct interviews. The second location of my stay was Bhumrabil village, 
where I was offered lodgings and meals at the house of a local school teacher. I visited several 
villages, and two camps for people who had been displaced in the aftermath of the 2012 
violence. 
 
 During my stay in Bhumrabil, I did not encounter any unpleasantness, partly because, 
I shared the religious identity of the residents, as I come from a Muslim background myself. 
This led them to talk to me more freely about their victimization. As I was immersed in their 
daily lives for a period of time, this also normalised my presence with them and helped locals, 
especially those guiding me around the area, to forge a bond with me (and I still stay in touch 
with some of them). Whilst staying in Bengali Muslim villages, primarily conducting my 
research with their aid, I encountered the limitation of not being able to cross the line and 
conduct similar research with Bodo villagers. Unfortunately, in a conflict zone, one is not easily 
able to win the trust of both sides of a conflict as a scholar and to engage equally on both sides 
of the divided line. In one village, where I briefly wanted to talk to Bodo women sitting outside 
their houses, I was not welcomed. I then entirely relied on the account I gathered from Bengali 
Muslim villages and their perspectives. Here again, the lack of time played an important role 
in limiting my research, since an anthropologist must spend long periods of time in an area to 
build relationships with both sides in a conflict. I also believe that, in a conflict zone, spending 
long periods of time is quite daunting for a researcher, since there exists the constant reminder 




stay in the field for too long. Perhaps returning to the field regularly may be a better idea. In 
this research, I did not get the opportunity to go back to the villages I visited, which is a shame. 
The renowned anthropologist, Veena Das, reminds us of the importance of returning to the 
field and keeping in touch with the informants, for which reason I have tried to remain in 
contact with the people I visited, especially those who guided me around the area and took the 
risks with me.  
 
I have not spent enough time in the field to call my research a proper ethnography, but 
since I stayed with the people who were the subjects of my research, observed their behavior 
and recorded their memories, I would call my approach an ethnographic oral history. 
Ethnography and oral history are not mutually exclusive and, rather, share certain features and 
perhaps certain challenges of the field too. Micaela di Leonardo (1987) identifies six areas 
where these two methods diverge: firstly, she notes that oral history relies on interviews, which 
are generally dyadic encounters, while an anthropologist takes individual life histories in the 
context of ethnographic encounters which involve a large number of people. The ethnographer 
comes out as a heroic individual who interprets the lives of the other, whilst the oral historians 
create extensive archives, working anonymously. Secondly, anthropologists define themselves 
by being in the field, and working in the field becomes a constitutive act, whilst oral historian 
rely on interviews and this means that gathering information is suspect. The third difference, 
Leonardo notes, is that the focus of oral historians is on the narrative and artifactual modes of 
data collection, whilst most modern ethnographers tend to de-emphasize artifacts and focus 
more on “narrative and behavioral evidence”, hence, the key difference between these two 
fields becomes the “lack of documentation and analysis of behavior in oral history”. The other 
important distinction is protecting the identity of people in ethnography and not so much in 
oral history, as oral historical work intends to use the narrative for public record and so does 
not use pseudonyms to protect informants. she notes,  
 
…anthropologists tend to seek private data from informants, information that might be 
harmful or embarrassing if revealed; they also document behaviour patterns of which 
informants themselves may be unaware (Leonardo, 1987, p.5).  
 
 All of the male informants interviewed for this research could speak Hindi, but most of 
the female informants did not know the language, and this posed a challenge to the research. 
With my rudimentary Bangla, I was not able to make conversation with those women who 




conversation and did not deliver a clear sense of the difference in language between the 




While conducting research in such a conflict zone, it was clear that I had a duty of care 
to my informants. It was not just me undertaking a risk in performing this research, but this 
risk was automatically transferred to the participants in the research. The participants gave me 
oral consent to use their names and photos, urged by what they believed, was their duty to tell 
me the truth. They co-operated openly in interviews, and a clear sense was conveyed that, being 
a researcher from a foreign university, they believed, I could give their voice some weight and 
that their problems would be discussed seriously internationally.  
 
The anonymization and protection of identity is of particular interest to me in my 
research as I initially thought of recording an oral history and using these recorded narratives 
in an exhibition, or to contribute to an oral history repository at some library. I decided, 
however, to use the ethnographer’s hat and protect the identity of my informants, with one 
exception, where I have used the informant’s real name and documents, and she provided me 
with permission to do so. They will be explored more thoroughly in the chapter on the field 
work. I have been careful to follow the ethical guidelines of protecting the “confidentiality of 
information supplied by research subjects and anonymity of respondents” (Crang & Cook, 
2007 ,p.29). I have anonymized all the respondents and taken care to protect their identities, so 
that “the potential benefits of the project do not outweigh the invasion of privacy that is 
entailed.” (Murchison, 2010, p.32) which is an important consideration for any ethnographer. 
I have used some random photos of the villagers and villages I visited to provide a glimpse into 
the site where I conducted my work but have at no point produced photos of my respondents.  
 
Why ethnographic oral history?  
 
Since my focus is on people who have been marginalized and lack resources to make 
their voices heard, the attempt in this research is not only meant to analyse them and their living 
conditions, but to also present their voice as it is. The earliest objective of oral history has been 




political power. This also means that this group of people lack documentation and memoirs, 
which would have been able to shape their narrative or influence the historian, or, in my case, 
even legitimize them as citizens. Possessing documents is a privilege of citizenship and, in the 
case of Assam, where citizenship demands a large number of documents, failing to produce 
such documents means that one, risks imprisonment and deportation4. In this research, hen, I 
attempt to bring a local oral narrative to challenge the narrative of the press.   
 
One of the pioneers of oral history, Paul Thompson, introduces oral history as  
 
…a history built around people. It thrusts life into history itself and it widens its scope. 
It allows heroes, not just from the leaders, but from the unknown majority of the people. 
It encourages teachers and students to become fellow workers. It brings history into, 
and out of, the community. It helps the less privileged, and especially the old, towards 
dignity and self-confidence. It makes for contact - and thence understanding - between 
social classes, and between generations (Thompson, 2000, p.23).  
 
Oral history, Thompson insists, is as old as history itself and it is the first kind of history. It is 
only the usage of the tape recorder which made it more possible to access and to have 
implications for the future. Oral history brings forward the narrative of the most marginalized 
people and shifts the focus of history from the political to the lives of ordinary people. It may 
not, be the only instrument of change, but it may certainly be a means “for transforming both 
the content and the purpose of history”. Since its focus is on the lives of people, the scope of 
oral history is wide and is definitely able to offer a challenge to “the accepted myths of history, 
to the authoritarian judgment inherent in its tradition” (Thompson, 2000, p.24). This is perhaps 
the reason that some argue that oral history is partial, and it is not possible to capture it without 
taking a side. Portelli suggests that  
 
‘Partiality’ here stands for both ‘unfinishedness’ and for ‘taking sides’: oral history can 
never be told without taking sides, since the ‘sides’ exist inside the telling. And, no 
matter what their personal histories and beliefs may be, historians and ‘sources’ are 
hardly ever on the same ‘side’. The confrontation of their different partialities—
confrontation as ‘conflict’, and confrontation as ‘search for unity’—is one of the things 
which makes oral history interesting. (Portelli, 2003, p.73) 
 
 
4 As I write, the citizenship of four million people in Assam is already in doubt, as per the new updated National 
Register of Citizens. The registration, or update, has demanded a lot of documentary evidence, which many poor 




McDowell (2002) underlines the importance of oral evidence in any historical research 
and notes that it can reveal a new line of enquiry and open up a totally new perspective for a 
historian. It can recreate the past more vividly, if compared to other methods. Since oral 
historians rely on recording the voice of the narrator, he notes that the meaning of the words 
are often not in the narrative itself, but are conveyed by “tone, volume and rhythm of speech 
and these cannot be reproduced precisely on the printed pages”(McDowell, 2002, p.61). 
Arguing along the same lines, Portelli writes that,  
 
Scholars are willing to admit that the actual document is the recorded tape; but almost 
all go on to work on the transcripts, and it is only transcripts that are published. 
Occasionally, tapes are actually destroyed: a symbolic case of the destruction of the 
spoken word. (Portelli, 2003, p.64).  
 
Nonetheless, what is at the centre or core of oral history is memory, from which a historian or 




By using a variety of methods, I have confronted a more varied series of obstacles and 
problems. Triangulating research methods to concentrate the different insights means facing 
different evaluation problems. If ‘archives’ are partial, contextualising that limitation is part of 
why they are so invaluable, as are the newspaper reports. These are constrained, not only by 
politics, ideology and political bias, but also by economic conditions. They are made, as bad 
or good as they are, by a lack of proper journalistic standards and the ways in which they are 
financed. Informants, too, have their own set of limitations. This research  thus faced complex 
issues in assessing material across time and across varied methods. Yet such ‘triangulation’ 
also added a richness to the research. 
 
From the question of approaching people and protecting them, to getting to the archive, 
working with four different kinds of material was a very challenging endeavour. It was never 
easy to bring out a coherent whole and there existed a constant risk of repetition. To observe 
the entire timeline through a different clock system, through different periods and parallel 
narratives, made this task very tedious, as one method would drag me in one direction, whilst 
another took me to another world. In this thesis, each chapter is its own world, independent of 




the challenges the triangulation method has posed it was enriching to work with such dense 
material and to bring out a ‘complete’ piece, with grand narratives that were interspersed with 
small and micro narratives. History was evinced, not only in archives and language, but also in 
moving and living human bodies, and this made this work and method very fascinating and 
intriguing for me as a researcher. Bringing together the various components has given me a 
better insight into the systemic time, causes and consequences of the repetitive nature of 
violence. Working with these methods helps us to understand how people live the category and 
time which is archived by a past power and narrated by the press every day. Bringing memory, 
archive and press together gives us a glimpse into our modern life, and into the events which 







































The history of the modern Indian sub-continent is partially made from a long, complex 
and shifting series of violent eruptions, some national, some local, and with an interconnected 
rhythm. One effect of these has been to continually re-enforce and separate one identity from 
another, one group from another.  For Brass “communal riots have been an integral part of the 
political process in modern India” (Brass, 2003, p.366). The tension between Hindu and 
Muslim, the evolution and solidification of the ‘majority’ and the ‘minority’, as essential 
categories, largely determined the future of British-ruled India, and continue to dominate the 
socio-political landscape of the country.   
 
 Within this general problem, however, the local causes and responses to 
ethnic/communal violence vary. Assam, the largest North-Eastern state in India, exemplifies 
how this can take on a particularly dense complexity. That rumour, information and the news 
media have played a part in this is evident. To gain a deeper sense of the events of violence in 
the Kokrajhar region of Assam, it is important to glean an understanding of the particular 
context in which the events become news. The history of the region is a complex subject, 
having multiple layers and an intricate entanglement with the colonial and post-colonial 
projects of the nation. The region was colonized by the British in the mid nineteenth century 
and from then onwards tea plantation and oil refineries became a significant part of the colonial 
government’s profitable enterprise. Consequently, labourers for plantations and rail work were 
deliberately imported from all over India, with the majority of 'migrant labour’ brought in from 
East Bengal (Guha, 2006).  
 
Yet, this complex patchwork of labourers, both imported and local, with different 
economic and political rights, became the basis for conflict. Soon after independence in 1947, 
the entire North-Eastern region entered into a phase of militancy and multi-ethnic conflicts as 
different ethnic and tribal groups demanded autonomy. Protests against the migrant population 






The modern history of Assam is not merely a history of colonization, but also one of  
intensive migration that is associated with the development of numerous competing strands of 
nationalisms. When we look at the question of migration and the issue of violence, in the largest 
North-Eastern state of Assam, we find the interaction of successive waves of arrival in Assam, 
settling in Assam, and the interaction of economic and political causes and responses to these 
movements of people which complicate the figure of an ‘immigrant’, but without which there 
is no comprehension of this figure. The story of migration in Assam is interwoven with four—
often competing—nationalisms, hence, these four overlapping histories of nationalism must be 
examined. 
 
The history of migration in the state is linked with Indian nationalism which has its own 
competing narrative, and whose story took a new turn with the struggle for Indian 
independence and, later, the partition of India. ‘Indian’ nationalism is a shaping force with its 
own dynamic.  Then there has been the occurrence of Bengali nationalism, which gave rise to 
strong regional sentiment in Eastern India, eventually threatening, Assamese identity in the 
region. In response, this brand of regional nationalism has provoked and re-shaped a strong 
kind of Assamese nationalism. Finally, the sub-regional or local nationalism of the Bodo tribe 
has witnessed an emergence which, it would seem, feels threatened and is made insecure by 
these other forms of nationalisms and the presence of ‘the immigrant’ in their territory. All 
these four nationalisms have played a role in shaping the region, and the identity of the people 
in the region. Each of these nationalisms form ideological, physical, economic, social and 
political forces. They have emerged and have been shaped in relation to, and in conflict with, 
each other; each possessing its own dynamic.  
 
In this chapter, we will locate the events of violence, which are emergent as a result of 
these nationalisms, and which form the core focus of this study through different assertions of 
nationalism and, hence, in different periods of history. These nationalisms not only provide, a 
stable and necessary source of identity for groups in difficult circumstances, –   but also provide 
each group with a framework narrative to look at the ‘other’. We are not going to trace the 
trajectory of each of these nationalisms, however, the narrative of the events of violence in the 
region would remain incomplete without referring to them. This chapter attempts to understand 
the origin of migration in the region and the emergence of regional and sub-regional 




the Indian state. The region of the North East is often neglected by the Indian state, and the 
development of these states has never received enough focus. The North East has been seen 
through the lens of cycles of violence and the fear of militancy which has gripped the region 
for a long time.  
 
Assam: From Colonial Times to Partition 
 
Assam was never seen as part of any mainland Indian kingdom or state before the 
British colonial period. Mughals, during the Ahom kingdom in the seventeenth century, tried 
to invade the region, but never succeeded in bringing it into the fold of the Mughal Empire. 
The Ahom conquered Assam in 1228 by defeating the local kings of Chutias, Kacharis and 
Jaintias, and they became the undisputed rulers of the Brahmaputra valley (The Brahmaputra 
is the river which runs through the state and divides it into two parts). Saikia (2004) highlights 
that this migrant community, which won the battle over the locals,  
 
…under the rule of a Swargadeo (from heaven (swarg), hence a god (deo)), brought the 
various groups of the hills and plains together into, one body politic. This polity is what 
we know as the Ahom Kingdom of Assam” (Saikia, 2004, p.8).  
 
The region was ruled by the Ahom kings, despite the serious threat posed by the Mughal 
emperor Aurangzeb, until the border attack from Burma became a major source of turbulence. 
The British were fearful that the Burmese might attack and overrun the region as soon as they 
lost their grip over it in 1813, a fear which came to pass when the “king of Burma moved in 
and brought Assam under Burmese political control” (Saikia, 2004, p.9). The British 
occupation of Assam began after the defeat of the Burmese King in the first Anglo-Burmese 
war, by means of signing the Treaty of Yandaboo in 1826. On condition of paying a revenue 
of fifty thousand rupees, after the treaty the administration of the region was left to the Ahom 
king, Swargedo Purandar Singha. The area came under direct British control after the second 
Anglo-Burmese war in 1838, under the pretext of bad administration (Saikia, 2004). 
 
  The colonial geography and the colonial administration following this war have had a 
lasting impact on the fate of the region. When the British took control of Assam, they treated 
it as an extension of the Bengal province and not as independent entity. Until 1874 it remained 




of imagining it as a ‘mere’ frontier   shapes the polity of Independent India. From 1837 to 1873 
the Bengali language was used in the courts and in the government schools of Assam, and the 
colonial administrators of the early period treated the Assamese language as being a mere 
extension of the Bengali language. However, during the 1860s, protest from amongst the 
Assamese against the Bengali language, grew. Two American Baptist missionaries, Nathan 
Brown and Miles Bronson, who performed the classic work of formalizing and fixing the 
language as they researched it, wrote about it, and so ‘fixed’ the grammar and dictionary of 
Assamese. In 1874, Assam became a colonial province with its own  Chief Commissionership, 
and included the regions of Goalpara, Kamrup, Darrang, Nowgong, Sibsagar, Lakhimpur, parts 
of the Naga Hills, the District of Cachar and the Garo Hills. The Eastern Bengal district of 
Sylhet was added to the province on September 12th of the same year, and this would have a 
significant impact on the region, as Sylhet was a part of Bengal with a majority Muslim 
population. Colonial Assam expanded in geographical area as compared to its precolonial 
extent, and in 1921 it was upgraded into a Governor’s Province (According to the GOI Act of 
December, 1919). The British Administration maintained a strict policy of separating the 
people of the hills and plains, maintaining a strict policy of restricting contact between them in 
the belief that they were two different entities and segregation was better for governance. Even 
Assam’s elected Chief Minister could not visit the hills without the British Governor’s 
permission. (Guha, 2006; Baruah, 2001)  
 
  The province that was controlled by the British Administration was seen as a resource 
with abundant land and a sparse population.  Eventually, the Administration started to 
encourage a policy of immigration into the region. The discovery of indigenous tea plants in 
1823 led the British to use the area for vast cultivation, and East Bengali labour and labour 
from other parts of India were encouraged to contribute to this new economy. Other than tea, 
oil was another resource that the British wished to exploit. Moreover, the British also used the 
English speaking, Bengali middle class to run the bureaucracy of the state, and this was another 
source of antagonism for the local Assamese population and the immigrant peasants.  
 
  Baruah (2001) classifies the immigrants moving to Assam during colonial times into 
five categories: 1) The “Tea Labour Community”, 2) Those Muslims of Bengali descent, 3) 
Hindu Bengalis, 4) The Marwaris (the commercial caste from Rajasthan), and 5) The Nepalis. 
Another source of classification, devised by Ghosh (2006), divides them into six groups: 1) 




present day Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, and who worked as tea garden labourers, 2) Muslim 
peasants from East Bengal, 3) The Nepalese, 4) Hindu refugees from Pakistan (this is the 
category which emerged from the end of the British Raj in India), 5) The Marwaris, and 6) 
Muslim economic immigrants from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). This is also a post-
colonial category of immigrants. 
 
  Tea plantation (or what Guha calls the ‘planter Raj’) was, in the main, the concern of 
the British colonial administration in the region which, as a by-product, resulted in defining 
the category of the ‘immigrant’ itself  which we will look into in greater detail in the next 
chapter. Adivasis were brought in as a labour force to work in the tea gardens, and East Bengali 
Muslim peasants, who were brought in to use the land for cultivation and to meet food 
requirements. All these categories of immigrants slowly made Assam their home, causing fear 
and unrest within the communities that had previously lived in the region.  
 
  In 1911, the Census Commissioner took note of “ongoing immigration as a peaceful 
invasion of Assam”, despite the fact that immigrants were welcomed from an economic point 
of view to fill the labour gap, as they were needed to cultivate the abundant land .  Studying 
the genesis of the clash between immigrants and locals, Guha (2006) writes,  
 
landless immigrants from overpopulated East Bengal of whom some 85 percent were 
Muslims – found land in Assam’s water-logged, jungle-infested, riverine belt. Used to an 
amphibious mode of living and industrious, they came by rail, steamers and boats up the 
Brahmaputra to reclaim these malarial areas. All they wanted was land. From their riverine 
base, they further pressed forward in all directions in search of more living space, to areas 
held by the autochthones. It was then that an open clash of interests began to take place 
(p.166).  
 
Rampant immigration prompted the administration to introduce the ‘Line System’, which 
was adopted in 1920 and under which a line was drawn in the districts to delineate the area 
for immigrants and to segregate them from locals. However, this system could not succeed, 
as Bengali peasants were better cultivators. They started to buy land from the Assamese and 
the Marwaris started to fund them. A further, rigid policy, was demanded by the Assamese 
to limit not only the immigrants from other provinces, but the British planters too. Bengali 
Muslims were opposed to the Line System, wanting it to be removed, an opposition that was 
supported by Assamese Muslim politicians. Guha notes that a politician from the Nowgong 




the assimilation of groups, however, the local Assamese Muslim population remained 
sceptical, since they found themselves closer to Assamese culture (irrespective of religion) 
than to the Bengali (Muslim) one.  
 
In the context of migration in Assam, the Line System has had a hugely adverse impact, 
leading to a large extent to the communalization of migration. Muslim League leaders, like 
Bhasani5, took up the issue of the peasant and fought for the abolition of this system, whilst 
Congress introduced an eviction policy which gained popular support from Assamese Hindus. 
Chakrabarty notes that,  
 
Apprehending the adverse economic and demographic effects of unchecked 
immigration from East Bengal to Assam, the Congress ministry (headed by Gopinath 
Bardoloi) that came to power in February 1946 decided to evict ‘the illegal immigrants’ 
from  Assam following the Line system – introduced in 1920 – whereby all settlers 
beyond 1 April 1937 were to be evicted. The Assamese Hindus welcomed the step, as 
‘the influx of Muslims from [east Bengal] was upsetting the population ratio and the 
Assamese wanted to retain a majority in the Brahmaputra valley’.  It was also suggested 
that the influx ‘could be countered only by Bihar Hindus to settle down’ in Assam.” 
(Chakrabarty, 2004, pp.184-185).  
 
The Line System divided the villages of Assam into four categories; 1) exclusively for 
immigrants, 2) exclusively for Assamese, 3) mixed villages, and 4) the Assamese side, in which 
no immigrant was allowed to settle (Kar, 2013). Some have argued that this was more of a 
communal line dividing Muslim Bengalis from the Mymensingh District of East Bengal from 
the local Assamese population, however, it also led to the official definition and limitation of 
the category of immigrant. As Dasgupta (2014) notes, even after the introduction of the Line 
System, migrants could not be effectively contained, and this led the Commissioner of the 
Assam Valley Division, S.N. Mackenzie, to define the term. This word would then be applied 
to anyone coming from any district of Bengal and the Surma Valley, but would exclude tea 
garden coolies and former coolies. Anindita Dasgupta highlights that,  
 
In his standing order, it was clearly stipulated that the term Mymensinghia would 
henceforth be dropped and the word immigrant substituted in all official papers. It 
further states that, ‘immigrants’ could not acquire the same rights as the Assamese ryots 
(peasants) (Dasgupta, 2014, p.152).  
 
5 Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani was Assamese peasants before Independence, and was part of the Muslim 
League as well. In East Pakistan, in the 1950s, he ran a movement for the self determination of Bengali people 
and demanded that it distance itself from Islam. Peter Custers (2010) argues about how this religious preacher led 





The Line System created more differences between these two communities and more clashes 
were reported. The restriction was initially created for the Mymensinghias (hence making them 
the prominent immigrant), but was eventually extended to everyone coming from East Bengal 
by the government order of 22nd August, 1924. This was further extended to other 
communities, like the Sikhs and Marwaris (or keyas and declared immigrants) on 3rd 
December, 1935, by a government order, and later tea garden labourers, who were brought in 
from Bihar. The lines drawn not only separated the Assamese and Non-Assamese, but this form 
of  boundary was extended  within the immigrant community also.  
 
 In the 1931 census, the Census Commissioner warned people of migration, calling it 
invasion, and writing, “wheresoever the carcase, there will the vultures be gathered together – 
where there is waste land thither flick the Mymensighias.” Reflecting on Mullan’s quotation, 
which warned locals about becoming outnumbered by Muslims from the Mymensingh District, 
in the census report, Guha highlights that Mullan’s prediction was irresponsible, and noted his 
“false prophecy of 1931, that provided a rationale  the chauvinism which was to plague Assam 
for many years to come” (Guha, 2006, p.172). Mullan prophesied that the Assamese race would 
ultimately merely be limited to one district (Sibsagar). Even though such sentiments may have 
activated the beginning of a long tension between the communities of the region, anti-Bengali 
sentiments were always latently present, especially among the Assamese middle classes, who 
saw Bengali domination as tough competition (Hussain, 1994). The immigration into Assam 
was engineered by the colonial administration, which led to demographic change in the state. 
Dasgupta claims that, “colonial rulers wanted to patronize the social conflict between the 
Assamese and the migrants” (Dasgupta, 2014, p.158) and thus Mullan “aimed at creating a fear 
psychosis among the Assamese so as to generate conflict between them and the East Bengal 
migrants” (Dasgupta, 2014, p.158). 
 
 In this way, competing linguistic identities, migration and its entanglement with 
religious divisive politics, has shaped Assam since colonial times. The migration question is, 
then, entwined with the communal history of the modern Indian subcontinent. The Muslim 
League assumed that Assam would be part of a new nation, as it would go with the Muslim 
majority East Bengal, but only Sylhet, a Muslim majority region, was able, through a direct 
referendum, to become a part of Pakistan. This loss was welcomed by the Assamese, who 




themselves without any Muslim domination” (Shamshad, 2010, p.5). As Chakrabarty points 
out, “Partition was not forced upon the subcontinent, but it emerged as the best possible 
alternative at a particular historical conjuncture” (Chakrabarty, 2004, p.10). During the Sylhet 
referendum, the voting rights of these immigrants were also fiercely debated and the 
Referendum Commissioner denied them such rights citing that tea plantation labourers did not 
fulfil the qualifying right of working as a permanent employee and hence designated them a 
floating population and like other labourers— agricultural and industrial— they do not have 
the right to vote. These labourers were, hence, excluded from voting (Chakrabarty, 2004)  
 
The partition of India led to the movement of refugees across the newly created border 
and allowed them to settle in their chosen country under the Nehru-Liaqat pact of 1952.  
However, to discourage Muslim immigration from Eastern Pakistan, the Immigrants Act 
(Expulsion from Assam) was passed by the parliament in 1950. Guha writes that  
 
… the act provided for the removal of immigrant persons (except the bona fide 
refugees), whose stay in Assam was politically undesirable. Empowered by the new 
law, the government of Assam ordered a sizeable number of Muslim immigrants to quit 
the province. This created a general panic among them (Guha, 2006, p.271).  
 
Guha notes that thereafter the immigration of East Bengali Muslims stopped, but Bengali 
Hindus, Christians and Buddhist refugees, “from the same area created new problems that 
defied any immediate solution” (p.271). In 1950, a major riot broke out in lower Assam, forcing 
over a hundred thousand Muslims to leave the country and take shelter in the newly born East 
Pakistan. Most of them returned after the Nehru-Liaqat Pact of 1952, however, the number of 
returnees was not included in the 1951 census but were included in the 1961 census, which 
certainly seemed to over-inflate their numbers and “this apparent increase made the Assamese 
feel threatened about Muslim migration from East Pakistan. At that time, it was described by 
the Assamese nationalists as Pakistani infiltration” (Shamshad, 2010, p.5). Guha notes that the 
riot of 1950 was the first big riot against a religious minority and, since then, “it was the 
language question that was to increasingly become the rallying point of anti-social, divisive 











Figure 2.1 Political map of Assam today 
 
            Source: Indian Map Service, Jodhpur 
 
The Assamese Nationalism and Assam Agitation Movement in Independent India 
 
The boundaries of Assam have altered repeatedly since the colonial period. States like 
Meghalaya (1972), Arunachal Pradesh (1948), Mizoram (1987) and Nagaland (1963), have 
been carved out of the historic Assam of the colonial period. Today, Assam has an area of 
78550 sq.kms. with a population of 3,1,169,272 (according to the 2011 census), with Assamese 






Between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, four styles of Assamese writing 
developed in the Brahmaputra valley: Gargaya (particularly practiced in Eastern Assam 
for writing buranjis), Bamunia (for religious texts), Lakhari, and Kaithali (practiced in 
Western Assam) All of these scripts merged into one when the printing press was 
developed in the nineteenth century, and the American Baptist Mission created 
standardized Assamese letters (Saikia, 2004, p.6). 
 
However, despite the emergence of one script, the boundaries of the speech community 
were maintained, and hence the difference in culture and politics between Lower and Upper 
Assam continued. Adding to this, Saikia writes: 
 
While the internal divisions between Assamese speakers are considerable, they dislike 
and share a general sense of mistrust of the Bengali speakers of Barak Valley. This anti-
Barak/anti-Bengali feeling of the Assamese has in recent years taken a new shape. As 
a result, Bengali speakers in Assam have been reduced to the status of illegal 
Bangladeshi immigrants, and local political demagogues in Assam, supported by the 
national Bharatiya Janata Party, are demanding their expulsion. A clear division, 
however, is made on religious grounds, and thus only Bengali Muslims are targeted as 
illegal. This targeting of Muslims reflects national religious divisions more than any 
clear history of religious conflict internal to Assam, where language has been a more 
divisive issue  (Saikia, 2004, p.7), 
 
The assertion of Assamese identity and the fear of being outnumbered by Bengali 
Muslims and Hindus continued in post-independence Assam. Assamese was made the official 
language of the state and Assamese speakers were given clear preference in government jobs 
and positions. The “Sons of the soil” policy was pushed in the state so that the native Assamese 
got the upper hand, and Weiner notes that: 
 
In this campaign to assert their culture and improve the employment opportunities of 
the Assamese middle classes, the Assamese won the support of two migrant 
communities, the tea plantation laborers from Bihar, and the Bengali Muslims. Both 
declared to census enumerators that Assamese was their native tongue, and both voted 
for the Assamese-dominated Congress party. (Weiner, 1983, p.284). 
 
Nandana Dutta (2012), has particularly noted the contribution of diasporic community of Char-
Chapori in helping the Assamese language to become a majority language. The Char-Chapori 
were the Bengali Muslim peasants who migrated from East Bengal in the late 19th and early 
20th century and settled in the low-lying riverine areas. They used this land for cultivation and 
made an important contribution to the economy of the region. The census of 1931 showed that 




speaking Muslim community, who had adopted Assamese as their own language, played a key 
role. Nanda writes: 
 
This is the point at which the tea garden tribes, the Assamese tribal groups, and the non-
indigenous Muslims stepped in as defenders of the language. As a result of the 
concerted efforts of the Char-Chapori Muslim between 1931 and 1951, the census of 
1951 revealed that Assamese had regained its majority status. The community 
participated in the efforts to make Assamese the language of use in government offices 
and courts and in schools and college. They were also involved in the 1972 movement 
to make Assamese the medium of instruction up to the undergraduate level. (Dutta, 
2012, p.234). 
 
 Bengali Muslims chose to side with the Assamese since they had a fraught relationship 
with Bengali Hindus and believed their alliance with the Assamese would strengthen rather 
than weaken their positions. This alliance continued until the 1970s, and it remained strong, as 
Weiner notes: 
 
 In the mid-1960s the Assamese turned against Marwari businessmen for not providing 
employment to local Assamese; bands of young Assamese smashed and burned 
Marwari-owned shops in Gauhati. There was a major anti-Bengali movement in 1972 
with large-scale riots throughout the Brahmaputra valley, but the clash was entirely 
between Assamese and Bengali Hindus. Though the central issue was whether Bengali 
could be used in the examinations at Gauhati University, the Bengali Muslims 
continued to side with the Assamese. (Weiner, 1983, p.286). 
 
Weiner highlights that, after the 1977 election, the Assamese turned against Bengali 
Muslims for political and demographic reasons. The 1971 Census showed a significant growth 
in the Muslim population, which caused fear amongst the Assamese in the Bengali population, 
and soon outgrowing the Assamese one. They believed this would threaten both their identity 
and language. In Weiner’s arguments, the fear of the Assamese society of being outnumbered 
is not totally illogical, as they are a small population. He writes: 
 
One should not underestimate the extent to which the peoples of the northeast, and 
especially the Assamese, have a sense that they are a small people living next to a vast 
Bengali population eager to burst out of a densely populated region. Bangladesh (in 
1980) had a population of 88.5 million, West Bengal (in 1981) had 54.4 million, and 
Tripura 2 million, for a total of 145 million Bengalis, making them numerically second 
only to Hindi speakers in South Asia, and the third largest linguistic group in Asia. 
Assamese also tend to view Bengalis as "cultural imperialists" who, if given the 
opportunity, would attempt to assimilate the Assamese, especially since the Bengali 
language is seen as more "advanced," its literary traditions stronger, and its cultural 





In the 1960s, and most of the 1970s, anger existed, not just against Bengali immigrants 
but against all ‘outsiders’. Monirul Hussain notes that it was the Bohiragatos (outsiders) who 
were targeted, as a whole, and the threat to Assamese identity was linked to their larger 
presence in the state. During these times, the walls of towns were plastered with Anti-
Bohiragatos slogans and “the Asamia bourgeois press too, started a vigorous propaganda 
against the danger posed by the outsiders in Assam” (Hussain, 1993, p.101). In Hussain’s 
historical analysis, the parties mobilizing the anti-outsider campaign, AJD (Assam Jatiyabadi 
Dal) and PLP (Purbachaliya Lok-Parishad), could not sufficiently mobilize the masses against 
the outsider. First, the concept of ‘outsider’ was itself very vague and not well defined, and, 
second, during the anti-Marwari protest/riots in the 1960s, the Marwaris did not vanish and, 
indeed, they became more powerful and established themselves further in the state. The leaders 
running the campaign did not possess enough credibility and, despite their persistent anti-
outsider campaign, the popular response was never satisfactory. The Asamiya ruling class 
needed to have better leadership and an alternative issue with which to mobilize people, and 
hence to “increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the Indian ruling class to enable them to 
exert their hegemony over the people of all nationalities and national minorities like tribals in 
Assam”( Hussain, 1993, p.102). 
 
They got this opportunity when, in 1978, the Chief Election Commissioner, S 
.L.Shakdhar, in a meeting with electoral officers, raised the issue of the influx of migrants from 
neighbouring Bangladesh, leading to an increase in voters, who might be illegal. Although 
Shakdhar did not explicitly mention Assam in his statement, this was enough to create a huge 
political issue which led the leadership of the Assam Movement to misinform the local masses 
effectively that their distinct identity was being threatened since illegal immigrants were being 
enrolled as voters. The issue, which then became decisive and historic in Assam, transformed 
from being the ‘outsider’ to being the ‘foreigner’. The protests in Assam between 1979 up to 
1985 were named the ‘Assam Movement’, which self-defined as an anti-foreigner movement. 
Axom Xahitya Xobha and the All Assam Students Union (AASU) played a critical role in 
shaping the movement, which later played a major role in defining the political mood of the 
region. The by-election of 1979, in the Mangolodoi constituency of Assam, triggered a long 
political movement which opened up a new front of violence and political contestation. During 
the election, the right- wing Janata Party (the predecessor of today’s BJP) saw its electoral base 





As the revision of electoral rolls started, some 70,000 complaints were lodged hurriedly 
challenging the authenticity of citizenship of a large number of people, most of whom 
had already received or exercised their constitutional rights to franchise. Later, it was 
found that the services of the state police force were utilized to inflate the number of 
alleged foreign nationals in Assam. The Asamiya bourgeois press played it up as a 
major issue bellicosely terming a large number of Indians and Bangladeshis (Hussain, 
1993, p.104).  
 
The magnification of the Mangoldoi issue instilled fear in the Assamese middle class, and the 
leadership movement persuaded people to support the movement in the cause of saving 
Assamese identity. This persuasion of the masses, as Hussain notes, was conducted by the 
AASU leadership in collaboration with the regional press.  
 
Baruah (1999) divides the six years of the Assam Movement from 1979 to 1985 into 
five phases. The first phase took place from June, 1979, to November, 1980, which he calls the 
‘festival of protest’. He notes that this phase saw mass demonstrations, rallies, and gathered 
the support of the ethnic Assamese population, and also threatened the immigrant community 
of the region, which started to feel insecure. This phase started with high optimism and ended 
with considerable pessimism. The second phase was the phase of ‘confrontation’, which took 
place between December, 1980, to January, 1983. In this phase there was direct confrontation 
with the government, as the movement started opposing local elections which the central 
government was keen to hold. Twenty-three or more rounds of discussions took place between 
the movement’s leaders and the government. The third phase started from the election of 1983, 
in February, which Baruah calls the ‘breakdown of order’. There was widespread violence and 
“more than three thousand people – mostly Muslims from Bengali descent – were killed during 
the violence surrounding the election”(Baruah, 1999, p.132). The fourth phase took place 
between March,1983, and May, 1984, and is the phase of the ‘contest between the state and 
the movement’(Baruah, 1999, p.135). This phase, followed by the violence during the election, 
saw a rift in the movement as there were instances of conflict between opponents of the election 
(ethnic Assamese) and tribal supporters of it—mainly Bodos. Bodos asserted their own 
distinctness during this period, and we will explore this more closely in the following section.  
The last phase is the phase of ‘Accommodation’, which took place from June, 1984, to 





The Assam agitation ended in the Assam Accord; however, all the years of agitation 
saw major ethnic polarization and widescale ethnic violence. This also resulted in making 
violence a routine event in the state, and militancy or “revolutionary violence” also grew post- 
the Assam agitation. In the North, Kamrup District of Assam more than 200-300 people died 
as a result of mob violence, during the movement. Most of those who were killed were non-
Asamiyas and thousands were rendered homeless. The worst, and most historic, episode of 
violence took place during the election in 1983, in Nelli, where “1,600 people were killed in a 
one-day attack” (Kimura, 2008, p.151) and it was noted that despite being an anti-foreigner 
movement “the victims were mainly Muslim immigrants of Bengali origin” (Kimura, 2008, 
p.151). The number of victims is still disputed, and for some it ranges from 1,800 (officially) 
to 3,000 (unofficially) (Chopra, 2014). Nellie, a small village (then in the Morigaon District 
and now part of the Nagaon District) of Bangladeshi Muslim immigrants, was surrounded by 
neighbouring villagers of the Tiwa tribe and ethnic Assamese on 18th February, 1983, who 
systematically burnt down houses and attacked the residents of Nellie village, leaving 
thousands dead (Chopra, 2014). Nelli then became a metaphor and memory for all future 
reporting and discussion of the violence in the region. References to Nellie continue to arise in 
the reporting, and is discussed in both English and Urdu newspapers in this study. Sanjoy 
Hazarika (2000) recalls, from his visit soon after the massacre, how “the issues raised by the 
killing fields of Nellie continue to haunt Assam and to a larger extent the North East and India”. 
He also highlights that: 
 
“Land or maati is critical to identity-formation, especially among agrarian societies. 
Their own short-sightedness is reflected every day when they contemplate their former 
tenants as owners of this ancestral land. The rage becomes deeper, blinding those in its 
grip to their own follies” (Hazarika, 2000, p.53). 
 
The questions of land and language have both remained central to the episodes of 
violence in the region for a long time, and certainly the taking over of land by Bengali peasants, 
and perhaps their better cultivation techniques, became a source of conflict. This is quite 
evident in the field study undertaken for this thesis in terms of how Bengali Peasants are 
employed by Bodos, and how they lose control over land through events of violence. Violence 
then becomes a means to gain control over land, and this was evident during the violent 
episodes in the Assam agitation period, perhaps significant to the fact that the violence was 
very rural. Generally, communal violence has been very urban in India, and rural India has not 




proved, as Hussain notes, that “communal violence in India is no longer confined to urban 
India alone but has very forcefully penetrated into rural India” (Hussain, 1993, p.142). Weiner 
also notes that:  
 
the central government mistakenly assumed that the agitation was 
predominantly urban and that its paramilitary forces in and around the cities and 
larger towns would be sufficient to maintain order. The desire of Assamese and 
tribals to take over lands now cultivated by Bengali Muslims—some of whom, 
incidentally, came before independence— appears to have been a significant 
element in the violence. (Weiner, 1983, p.287). 
 
 The Assam Accord, which marked the end of a long period of agitation, protest and 
violence, was signed between the AASU leadership, the Central government and the State 
government. The Accord stipulates that anyone entering Indian territory after 1971 would be 
considered illegal, and would be deported, and whoever had entered before must be considered 
an Indian citizen, however, those who entered between January, 1966, and March, 1971, would 
be disenfranchised for ten years, consequently losing voting rights for that period.  The initial 
demand of the AASU was to make 1961 and not 1971 the cut-off year for citizenship, but 
central government did not accept this demand, which some view as a defeat for the AASU. 
Navine Murshid questions the reasons for this choice of 1961 (when Bangladesh was not an 
independent country) by the AASU as the cut-off for citizenship, rather than 1971 (when it 
gained its independence). He argued that:  
 
…the logical cut-off would have been 1971, at Bangladeshi independence, rather than 
10 years prior, before the 1962 China–India War. In effect, the identity construct was 
directed toward Bengali Muslims from East Bengal—regardless of whether they came 
from ‘‘East Pakistan’’ before 1971, or from ‘‘Bangladesh’’ following independence. 
(Murshid, 2016, p. 596)  
 
The construction of the identity of the “foreigner” which was central to the Assam agitation 
was carried out through this demand, as this “allowed the broadening of the understanding of 
outsiders from ‘‘foreign Bengali Muslim’’ to ‘‘Bengali Muslim,’’ encompassing even those 
who had been in the region since the early 20th century” (Murshid, 2016, p. 597).  The result 
was different, as 1971 became the cut-off year, but in the public consciousness “six years of 
mobilization against the ‘‘illegal Bangladeshis’’ was the conflation of the identities 





The end of the agitation was in no way the end of violence, rather, new forces of 
violence emerged in the state during the agitation years of which, ULFA (the United Liberation 
Front of Assam) was the most menacing. Other ethnicities too started to demand more rights, 
and new militant groups started to shape the movements of statehood. The violence and 
militancy of ULFA gripped Assam by the mid-eighties, as the post-Assam Accord government 
was not effective enough in protecting the identity of the Assamese and meeting the demands 
of the people. It should be noted that in only one decade, between 1992 -2002, “as many as 
4,888 people have been killed across the state in insurgency-related violence. These included 
643 personnel of the security forces and 2597 civilians. Besides, the number of people killed 
in ethnic flare ups is estimated to run into several hundred” (Hussain, 2006, p.6). 
 
Bodo Nationalism and the cycle of violence in Bodoland  
 
Bodos are one of the early inhabitants of the North-Eastern region of India. The Bodo 
indigenous tribe is one of the major ethnic minority groups of the region and has been 
demanding rights and recognition for a long time. They are said to have migrated from central 
Asia, and the earliest known inhabitant settled in the Brahmaputra valley (Gait, 1926,  p.247). 
There is a difference of opinion about the term ‘Bodo’, however, but most scholars agree that 
this is a generic term for the tribal people of the region. Today, Bodo Kacharis, Dimacha 
Kacharis and Mech-Kacharis, are all broadly termed Bodo.  Today, in representational politics, 
the broad terms ‘Bodo’ or ‘Boro’ are used to include all these people (Basumatary, 2012). With 
the arrival of Ahoms in Assam, the Bodos engaged in a long struggle with them and fought 
numerous battles to dethrone the kingdom. Despite this political rivalry, many Bodos were 
taken into the fold of the Ahom Kingdom and received administrative positions (Swargiary, 
1997).  A lot of new Indian nationalistic historiography is re-writing the evidence about the 
‘origins’ of the Indian people, and the Bodos are, like other groups, being written out of 
contemporary, ideologically nationalistic, historical writing. 
 
We observed earlier that in Assam there existed hill tribes and plain tribes, which the 
British administration’s policy preferred to keep separate. After the Independence of India, the 
situation of the plain tribes did not improve much, whilst the hill tribes received a lot of 
attention and protection through the autonomy that was provided by the central government. 




schedule of the Constitution of India, which safeguarded the interest of tribal populations. 
However,  as Swargiary notes,  
 
…the Bodos and other plains tribes were fobbed off with the so called “tribal belts and 
blocks” where the Assam Land Revenue Rules and Regulations in theory imposed 
restrictions on possession and transfer of tribal lands. In practice, the restrictions on 
ownership and transfer of land in the tribal belts and blocks have been observed more 
in breach resulting in large scale alienation of land owned by Bodos and other plains 
tribes (1997, p.80).  
 
The Bodos, comparatively, also felt that they were more alienated than the other tribes of India, 
who were protected by the fifth schedule of the Constitution. However, the feeling of alienation 
and insecurity in identity goes back to colonial times, when on 12th August, 1927, a resolution 
was adopted by tribal representatives of the Bodo family to safeguard their identity, and they 
refused to be identified with the Assamese community, since they felt threatened by 
Hinduisation (Swargiary, 1997; Kumar, 2016). In his famous work on the history of Assam, 
the colonial administrator and historian, E.A. Gait, raised his concern about the future of Bodo 
identity, and writes, “the Bodo dialects, though still spoken in Assam by more than half a 
million persons, are in their turn giving way to Aryan languages (Assamese and Bengali), and 
their complete disappearance is only a matter of time” (Gait, 1926, p.7).  
 
In 1928, under the leadership of Gurudev Kalicharan, two organizations, the Assam 
Kochari Youth Association (AKYA) and the Golpara District of Boro Association (GDBA), 
met the well-known Simon Commission in Shillong and put forward some key demands for; 
1) the creation of a separate category in the census report, 2) separate representatives in the 
provincial council, 3) reserved seats for the Boros in the central legislature, 4) the reservation 
of executive posts for Boro educated youth, and 5) the creation of separate seats for the 
Boropeople on the Dhubri local Boards (Kumar, 2016). 
 
The Bodos continued to struggle after Indianndependence, asking for more rights and 
the recognition of their language. When, in the 1960s, Assamese was made the sole official 
language of Assam and, in 1972, the sole medium of instruction, and then as a third compulsory 
language in non-Assamese schools during the AGP government, tribals vehemently opposed 
these moves by the government. Since the 1950s, Bodos have been pushing to achieve 
recognition of their language by the state. The Bodo Sahitya Sabha (BSS) demanded that the 




submitted a memorandum in 1953 to the then Chief Minister of Assam. The language 
movement of Bodos continued in the 1950s and 1960s and, as a result of the movement, in 
1963 the Bodo language could be taught in school, but only until the fifth standard, and the 
state government maintained that Bodo was not a recognized official language and could not 
be taught in medium and high school. Bodos continued to fight for the recognition of their 
language and script. Bodos wanted to use the Roman script for their language, which the 
government did not accept. During colonial times, the Bodo language had been written in 
Roman script, and between 1904 and 1936, Roman script was used to prepare Bodo text books. 
However, the Devanagari script was eventually adopted to be used to transcribe the Bodo 
language in schools, after a series of pressures were exerted by the government (Swargiary, 
1997, p.87) 
 
Alongside the struggles for the change in script and the recognition of language, a new 
struggle of a more political nature has started to grow since the late 1960s and early 1970s. As 
the project of nation state building advanced, a sense of alienation and deprivation grew within 
the Bodo community (Behera, 2018).  Bodos started to realize more deeply the negligence by 
the state and the demand for “an autonomous region for plains tribals to be called Udyanchal” 
started to grow. The movement, the Plain Tribal Council of Assam (PTCA), could not progress 
much due to ideological differences within the movement, and this gave rise to the United 
Tribal Nationalist Liberation Front (UTNLF) which, in 1984, for the first time, demanded a 
separate homeland from Assam and was actively supported by the All Bodo Students Union 
(ABSU). Both the ABSU and the PTCA presented the Bodo tribe’s urge to possess political 
power and the right to self-determination. The ABSU led the movement for self-determination 
when the PTCA failed to fulfil the dream of a separate state. During the 1980s, until the 
leadership was taken over by Upendranath Brahma, the peaceful struggle for splitting Assam 
into half gained momentum. The slogan “divide Assam fifty-fifty” echoed strongly in the state 
and the vague demand for a tribal homeland then turned into a fully -ledged demand for a new 
state of Bodoland; a new political reality. 
 
Here, it is important to note that the Bodo movement’s emergence is owed to the feeling 
of being dominated by the “majoritarian Assamese Discourse” and different Bodo groups 
“expressed their unwillingness to be identified as Assamese” (Behera, 2018, p.5). However, 
when the Assam agitation movement against foreigners, a movement, in basic terms, that was 




end of the 1970s, and almost took a violent turn in the 1980s, overshadowing everything else, 
the Bodo groups supported this movement instead. However, the movement against 
“foreigners” was also an assertion of Assamese nationalism and an attempt to bring all ethnic 
groups under the umbrella of Assamese identity. The signing of the Accord shocked the Bodo 
leadership, and they realised that their dreams and interests were not protected. This was when 
the Bodo Movement, in the mid-1980s, turned to violence and a new geography of violence 
opened up. The Bodo leadership saw that the supremacy of Assamese culture and language 
was being imposed upon them as a result of the anti-foreigner movement.  
 
The struggle for a separate state then took militant form in 1986, as the Boro security 
forces (BrSF) turned to armed resistance to liberate the “Boro nation from Indian expansionism 
and occupation” (Kumar, 2016, p.597). BrSF, which later became the National Democratic 
Front of Bodoland (NDFB) wanted a separate country. The Bodo People’s Action Committee 
(BPAC), which was formed in 1988 to mobilise Bodo people towards the demand for 
statehood, is considered a historic moment in the history of the movement, which later, 
however,  adopted violent methods and came to be considered the armed wing of the ABSU. 
In 1993, the Bodo Accord was signed to give some autonomy to Bodo people in the districts 
of their domination, but the Accord was not a solution to the problem and it eventually 
collapsed. At the time of  the Accord, violence gripped Bodo dominated districts as Bodo 
militant groups aimed to cleanse the villages of non-Bodos in order to bring more areas under 
the newly formed Bodo Autonomous Council (BAC). The BAC could not function for long, 
as Kumar notes that it, “could not exercise whatsoever limited autonomy was provided by the 
Act mainly because of insufficient financial powers and overwhelming domination of the state 
government over most of the transferred subjects” (Kumar, 2016, p.61). The line demarcated 
by the government for the BAC was rejected by both the ABSU and the BPAC and caused 
large scale violence in 1993 and a brutal massacre in 1994.  
 
The failure of the Accord saw the emergence of the NDFB and the Bodo Liberation 
Tigers (BLT), both different in ideology but sharing the common “revolutionary” zeal of 
liberating the region through violence. BLT, however, through stronger organization and armed 
struggle, became “the de facto guardian organization of the Bodo movement” (Kumar, 2016). 
The militants carried out a number of ethnic cleansing operations to clear the districts of non-
Bodos and make way for a pure Bodoland. As a result, hundreds died and thousands were 




(Santhalis), both of whom had originally started to settle in the region during colonial rule. The 
violence was not, however, limited to targeted attacks on non-Bodos, and it also extended to 
clashes between these two militant groups (the BSF/NDFB and the BLT). Basumatary (2014) 
has observed that the areas of these two groups were virtually demarcated, and  
 
… a person belonging to a particular area believed to be patronising one group would 
be murdered with no questions asked if that person ventured into the areas which 
patronised the other group. Such a situation eventually resulted in fratricidal killings 
among the Bodos. Bodo militant groups killed 260 people in 1996 alone. (Basumatary, 
2014, p.12) 
 
 He also noted that the divisions between these two groups were sharp because, “BLT being 
perceived as adherents of the Bathou6 faith and the NDFB being perceived as neo-convert 
Christians” (Basumatary, 2014, p.12). 
 
 The rise of Bodo militant groups, and the ensuing killing, created a sense of 
insecurity in all non-Bodo groups living in the Bodo dominated district of Western Assam. K 
och Rajbongshis, especially, who had their own political aspirations to form a state (Kamtapur,) 
for themselves, were discontented with their villages being made part of the BAC. 
Consequently, most of the non-Bodo ethnic groups started to form their own militant groups 
to counter the Bodo militant groups, and Basumatary notes that the  
 
Santhals formed the Bisa Commando forces (BCF) and Adivasi Cobra Militant force 
(ACMF), the Koch Rajbongshis formed the Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) 
and the ethnic Bengalis formed the Bengali Tiger Force (BTF) (Basumatary, 2014, 
p.14). 
 
The above may be viewed in the light of the way that Arendt (2014) differentiates between 
violence and power, and how the weaker power enables violence. The violence becomes the 
alternative to the political solution, which power is not ready to address. The situation 
throughout the 1990s, in Western Assam, remained tense and ethnic clashes, along with 
targeted killing, continued. However, a decade later, after the BAC had wrapped up its 
operations in 2003, the state government entered into negotiations with the BLT leadership, 
 
6 This was the traditional faith of the Bodo people before Hinduisation, it is a kind of animistic faith in which a 




eventually signing a peace accord. The second Bodo Accord, signed in that year, was a 
modified version of the first one, which had been proposed in 1993. The Bodo Territorial 
Council (BTC) was formed in accordance with the sixth schedule of the Indian Constitution. 
Four districts: Kokrajhar, Baksa, Chirang and Udalguri, were carved out to make Bodoland 
Territorial Area Districts (popularly known as BTAD). This formation was not without 
resistance, since the NDFB, aiming for a sovereign Bodoland, was against this, as was the non-
Bodo community. However, with the surrender of 2,641 BLT militants, with their sophisticated 
arms on December 6th, 2003, a new chapter in the history of Bodoland began. The government 
also opened talks in 2004 and 2005 with the NDFB militants. The NDFB split into three groups 
after the formation of the BTC: the Dhiren Boro group, which was known as the NDFB -P, the 
Ranjan Diamary group, which was known as NDFB R, and the Songbijit group, which was 
known as NDFB -S and which carries out militant activity to this day, whilst the former two 
have engaged in peace talks with the government (Behera, 2018; Basumatary, 2014).  
 
The formation of the BTAD has not seen the end of violence and ethnic conflict in the 
area. Bodos, who make up roughly 30% of the region, are running an autonomous council 
within the state of Assam, but still remain a minority. The contradiction of being both a 
minority (numerically) and a majority (politically) complicates the situation, and the violence 
against non-Bodos continues. In essence, then, the narrative of ‘native’ and ‘foreigner’ takes a 
complex form, as the struggle for the supremacy and dominance of the Bodo group becomes 
part of the narrative of ‘illegal immigration’ too. Bodo leadership sees it as being politically 
more relevant to assert their political demand by making ‘illegal immigration’ a route to 
attaining it. The story of the tussle over land becomes the story of the “foreigner” as well; as 
Naveen Murshid articulates it,  
 
… while the tensions between tribal population and Bengalis are not predicated on 
ethnicity per se but on economic transactions over land use, political actors, particularly 
Bodo leaders in this area, have figured out that relabeling land encroachment issues as 
foreign encroachment is politically more rewarding. This is how the story of land grabs 
became one of Bangladeshi infiltration as well (Murshid, 2006, p.587). 
 
During 1992 and 2014, many incidents of violence, extortion,  kidnapping and targeted 
killings by the NDFB were reported. In the episodes of violence, Adivasis and Bengali Muslims 
remain the main target. As the table below shows, in major incidents of violence in the BTAD 





Table 2.1 Ethnic Clashes in Assam in the BTAD Region (1992-2014) 






Persons in  
relief camp 







     - 
1994 Bodo - Muslim Undivided K&B 113  
     - 
1996 Bodo - Adivasi Undivided K&B 198  
     - 
1998 Bodo- Adivasi Undivided K&B 186  
     - 
2008 Bodo - Muslim Darrang & 
Udalguri 
64 1,93,000 














Source: Department of Home Affairs, Government of Assam, Guwahati (Saikia,, 2015) 
 
Saikia (2015) draws a parallel between the civil war in Sri Lanka and the violence in 
the Bodoland region of Assam. In the case of Sri Lanka, the majority Sinhalese community  
 
…used outbidding as a means to attain power” and this led to a systemic 
marginalization of the Tamil minority population in the country. What led to the 
reactive nationalism of the Tamils and a cycle of violence in Sri Lanka was the process 
of outbidding, which was “embedded in the institutional structure of a polity (Saikia, 
2015, p.214). 
 
Bodos were disenchanted with the Assamese ruling class and felt outclassed by Assamese 




population used violence as a means to ‘outbid’ the moderate Bodo leadership in order to 
influence politics. 
 
The violence of 2012 received international coverage and attention and populated 
national and regional news, not only due to the intensity and scale of violent episodes, but for 
two other reasons: firstly, the conflation of the riots as a result of the Rohingya issue in the 
Arakan state of Burma, and, secondly, the usage of social media to mobilize and create an 
atmosphere of fear; eventually leading to the ‘exodus’ of North-Easterners from the major 
metropolitan cities of India. The 2012 violence started with the killing of two activists from a 
minority (Muslim) organization in the Bodoland area, which was called the All Bodo Muslim 
Student Union (ABMSU). Both were shot dead by unidentified bikers in Magurmari village on 
19th July, 2012, in response to which four ex-BLT militants were killed by a mob the next day. 
These events led to a cycle of violence and killing on both sides (Bodos and Bengali Muslim) 
which continued for over two months. Thousands of houses were burnt down and half a million 
people were displaced. The issue of violence soon became synonymous with the issue of illegal 
immigration. As an academic from Assam writes,  
 
… to make matters worse, leaders of the Bodo community, large sections of mainstream 
Assamese society, and a section of the media and political class took it upon themselves 
to allege and prove that the responsibility for this human tragedy lies squarely on illegal 
Bangladeshi migrants (Goyary, 2015, p.16).  
 
The violence then became a means to identify migrants and necessitated a construction of 
identity, which ultimately served as the face of the enemy.  
 
In 2014, violence followed the May general election, when the militants of the NDFB-
S gunned down Bengali Muslims in the Kokrajhar and Baksa districts of Assam. The actual 
reason, for scholars like Saikia, is that the “provocation of Bodo leaders that non-Bodos have 
not voted for the BPF (ruling party of BTC) candidate” (Saikia, 2015). The killing of 46 people, 
including 22 children, and the burning of over one hundred houses, again raised the question 
of the legitimacy of Bengali Muslims and their legitimacy as citizens of the country. Some 
scholars, like Dutta (2016), have argued that Muslims eventually become the soft target of 
nationalistic sentiment, as they are frequently labelled as Bangladeshi. This categorization, or 




of hindering infiltration by the enemy. Dutta highlights that the fear of land alienation has 
gripped the Bodo population, and  
 
… the Bodos feel that Muslim immigrants are swamping the area and alerting its 
demographics. The immigration issue assumes further importance because Bodos 
believe that Muslim settlers lend support to illegal immigrants from Bangladesh by 
helping them cross the border into India and settling them on their lands (Dutta, 2016, 
p.488).  
 
There is no doubt that there is a deep sense of alienation in the Bodo community, not only 
because national and regional governments do not give the community their due share in 
resources, but also because Assamese nationalism marginalizes their identity, coupled with the 
uniting of non-Bodo ethnic groups against them. These factors, combined, prompt the 
emergence of violence, which creates deeper divisions between Bodos and non-Bodos. The 
ethnic solidarity between non-Bodo ethnicities creates more tension between communities, as 
these ethnicities share a certain memory of loss, have the same grievances, and fear the violence 
of the same common enemy, resulting in Bodo groups being put in a vulnerable position. A 
clear example of this may be found in a memorandum that was submitted to the Home Minister 
of India on 6th August, 2014, by non-Bodo groups. It alled into question Bodo hegemony over 
the region. I accessed a copy of the memorandum during my field visit to Bodoland. It was 
presented to me by a leader of the ABMSU. The memorandum was submitted to the Home 
Minister by a united forum of twenty-one organizations, which mainly represented Bengali 
Muslims, Adivasis and Koch Rajbongshis. One can clearly see the ethnic solidarity of non-
Bodos and the demands made in the memorandum, which has certainly challenged the 
existence of the autonomous entity of Bodoland. Some key demands included: 
 
- Reviewing the BTC Accord and the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution (Amendment) 
Act -2003, to preserve the constitutional rights of non-Bodo people, and to exclude the 
non-Bodo majority villages from the BTAD. 
- White paper on the situation created by the Bodo movement 
- Scheduling of Koch Rajbongshis and Adivasis 
- To find a permanent solution, the foreigner issue in Assam, Bangladesh, and India .  
- The Bhutan border must be sealed within one year and all river routes patrolled to stop 





I do not want to list all the demands made in the memorandum, most of which concern 
action against the militants, the perpetrators of violence and the rehabilitation of victims of 
violence. However, two issues are quite prominent here, one is the issue of villages in BTAD  
with a non-Bodo population and, two, the sealing of the Border. The White Paper on the Bodo 
Movement and the exclusion of non-Bodo villages from BTAD, certainly raises the question 
of the legitimacy of Bodo leadership over non-Bodo peoples. Such insecurity, in turn, triggers 
violence from Bodo groups, who aim to cleanse villages of the non-Bodos, rather than allowing 
for the collapse of the administrative council by letting non-Bodos remove villages from the 
BTAD. The violence of 1993 clearly demonstrates how Bodo militant groups strategized their 
violence to create a geography exclusively for themselves. As the issue of infiltration and 
border crossing from Bangladesh is made central to all the violence in the region, the 
memorandum clearly wants a strict border which will eventually protect them, along with an 




 We may argue that in the specific context of Bodoland and  the larger context of Assam, 
the usual frame for communal violence to grasp the tension between two communities would 
be inadequate. Since the Bodos are also competing with other communities and trying to assert 
a distinct identity from that of the Assamese, the conflict in the region becomes a multi-
dimensional one. The violence in the region also highlights the failure of the State to address 
the demands of different groups of people and to include them within the idea of a ‘nation’. 
The violence between the Bodos and the Bengali Muslims in Bodoland is about land and 
identity, and this becomes ‘ideological’ when instrumentalized by the right wing politics of 
Hindu Nationalism, or the victim politics of the Muslim minority. We will see how the narrative 
of violence in the English and Urdu press undermines the multi-layered context of the region 
and uses the events to essentialize the identity of these groups in the chapters on the English 
and Urdu Press. 
 
The events of violence we are going to encounter, with respect to their coverage in the  
press, in the following chapters, cannot be understood without engaging with the complex 
history and context of the competing nationalisms and identities of the Assamese region. The 




situated within this broad context, in which many insecure identities are struggling to find space 
for themselves. The struggle is not just over physical space, but over the conceptual space 
wherein the definitions of the self and the other take place. Violence often operates as a system 























Assam has had a history of immigration from different parts of the region. People of 
different faiths and language groups have settled in the region for centuries. With the defeat of 
the Burmese Army and the signing of the Yandabo Treaty, Assam, once a frontier for the 
British Administration, came under its direct control. The inclusion of Assam in the colonial 
administration made immigration a whole new phenomenon. It was done on an industrial level 
as the demand for labour soared, people from over all the region were brought into the state as 
never before. This was a modern-day migration which was not just a movement of people but 
a very careful management of them, which was based on information, and this information 
contributed to the social formation of the immigrant in the region. The British Administration 
devised polices, created laws and showed great care in archiving this category. A new 
cartography emerged from this importation of labour in the region, as the administration started 
to map/demarcate the territory as per the labour movement.  
 
Nirod K. Barooah, in his book on David Scott7, mentions an incident when an Assam 
hill king asked David Scott why he recorded every judicial transaction in writing as, for him. 
it was an unnecessary process to put everything down. To his enquiry, David Scott replied 
“Swurgo Deo, you are of celestial origin, and can recollect everything. We are earth-born, and 
when we go to dinner forget what we have heard in the course of the day; therefore, we write 
down what we hear.” (Barooah, 1970, p.134). The answer may have satisfied the king but, 
retrospectively, when we look at history we find an immense network of knowledge produced 
 
7 David Scott, Jr. (1786-1831) was a very influential local administrator of British India. He played a key role in 
administration of not just internal affairs but complicated matters of frontier administration as well.  He was 
appointed as commissioner of lower Assam after being a judge and magistrate in north-eastern district of Bengal 




by the Empire through a varied range of information systems, Christopher Bayly, in Empire 
and Information,  has shown how social communication was shaped in India during colonial 
rule. Bayly used the concept of the ‘Information order’ to reflect on the broad framework of 
the state’s intelligence and social communication.  
 
 Assam’s modern history is tied to the history of tea, but even before tea plantations 
formally began in the state, Francis Jenkins advocated the settlement of Englishmen on the 
wastelands in Assam. Amalendu Guha (2006) has noted that Jenkins’ colonization scheme 
finally materialized as the Wasteland Rules of 6th March, 1838, and this allowed forty-five 
years of leasing for the applicants, with just one condition: land clearing at leastevery five 
years. However, it was not a very attractive offer for the Europeans, and the growth of the tea 
industry was very slow. This prompted a new intervention in the form of the Wasteland 
Settlement Policy, which was adopted by the government in the 1850s and ‘60s. The idea of 
the “fee-simple rules” of Lord Canning, under which there was no land clearing condition and 
“instead of giving a lease the land was put up for sale at auction. This encouraged large-scale 
land grabbing.”  (Behal, 2006). A large area of land was taken up for tea plantation and the 
industry continued to grow from the late nineteenth century to the end of colonial rule. Behal 
has noted that “at the end of colonial rule in the Assam Valley, tea plantations employed nearly 
half a million labourers out of a labour population of more than three quarters of a million, and 
more than 300,000 acres were under tea cultivation out of a total area of a million acres 
controlled by the tea companies” (Behal, 2006, p.143).  
 
The Indian Tea Association (ITA) was founded in 1881, and it became one of the most 
powerful pressure group in India and Europe. It lobbied to devise friendly policies and laws 
for itself, and it even used state machinery to suppress labour protest and strikes against low 
monthly wages. When the Chief Commissioner of Assam, Henry Cotton, advocated for an 
increase in the monthly wage after his inspection report, the ITA campaigned and lobbied 
against it, which lead to “trouble for Cotton from his superiors and marred his future prospects 
in the Indian Civil Services.” (Behal, 2006, p.148) Cotton earned a warm reception from 
coolies after this, as he was passing “from Fenchgunj to Silchar, the roads for a distance of 
fifteen miles were reportedly lined with coolies holding lanterns and crying out ‘Cotton sahib 
ki jai’ (Glory to Cotton)” (Guha, 2006, p.38). The tea business contributed immensely to the 





They formed powerful and long-lasting trade associations that lobbied governments 
and raised taxes that paid for massive, and often repetitive, global advertising 
campaigns. Planters, their allies, and associations thus cultivated many of the 
technologies and ideologies we associate with the history of modern consumer society   
(Rapport, 2017, p.8). 
 
When, in 1864, Oscar Flex came to Assam as the manager of a tea estate, he wrote that:  
 
…if this region has suddenly become the centre of attraction, it is due only to the fact 
that hordes of Europeans have descended on it to produce just one thing Tea – and make 
a business out of it. But no attempt has yet been made to put to better use the mineral 
resources available in the region and harness the potentials of its innumerable rivers. 
Only the tea planters are scouting around its dark and fearsome jungles and the 
grasslands to find suitable site for tea plantation.” (Flex, 2013, p.13).  
 
Flex’s account is a glimpse of the reality of the situation prevailing at that time in Assam. Vast 
amounts of land were needed for tea plantations, and for that tea estates needed a large number 
of labourers. In its early days, during the 1840s, The Assam Company had imported Chinese 
staff who were better paid than the Assamese labour (Guha, 2006). However, the situation with 
the arrival of the indentured labour changed everything in the state. 
 
 The category of Indentured Labour, or contract labour (coolie, which is now considered 
a derogatory term), was introduced by the British Empire when this slavery was abolished as 
‘a new system of slavery’8. Indentured labour filled the labour demand of the Empire’s colonies 
globally, and India provided the largest share. Marjory Harper and Stephen Constantine wrote 
that:  
 
In total, 1, 47,740 indentured workers were recruited and sent overseas to other British 
Empire destinations between 1834 and 1920. India provided the largest share. Indeed, 
with the exception of those leaving the British Isles, Indians were the empire’s most 
numerous and persistent migrants. Indentured workers from India travelling to British 
colonies numbered 1,258,861, or 85 percent of the total. (Harper and Constantine, 2010, 
p.50) 
 
Not only the labourers sent to the colonies worldwide, but the indentured labour’s 
importation into Assam changed the entire dynamics of the region and shaped its history and 
future. The British administration took great care in managing the labour force and recording 
 
8 As argued by Hugh Tinker in his work A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour Overseas 1830- 
1920. In Migration and Empire, Harper and Constantine try to look into this position critically and to contextualize 




minute details about them. Annual labour immigration reports were written for all the colonies 
and one can see a commonality in these reports, with their particular dealings in the region. 
Labour immigration reports were not only written for the labour traveling to places like Jamaica 
or Mauritius, but to Assam as well. In this chapter, we will look some examples from these 
reports which will give us a glimpse into the past and the archive which recorded their lives 
and movements as it was. This is not an extensive chapter on the colonial archive, but it should 
be read as a supplement to the previous chapter. These examples I have used should be read as 
fragments to look into how the category of a migrant was constructed and preserved during the 
colonial time. The purpose of this chapter is to help us to locate the migration debate and the 
violence around it, which we will encounter in the further chapters. This gives us an historical 
understanding of how a semantic category, like migrant, holds different meanings in different 
periods of history.   
 
The Labour Districts Emigration Act (Act No VII of 1873) 
 
This Act was introduced in 1873 to amend the law relating to the emigration of 
labourers to districts of Assam and to regulate contract labour and service. The Bengal Act II 
of 1870 was repealed after the introduction of this Act. The Act was divided into twelve 
chapters with one hundred and sixteen articles. It ensures that accommodation, support and 
medical treatment is available for all emigrants. The power to prevent the emigration of a 
labourer was invested in the hands of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and the Garden 
Sardar (the head coolie, who recruited coolies) could only make someone an emigrant by 
getting a signed certificate from the magistrate. The emigrant is a labourer who is a native of 
India, the native Indian is imagined as being outside the boundary of Assam and, hence, their 
arrival is regulated. The emigrant is the term used for indentured labour and through these Acts 
they are regulated and protected. The Act clearly outlined the limits of recruiters, contractors, 
and garden sardars. These Acts were also guaranteeing some protection to those recruiting 
under the contract. The major aspect of an emigrant/immigrant in the archive is his mortality 
and health. His health was given utmost importance in the Act and a number of articles talk 
about it, since unhealthy labourers were not good for the Tea gardens and there was also the 
fear of epidemics. Every migrant needed to be certified by the medical officer before 





Article 53 shows how the migrant had to go through a medical check-up at the arrival 
depot, and the Act defines how: 
 
…the medical inspector shall examine any emigrant in regard to whom a medical 
certificate is not forthcoming, and shall certify whether such an emigrant is in his 
opinion in a fit state of health and able in point of physical condition to journey and 
work for hire in a labour district.  
 
In the case that someone is deemed unfit, then s/he should be sent back. The provision for 
compensation was also in the Act if, at the depot, the Superintendent of Emigration finds any 
emigrant being ill-treated by a recruiter or a garden-sardar. Chapter ten of the Act was 
dedicated to the regulation of labour, which also included the article about not using the labour 
more than six days a week, nor for more than six hours consecutively. The employer could be 
punished by a fine if he forced the labourer to work when he might have been unfit to do so. 
Chapter twelve of the Act talked about the necessary provisions for labourers, which included 
sufficient and proper house accommodation, a water-supply, sanitary arrangements and rice.  
 
Report on Labour Immigration into Assam for the Year 1879 
 
Generally, the labour immigration reports were compiled in the light of the existing Act 
relating to emigration or immigration. The labour report for the year 1879 talked about the 
decrease in the number of unsuitable coolies, but still there were complaints about coolies who 
were found to be sick or weak. Different reports discussed the implications of the arrival of 
coolies by steamer and the need to improve the steamer services. The tension between the 
administration and the planters could also be found in the reports. On the issue of making a 
depot at Disangmukh in the Sibsagar District, the report said:  
 
…it was under consideration during the year, but, as the planters, for whom alone the 
depot would have been of use, would not undertake to share any of the expense which 
it would have entailed, the Chief Commissioner did not feel justified in recommending 
that the necessary expenditure should be incurred entirely by the Labour Transport 
Fund (p.3). 
 
On the legal status of an emigrant who had arrived without written agreement, the report 
suggested that a circular be issued “explaining that a coolie who, even without giving a written 




is to labour for that planter, is an emigrant.” (p.3)  The report, in light of the Act of 1873, 
determines the meaning of an emigrant. The need for labour shaped the definition of a migrant 
in the region. The emigrant is one who is imported for labour and who has the will to labour. 
The report, separately, would talk about mortality among coolies from different regions. 
Madrasi9 coolies’ mortality was a concern in the previous year, and the  death rate had not been 
that high that year, but still the health and mortality of Madarasis has been an issue, and “a 
stricter examination of immigrants before they leave the recruiting districts in years of scarcity” 
is recommended in the report. The Act of 1873 was informed by labour reports like these and 
amendments were made. and the report reflects on those changes that had been made. Regular 
inspections were carried out to check the implementation of the Act, and they would also be 
part of the report.  Statistical data on the inspection of each tea garden in all districts, along 
with general statistics in relation to numbers were important features of the report. The report 
enlists coolies who were working on contracts made under Act VII and also non-Act ones. In 
1879, fewer labourers were imported if compared to 1878, and this was due to the decrease in 
the good harvest, another reason being the high number imported in the previous year. The 
report also had a comparative statement on the localities of the coolies. The report named this 
section ‘Localities from which coolies were imported’. For the year 1879, coolies were 
imported from Bengal, North West Province, Chota Nagpur, Nepal, Madras, and Bombay. The 
largest number of importations came from Chota Nagpur. The issue of free immigration is also 
discussed in the report, and the need to obtain more statistical data on that is asserted. The 
report mentioned: 
 
The extent to which free immigration has been going on during the year cannot be 
ascertained. But looking to the diminution of non-Act imported labourers, it is not 
probable that it has materially increased. An attempt will be made during the year 1880 
to register the free immigrants at Dhubri for the Assam Valley, and at Bhairab Bazar 
for the Surma Valley, and, if these attempts prove at all successful, the Chief 
Commissioner hopes to be able to give some interesting details on this point in the next 
year’s report. (p.8). 
 
The report discussed the issue of the free immigrant as cheap labour and that they were 
desired by the employers, if compared to contractual labour who were emigrants. In the report, 
the free immigrant is distinguished from the emigrant. One who is free and not part of reporting 
system, and the other is the emigrant who is part of the contracted labour scheme, and thus of 
 




the reporting system.  The report uses both the terms ‘locality’ and ‘nationality’ to talk about 
the imported labour. The idea of nationality is just of locality -- from the region of origin – the 
region as demarcated by the administration. So, the nationality is not even an ethnic or 
‘national’ category. The report comprehensively talks about the average wage, the offences of 
labourers statistically, settlement within provinces, and rice cultivation for the benefit of the 
local population.  It also reflects on the limitations of the Act and concludes with 
recommendations to improve communications for the development of the region. 
 
Rules, forms and Schedules under the Assam Labour and Emigration Act, VI of 1901  
 
With six parts and two hundred and twenty-three articles, a new emigration act was 
passed in 1901. The changing Acts are one of the features of the administration in those times. 
The regular updating of Acts is owed to the information system that wa at work through 
different kinds of reporting and information gathering. The emigration related Acts were 
aiming to achieve a lower mortality rate, better regulation and the protection of labour from 
exploitation in recruitment, and the better administration of the entire area. Along with some 
general rules, the Assam Labour and Emigration Act had sections on the management of depots 
and places of accommodation, procedures to be followed in relation to the occurrence of 
cholera, transport, embarkation agents, medical offices, etc. This was a very comprehensive 
Act with lot of specific guidelines, but the first section started with the definition of an 
‘Emigrant’ “which means a labourer and includes his dependents”, and a category of 
“Intending emigrant” was also defined. The issues of health and a healthy place to live for the 
labourers, are discussed in every detail. Separate articles on ‘ventilation of depot sleeping 
sheds’, ‘depot water-supply’, ‘Depot latrines’ ‘Depot hospital’, ‘Depot dispensary’ and 
‘penalty’ were discussed with clear directives. For example, Article 24 said  
 
A hospital for ordinary cases, with separate wards for male and female patients, shall 
be provided. The ward shall be dry, well-raised, thoroughly ventilated, well-lighted and 
furnished with a separate platform or machan for each patient, which, when not 
boarded, shall be covered with matting. (p.3).  
 
A Superintendent or Medical Officer’s words were binding for the contractors until he 
successfully appeals against the Officer. The figure of a migrant is one that has been dealt with 
with great care in the archive. The body of an emigrant also shaped the category of an emigrant 




Article Fifty Seven is about the ‘personal cleanliness of the emigrant’, in which the Act said 
“Emigrants and intending emigrants shall wash their clothes at least twice a week when 
possible, and shall bathe daily. A liberal supply of soap shall be provided for the purpose” (p.6) 
The mortality of the labourer was a great concern, and one can see in these Acts how that care 
has been shown or archived. Communicable disease, and the procedure to deal with it, are 
detailed in the Act as there is special chapter outlining the ‘procedure to be followed on the 
occurrence of cholera’. The contractor is made responsible for paying for the treatment of each 
emigrant in such a situation. There are different rules for migrants taking different routes to 
Assam. Most of the articles in the Act are concerned with the transportation of the emigrant 
and the care needed to take them to the actual ground where they labour. The instructions 
included in the Act said:  
 
…the person in charge must take every care of the emigrants on the journey. He must 
give them a cooked meal before they start, and if the journey is likely to occupy more 
than six hours, he must distribute biscuits and sugar in the proportion of two biscuits 





Figure 3.1 Map of Assam to illustrate the immigration report 
 
 
Source: Report on Labour Immigration into Assam for the year 1901 
 
 
Report on Labour Immigration into Assam for the year 1901 
 
  The map above was presented with the report and, unlike previous years, draws lines 
on the map of Assam according to the Immigration Report. It shows the coolie routes, the ports 
of inspection, river and railway disembarcation depots, and also coolie rest houses. The 1901 




Act I of 1882. Samita Sen has noted that the Act of 1882 was a major watershed, in the sense 
that it  
 
“married unsupervised recruitment with contractual employment, resulting in a system 
of ‘free emigration’. The planters benefitted enormously from this system, as did the 
brokers. The share of ‘non-Act’ recruitment increased by leaps and bounds until the 
system was discontinued in 1901” (Sen, 2012, p.194). 
 
In eight chapters, the 1901 Report discussed general statistics in relation to the labour 
force, immigration, contracts and wages, vital statistics, unhealthy ground, offences, relations 
between employers and the employed, and miscellaneous other things. Reflecting on the new 
Act, the report noted that it was:  
 
…designed to cheapen the cost of importing tea garden labour, and to 
safeguard coolies against fraudulent or oppressive recruitment by bringing under 
some control the operations of all recruiters whether working under the special 
labour Law or not, and by encouraging the employment of garden sardars as the 
recruiting agency, instead of contractors (Report on Labour Immigration into Assam 
for the year 1901). 
. 
 
There is a fair amount of discussion on recruitment and different meetings and 
memoranda show us that the administration preferred the Sardari system over Contractors or 
sub-contractors. It clearly mentions Arkati in the report, as the number of coolies dropped in 
1901 from Arkati recruitment. Without going into a detailed discussion of Sardari and Arkati 
we should note that these were two recruiting methods. The Sardari system was organized by 
a law in which the Garden Sardar was given a license to recruit 20 workers. Arkati was part of 
a network of sub-agents that was being used by the contractors. Sumita Sen has pointed out 
that the “arkati [was] already a notorious figure, [and] came to symbolize immoral profiteering, 
invoking memories of slave traffic, increasingly associated with crime and violence” (ibid). 
For employers, the Arkatis were not a viable option, and the Sardari was trusted. In a 
memorandum submitted to the Secretary of the Chief Commissioner of Assam from the 
Chairman of the Assam Tea Association, J. Buckingham, in 1892, he pointed out that:  
 
At present free emigration is actually checked by arkati competition. A good coolie is 
not allowed, so to say, to emigrate at his own discretion. A strong proof of this is the 
number of old coolies coming up to Assam under five years agreement on Rs.5  and 




value too well to let them off cheap (Report on Labour Immigration into Assam for the 
year 1901).  
 
The Memorandum also makes a clear point about how tea companies have to bear the cost of 
these four stages of recruitment: First, the village Arkati; Second, the recruiter; Third, the sub-
contractor, and Fourth, the contractor. There is a discussion between Sen (2012) and Ghosh 
(1999) on whether there is a  logic in thinking that the Sardar were considered insiders and the 
Arkati outsiders, in the colonial understanding, or was it that by promoting Sardari the 
administration managed the criticism against the labour system in Assam. 
 
 The Arkati’s exploitation is also found in the oral narrative of indentured labour. It is 
part of folk songs and the collective memory of those who left their homes as an immigrant to 
go to various parts of the world during the colonial era. A folk poem is mentioned in the project 
book on Bhojpuri migration, edited by Mousumi Majumder (2007), Pravasi Yadgar 
(Immigrant’s Memory), Amarshingh Raman wrote: 
 
vahi dinva jab yad avela, ankhiya me bharela pani re. 
Hindustan se bhagkar aili, yahi hai apni kahani re, 
bhai chuta, bap chuta, aur chuti mahatari re 
Arkatiya khub bharamavlis, kahai paisa kamaibu bhar-bhar thali re, 
 
 
[When that day comes to mind, the eyes are filled with tears, 
Fleeing India, I’ve come here - this is my personal story  
Brother got separated, father got separated, and my wife got separated too. 
The recruiter (Arkati) deceived me badly, saying that I would make much money10] 
 
The 1901 Report dealt with the labour imported for employment on tea gardens, in the 
oil refinery at Margherita, in coal mines, and in a few saw-mills in Upper Assam. The report 
categorically said that this did not include all those immigrant labourers who worked on 
railways or were seasonally employed. The report gives a comprehensive figure on the classes 
of labourers for five years, which included Act and non-Act adults and children. The report 
notes a striking decrease in immigration due to famine in the recruiting districts. The title of 
the section on the locality of immigrants from 1879 was changed to Nationality of Immigrant.  
The number of deaths and their causes were also an important aspect of the report. Most of the 
 
10 I have changed a few words in the translation to make it more accurate to the exact poem. The actual poem can 




labourers died from cholera. The report also talked about the wages and contracts in detail, and 
there was verification of the contracts in every district with numbers. The relationship between 
employers and the employed is briefly discussed in the Report, and an improvement was noted 
in the relationship, however, incidents of rioting and assault were also noted. Incidents like 
allegations made by the wife of a coolie that the manager had abused and assaulted her, lead 
five coolies to attack the manager, leading to severe injuries. In another case, the manager of a 
tea estate allowed coolies to fight amongst themselves, and this became known as the “Lyall 
Case”. The statements at the end of the Report gives the comprehensive statistics about a range 
of things, including the nationality and sex of the immigrant and information about their 
recruiting agency. The nationalities of immigrants listed in the table were: Bengal (Chota 
Nagpur and Sonthal Pargana, Behar, Bengal proper and Orissa) United provinces of Agra and 
Oudh, Central Provinces, Madras, Nepal, Assam. The immigrant term is used for Assamese 
labour as well, as s/he is recruited for labouring work in the tea gardens, both on Act and non-
Act contracts.  
 




In the 1930 Report we no longer find any Act and non-Act coolies, there are coolies 
recruited to the tea gardens and there is no Act to classify them. The Report addresses the 
labour force employed on tea gardens, on the oil fields, in the Digboi refinery, and in the coal 
mines, but it does not talk about the labourers and their conditions in these mines and oil 
refinery. The focuses of the Report are the tea gardens and tea districts and tea labourers (who 
will later call themselves tea tribes) and one can easily get a sense of a coolie’s life working on 
these gardens, but it hardly reports on the condition of coolies elsewhere. The 1930 Report 
noted that the condition of the tea industry was “not prosperous during the year under review” 
and this was one of the reasons for there being fewer immigrant labourers compared to the 
previous year. The “depressed condition of the (tea) industry” was the factor given for less 
labour recruitment. The mortality rate and birth rate are reported on in the Report, as three 
deaths in transit are also mentioned. The Report also mentioned a fraudulent recruitment 
complaint made against C.K. Bezbarua for obtaining labour from Arkatis in Calcutta, which 





In 1930, the Report is more focussed on the status of tea gardens, the land under cultivation 
and the situation of those lands. There is less discussion on health and mortality, if compared 
to previous reports, although in discussing the welfare of the coolies their birth rates, death 
rates and epidemics are discussed. The issues of wages and concessions are also under 
discussion and the report noted that the “Deputy Commissioner of Lakhimpur reports that there 
has been a marked improvement in the standard of living amenities of life of the labour force 
due to the higher wages.” One can see a shift in 1930, as earlier reports were more focussed 
oin the health of tea labourers, what they had been eating and how they were dying, but here 
the report lists the properties owned by coolies. The report produced districts/subdivision 
statistics relating to a number of gardens with a totally adult labour force, and then labour is 
classified under two categories, those who own buffaloes and those who have any other cattle.  
The report also mentioned the savings and remittances of these coolies. The report said, “The 
information as to the amount of money saved by coolies is not available except in the case of 
the Kellyden Tea Estate in the District of Nowgong, where the coolies have remitted a sum of 
Rs 3,200 to their native districts”. It also provides information about land held by ex-tea garden 
coolies immediately under the government as subtenants. The statistical data also provides 
information about the average earnings of different categories of labourers:  Men, Women, 
Children (in book) and their average daily working strength, monthly cash earnings, and 
average monthly cash earnings. 
 
The major aspect of the 1930 Report is the vivid and descriptive account of incidents that 
had occurred in that period. The relationships between managers and labour forces were 
discussed in detail, as a few incidents were reported about tensions between manager and 
labour, as they refused to work. More serious was a garden disturbance in Darrang District, 
which caused a riot in which the manager, assistant manager and an engineer were assaulted 
by coolies as a result of a “head hunting” scare.11 There are a number of incidents of labour 
striking for more pay, which were also reported. This is very specifically explained through 
the reporting of cases in individual districts. Along with incidents between managers and 
coolies, riots, protests and strikes, ‘separate cases of disturbances’ were also reported. As one 
incident of that nature is reported:  
 






Mr.Lamb, the manager of Bhumbrighat Tea estate in the Karimganj subdivision, fired 
a gun at a mad dog and accidentally shot a coolie woman of his garden, causing her 
death; two other men were also injured slightly. A case under Section 304 (A), Indian 
penal code, was taken up but was finally reported as mistake of fact. (Report on 
Immigrant Labour in the Assam valley division for the year ending the 30th June, 
1930.) 
 
Another incident of ‘disturbance’ reported: 
 
In Clevedon Tea Estate in the South Sylhet subdivision, the manager, while inspecting 
the work of the coolies, took a Sardar to task for bad outturn of work from the women 
in his charge. The Sardar resented this and showed an insolent attitude. The manager 
therefore placed him off work for six days as a punishment. On the evening of the same 
day when the manager was getting the leaf weighed the women folk surrounded and 
insulted him. This was the version of the manager. Coolies, on the other hand, alleged 
that the manager slapped a coolie woman and hence the trouble. The matter was settled 
by the sub divisional office and the coolies resumed work. (Report on Immigrant 
Labour in the Assam valley division for the year ending the 30th June, 1930.) 
 
This year’s report also mentioned an incident that was related to Hindu-Muslim tension: 
 
About 200 coolies of Kumbhigram Tea Estate suspended work from the 25th June, 
1929, to the 3rd July, 1929. Their demands were for the dismissal of Mussalman clerks 
because certain Bengali servants (Mussalmans) had killed a cow or ox. As the coolies 
had no fault to find with the clerks and the offending servants had been dismissed, the 
strike had no substance and fizzled out. The coolies returned to work peacefully. 
(Report on Immigrant Labour in the Assam valley division for the year ending the 30th 
June, 1930.) 
 
The Report carries a lot of everyday incidents around tea gardens, along with extensive 
statistical data on different aspects of tea gardens and immigration, together with the 
‘nationality and sex of the adult labour’, which included labourers from the United Provinces, 






The Reports and Acts discussed above represent different periods during colonial rule. 




documents were configuring the power, but such fragmented glimpses from these reports show 
us how the figure of the ‘immigrant’ was defined, understood, regulated, protected and 
archived. These reports reveal how the semantic meaning of ‘migrant’ was built up and 
connected to other semantics in that field. The labour that is defined and determined within the 
category of the ‘immigrant’; the mortality of labourers, which was a defining feature of the 
category, and that also shows what the colonial care of the labourer was at that time. Along 
with health and mortality, the exploitation of the labourer was a serious concern for the 
administration. Different laws and policies were devised to address this, and the concerns of 
labour also found a place in the archive. The vividness and descriptive nature of the archive is 
quite telling, since it outlines the category of ‘immigrant’ with great care and particularity. 
There are not just numbers, statistics and bureaucratic and administrative issues, but there are 
stories and narratives which tell us about the time. In one way, these archives reveal the lives 
of coolies from that time, their journeys, their struggles with diseases and weather, their 
troubles with employers, and their economic achievements.  We do not know what the 
document excluded, but what it included is quite telling about the labour force, employers, 
administrators and that historic time. In the archive, the ‘nationality’ is also very geographical, 
and the location of origin is considered to be the nationality, and not an ethnic or political 
category. Labour working on tea gardens were recorded as ‘immigrants’, whether they were 
Nepalese or Assamese.  
 
It is true that the archive cannot be understood without the power, Foucault would 
argue, in The Archaeology of Knowledge, that it is a “system of statements” and the “rule of 
practices” (Foucault, 1972) which shape the particular regularities, and Derrida talked about 
how an archive cannot be understood without the power to archive. Derrida, in his essay 
‘Archive Fever’ (1995), shows the tradition of archiving and its concept in the Greek language. 
The archive has a relationship to command. The archive, or archival knowledge, is also the 
work of a certain form of command. Someone has to command the archiving of the other and, 
hence, to archive the knowledge about someone. Derrida demonstrated that the archive has a 
deep relation with the idea of the future, and it cannot be understood as a mere event in the 
past. The question of the archive is not a mere question of physical space, in which the 






Despite the way that Derrida, Foucault, or others, question the archive and its inherent 
authority, an archive still reveals to us what historiography might conceal, it can reveal to us 
the condition of knowledge and, as Ann Laura Stoler has argued about the status of colonial 
archive,  
 
It diverts our attention from how much colonial history-writing has been shaped by 
nationalist historiographies and the nation-bound project. It leaves unquestioned the 
notion that colonial states were first and foremost information-hungry machines in 
which power accrued from the massive accumulation of ever-more knowledge rather 
than from the quality of it. (Stoler, 2002, p.100)  
 
The archives were not only documents of reason and official repositories of policy, but 
are also records of fear, intimacy, emotion and cultural sensibilities. The information system 
shaped the social formations of the time and, as Bayly has noted in one of the footnotes to 
Empire and Information,  
 
Following Foucault and Said it is often taken as axiomatic that the influence of a 
knowledge or a discourse both reflects and substantializes the political 'weight' of its 
authors. Yet we shall suggest that in pre-colonial and colonial times the emergence of 
systems of knowledge could equally well reflect the weaknesses of power and 
legitimacy, or situations of intense social competition. Assertive 'knowledges' might 
grow up on the troubled margins of power. (Bayly, 1996, p.25). 
 
The significance of the colonial archive in understanding not just the colonial 
knowledge formation, but also the link between the categories of colonial and post-colonial is 
quite critical. The way colonial archives show the formation of categories and different system 
of knowledge has its bearing on the postcolonial formation of categories. The way labour and 
immigrant are archived underlines the categorical formation of the immigrant class and its 
impact on the social and economic aspects of the region. This cannot be overlooked in any 
contemporary debate about immigrants in the region of Assam today. In Javed Majeed’s latest 
work on Grieson’s Linguistic Survey of India, one notices the profound significance of this 
survey, not just in understanding the formation of colonial knowledge, but also in how India 
emerged as a linguistic region (Majeed, 2019). In looking at these archives, the development 
of  the intertwined categories of ‘immigrant’ and ‘labour’ enriches our understanding of history 





We saw how the ‘immigrant’ emerged in the colonial archive, now, in the next chapter, 
we will see how the change in context has created a new semantic field for the ‘immigrant’ and 
the figure, immigrant, moves from ‘care’ to an existential threat. The chapter has shown the 
emergence of the phenomenon of migration and the usage of the term in its very context. The 
following chapter, on the English newspaper coverage, will show how a new context displaces 








The Assam Tribune 






The Assam Tribune, one of the most prominent English newspaper of North-Eastern 
India, covers regional politics and events extensively. In this chapter we will look into the 
coverage of four events of violence in the Bodoland region of Assam and the newspaper’s 
interpretation of them for the Assamese public. Here, we will look at the politics implied in the 
reporting of events of violence and how certain themes are embedded in the discourse around 
ethnic violence. Two interconnected issues: ‘Border’ and ‘Immigration’ are integral to the 
newspaper’s framing of the violence and its rationale. In this chapter we will explore how 
events of violence become an avenue along which to define immigrants, as against natives. 
 
Press and Politics: An historical entanglement  
 
On December 4th, 1999, the then Prime Minister of India, and the prominent leader of 
Hindu Nationalism, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, addressed the diamond jubilee celebration of The 
Assam Tribune newspaper in New Delhi. He praised the newspaper and remarked that people, 
the heart of the nation, might not know of a regional newspaper, from a remote part of the 
country, but, “India’s national media would be incomplete without what is described as the 
regional press.” He praised  the newspaper for not being an imperial enterprise and maintained 
that, “The Assam Tribune was in the forefront of arousing the latent nationalism of India’s 
Northeast, thus making a major contribution to the national freedom movement, and to the 
subsequent consolidation of the country,”  and added that, “Whenever India has faced a 
challenge to her sovereignty and territorial integrity, this newspaper has played a frontline role 




Minister Narendra Modi, in November, 2014, addressed the platinum jubilee celebrations of 
The Assam Tribune  and said “The Assam Tribune has remained indispensable for the people 
of the region. They can spare the morning cup of tea, but not The Assam Tribune” (The Assam 
Tribune, 2014, 30Nov). These two instances of Indian Prime Ministers (from the same political 
party) speaking at prominent events that were held by the same newspaper, is symptomatic of 
the symbiotic relationship that the press and politics may have. The government’s vision of a 
country, and its narrative of the nation, are channelized through the processes of 
communication. Since the growth of the press in the modern world, its relationships with 
politics and the politician have been significant. 
 
 In his work on the press and propaganda in the Indian nationalist struggle, Milton Israel 
highlights the distinction between the Anglo-Indian press and the Indian-owned press, and its 
meaning for politics during the colonial era. He underlines that whilst the Anglo-Indian press, 
was able to be critical of the Raj, there was consensus about its legitimacy, whilst the Indian 
owned newspaper, on the other hand, acted as its opposition. He argues that,  
 
Among Indian newspapers, their shared nationalism was no constraint on a spacious 
range of views regarding means and ends. In its daily editorial comment and reporting 
of events, competing images of India present and India future reflected loyalties to a 
particular leader and the significance of ethnicity, language, local historical experience, 
and religion in any response to calls for unity of action and identity  (Israel, 1994, p.5).  
 
Milton Israel draws from Stephen Koss’s reflections on the emergence of the Press in the mid-
nineteenth century, and particularly on the intimate relationship between the press, politicians 
and the political process, including the partnership between individual parties and politicians 
which, according to Koss, in Victorian England,  dominated newspapers. In Israel’s view, this 
essential characteristic, if not the whole context, was replicated in India. He underlines how 
Indian papers were attacked for their allegiance to the Indian National Congress and were 
described as “unprofessional propagandists writing for political rags with no legitimate claim 
on freedom-of- the-press protection” (Israel, 1994, p.7). The late nineteenth century Indian 
Press, focused a lot on social reform and the defence of traditional values,  and in so doing  
often made use of the past, which could prove to be emotional and combative between the 
Hindu and Muslim communities. Israel notes, about that period in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century press, that, “urban-based English-language papers tended to be more 





Chandrika Kaul, in her work on the relationship between the British press and colonial 
India, explores this relationship quite extensively, and demonstrates how reporting on India 
shaped the imperial experience. She underlines the fact that the Empire was very much 
interwoven with, “social conditions and British cultural institutions”. It is not just that imperial 
policies and political events are covered and analysed by the press, but also that the government 
attempts to influence the reporting. To gather public support for its India Policy, the Empire 
developed a systemic approach to news management. In one instance, the royal tour of Edward 
VII was used as a public relations event and, as Kaul mentions, “The chairman of the 
Newspaper Proprietors’ Association was invited to assist the India Office to ensure that the 
arrangements would be ‘helpful’ to the press” (Kaul, 2003, p.233).  Where they failed to control 
the information, they influenced its interpretation, as is shown in the case of hartal and the 
protest against the government that was called by Gandhi in this period. Influencing both the 
news and its interpretation was vital to the Empire. Another important aspect of Reporting Raj 
which can be extended to the study of newspapers in different contexts, is that a free press in 
Fleet Street was, “at the heart of an imperial system of coercion, and to that extent it was 
inevitable that the press both reflected and reinforced prevailing images of order and power” 
(Kaul, 2003, p.9). A free press may operate within a coercive system and legitimize the policies 
of government, even those of an extreme kind.  In reading the newspapers of a particular era, 
one is enabled to reconstruct “contemporary perspectives on events” and newspapers, as Kaul 
notes,  allow us to capture the reaction of contemporaries in history, yet the coverage of each 
paper is determined by various factors,  like the costs of information, the relationship between 
the paper and its reader, and the journalists (Kaul, 2003). In modern society the press plays an 
important role in shaping public opinion and the nexus of politics - the press is also used to 
legitimize or normalize certain views or positions. The press’s views and public opinion are 
connected to each other and, often, such views are regarded as “a proxy for a wider public 
opinion” in a society where there is limited opportunity for the public to showcase its opinion, 
or an “absence of alternative insights into public attitudes” (Kaul, 2003, p.20).  
 
The History of the English language Press in India 
 
Soon after Indian Independence, in 1954, a Report of the First Press Commission was 




which was 25.255 lakhs, with a daily circulation of 6.97 lakhs12. The 62nd Annual Report for 
2017-18 by the Registrar of Newspapers for India, shows that there are 3,838 Hindi language 
news dailies, claiming a circulation of 10,34,78,860, whilst there are 815 English Dailies, 
claiming a circulation of 2,97,25,905. Hindi language newspapers, over a period of seventy 
years, have seen immense growth owing to various factors. However, the significance of the 
English Press in shaping public opinion and policy debate, remains influential.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Circulation of Publications during 2017-18 (language-wise) 
Source: The 62nd Annual Report for 2017-18 by the Registrar of Newspapers for India 
 
With regard to the Hindi and English Press, during colonial India it was noted that the 
Hindi Press was overtly politicized and “Hindi journalists were deeply patriotic and adopted 
journalism as a mission …Hindi newspapers were largely used for propaganda and opinion, 
rather than news (Neyazi, 2018, p.44). Hindi newspapers were associated with the 
politicization of the public sphere in the colonial period, and the language was the most 
significant vernacular language used amongst the people of India, if compared to any of the 
 




other Indian languages  “because of the support provided to Hindi by Gandhi and other national 
leaders” (Neyazi, 2018, p.48). Nationalist English newspapers were also in publication at the 
time, like the Hindu in Madras, the Indian Mirror in Kolkata, etc., the popularity of which grew 
in the first half of the twentieth century. The division between the Hindi and English language 
presses, however, is an interesting one as it demonstrates the influential power of the English 
press in India, even in post-colonial times. At one level, it is the colonial history of India which 
has granted the English language a special status in national discourse, and it has traditionally 
also been viewed  as the language of modernity. However, the dominance of the English 
language media on political power structures and other aspects of life also owes itself to other 
factors. Neyazi’s work on the Hindi press in India shows that, in contrast to the English Press, 
the Hindi language was not able to establish its authority in the market, and its influence did 
not expand beyond Northern India. The dominance of English in the public sphere is also due 
to the failure of Hindi “to widen its social base constituency and emerge as a vehicle of 
communication” (Neyazi, 2018, p.50). A few important factors are owed to the dominance of 
the English language in public discourse, as noted, and these are: English, in contrast to Hindi, 
became the language of the elite, the ideological dominance of English was greater than any of 
the other Indian languages in national discourse, and it also became the language of social 
mobility, since English newspapers were viewed as being more credible, and Hindi newspapers 
borrowed news from them, emulating English newspapers. The Hindi newspapers tendency to 
imitate is described by Arvind Rajagopal as their acting as ‘‘satellites’’ of the national English 
language newspapers, rather than as ‘‘independents”, utilizing the distinction, which was 
originally made by Rahul Sankrityayan (Rajagopal, 2004, p.158). The Hindi language press 
started to triumph over the English press by the end of the twentieth century, as is well reflected 
in the Report of the Registrar of Newspapers for India but, as Neyazi concludes, it “still does 
not occupy the status that is commanded by English, the language of a growing Indian middle 
class” (Neyazi, 2018, p.76). 
 
While we see in Kaul’s work (2003) the influence of the Empire over news reporting 
and management, Rajagopal highlights the way in which the post-independence period in India 
curbed the press and devised ways to control it. The attitude towards the press varied in this 
period and the provincial press saw less control by the government if compared to the 
metropolitan press, as the government feared its “potential political power” (Rajagopal, 2004). 
It was through limiting their growth and the “rationing of essential supplies such as newsprint” 




it “through numerous complaints to the Press Council, and the threat of withdrawal of 
government advertising” (ibid).While it exercised control on the metropolitan press, it showed 
generosity to small newspapers in remote states, and acted as a benefactor by “providing 
advertisements and subsidies of newsprint to encourage their growth” (Rajagopal, 2004, 
p.157). The distinction between provincial and metropolitan papers is in their quality and, as 
is the case in Hindi, the provincial press imitated their English counterparts.  
 
In the context of India, the other significance of the English language, in contrast to 
other language presses, is that its audience is considered to be relatively more coherent and a 
“well networked national elite, with a sense of being bearers of the agenda of modernization.” 
This granted the English press the privilege, and in some sense the right, of defining the nation 
and narrating its limits of inclusion and exclusion. This implied, as Rajagopal has noted, that 
the English press be secular, if not in fact then in intention. The limit and unevenness of the 
meaning of secularism presented a dilemma for the English press, and it could not solve the 
contradictions of secularism in India (Rajagopal, 2004, p.158). The cultural disparity between 
the English and Hindi presses is also being effectively used by the Hindu Right, as noted:  
 
If the English media treated issues of religion as for one reason or another peripheral to 
their concerns, and the Hindi media treated it as a relatively familiar, living presence 
and as a sociological fact within their purview, the latter could become an organizing 
ground for the Hindu right. (Rajagopal, 2004, p.160). 
 
The History of the Press in Assam 
 
In 1999, the Department of Post, issued a commemorative postage stamp celebrating 
150 years of Newspapers in Assam, with an image of the first newspaper in Assam, Orunodoi, 
which published in Sibsagar in 1846 (Istampgallery.com, 2016). This was a missionary paper, 
but played a role in shaping the Assamese literary scene. Since then, several newspapers and 
periodicals have emerged and grown in the region and not just in the Assamese and English 
languages, but in many other regional and tribal languages.  
 
A “confidential” report published during the colonial period with the Statement of 
Newspapers and Periodicals Published in the Province of Assam from 1924 to 1944, shows a 
changing number of publications during this period. Many newspapers and magazines 




Assam, and in 1928 51. In 1929, there were 45. Nonetheless, there has been a significant growth 
in the press media, and various language newspapers were trying to publish. The Report 
mentions newspapers and periodicals in languages like Mikir, Lushai, Khasi, Gurkhali, Lakher, 
Bodo, etc. Deka Assam, published in Assamese in Gauhati since 1935, needs a special mention, 
as the ‘General remark’ by the colonial administration characterizes it in 1935 as being “A pro-
Assamese publication, prone to attack the Bengali community by whom it is very much 
disliked”,  and in 1936 a report remarks that it was “ inclined to foster class hatred between the 
Assamese and non-Assamese”, and each year the report carried the same remark, with one 
addition in 1938, that “it supports the congress coalition ministry”. This is the only periodical 
which is categorized as being anti-Assamese by the colonial administration reports. Since 1939, 
The Assam Tribune has also appeared on the list of publications, with the remark column 
carrying only one word, “moderate”, with a note that it had an approximate circulation of 2000 
during that period.  
 
As Deka Assam was characterized for its dislike of the Bengali Community, the Bengali 
Press, in the Bengali language, raised the issue of the exploitation of plantation labour in 
Assam. Prem Narain (1970) has noted that, “… the Indian press of the period, especially that 
of Bengal, is replete with instances of fraud as well as of atrocities that the planter and his agent 
committed on the helpless people” ( Narain, 1970, p.176). He maintains that Anglo-Indian 
newspapers, in general, represented the views of the colonial administration, but there have 
been instances where newspapers, like The Pioneer, took note of the oppression, and this was 
taken by the vernacular press as evidence of what they had been reporting (Narain, 1970). The 
question of the Bengali immigrant would later dominate the news-scape of Assam in post-
colonial India. 
 
As per the 62nd Annual Report for 2017-18, by the Registrar of Newspapers for India, 
there are 131 registered dailies and periodicals published in Assam, in various languages. The 
English Press is particularly strong, as English papers have the highest circulations amongst 
the dailies in the state. The Assam Tribune and The Sentinel have a claimed circulation of 
84,215 and 90,435, respectively, which is much higher than any other Assamese or Bengali 
newspaper. This is one indicator of the importance of the English press and the role it plays in 





The Context and Background of the Bodo- Bengali Muslim conflict  
 
 As we have seen in the previous chapter, the struggle of the Bodos to be 
uniquely identified as a cultural group has gone through many stages in the last few decades, 
starting in 1993, when the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) Accord13 was signed. The 
Accord, however, did not address the anxieties of the Bodo groups. In February, 2003, the 
Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) was created, but since it has not been successful in solving 
the issue of Bodo recognition, ethnic violence has continued. The Bodo struggle and the 
resulting violence are not just indicative of their constant tension with the other groups in the 
region, but also of the strains that different ethnic groups cause on resources. It is as much a 
battle for state attention and resources as it is a cultural battle. Appadurai points out that as 
 
 “these culturalisms compete for a piece of the nation (and of the resources of the state), 
they inevitably enter into the space of potential violence”. He proposes a new 
understanding of the relationship between “history and agency, affect and politics, 
large-scale and local factors” in order to effectively study contemporary ethnic 
movements (Appadurai, 1996, p.157).  
 
According to Appadurai, the crisis of the modern nation-state is very much tied to modern 
ethnic movements through “a series of interesting links”: how natural affinities are assumed to 
be holding the national self-rule, the link between specific projects of modern nations state 
(e.g,, the census) and large scale group identities, and the inextricable link between “language 
of rights and entitlements” with “large-scale identities” (Appadurai, 1996, p.157). The Bodo 
struggle can, then, be best explained through these links, as they strive to establish themselves 
by using the logic of the nation to establish a state, or to get maximum entitlement from the 
state. The crisis is not just theirs, but is that of the nation state too. However, the question of 
Bodo identity and their struggle for recognition is also mired with the “immigration” question 
in the state. 
 
The framing of migration or illegal immigration differs in the regional Assamese 
narrative when compared to the national Indian one (Baruah, 2001). The creation of India and 
 
13 On 20th February, 1993, a memorandum of settlement was signed between the State =Government of Assam, 
the Bodo groups and Central Government to end the problems of the Bodos and other Plains Tribals living on the 






Pakistan in 1947, and of Bangladesh in 1971, brought legal/illegal, native/foreign, and 
citizen/alien binaries into place which were absent in pre-independence India, despite anxiety 
among the locals about migration and demographic change. These binaries are not merely a 
product of post-Independence India, but also of the politics of more than seven decades of 
Independence. Within the national framework, and in the context of the violent history of 
partition, the migration question is entangled with highly sensitive questions of religious 
identity: firstly, the way that the Muslim minority in India is treated, and, secondly, the 
obligation the Indian government feels about the Hindu refugees/migrants from 
Pakistan/Bangladesh. (Baruah, 2001). The question of Muslim immigrants in the region, then, 
takes on a special significance as, in general, the Muslims who chose to remain in India after 
partition are generally viewed with suspicion, and, as Pandey (2006) notes, despite choosing 
India as their homeland, the question remains “can a Muslim really be an Indian?” Perhaps 
“this is one of the enduring legacies of the partition in India”(Pandey, 2006, p.136). The 
Muslim peasants who migrated, from the, then, East Bengal, are at the triple disadvantage of 
being peasants (underprivileged class), Muslims (oppressed minority) and migrants (the 
outsider).  
 
The question of framing or reporting violence in Assam is far more complex. Being 
part of the North Eastern state, it is virtually detached from mainland India. It is marginalized 
in the national discourse, and the national media gives it attention only in cases of big crises 
and covers it using pre-existing stereotypes. The disappearance of these regions in Indian media 
coverage is a wider problem. It is not merely that India is ‘large’ and ‘federal’, but it has also 
had to do, more recently, with shifts in media ownership and control: the extent to which the 
media in India is owned as part of political strategies and, increasingly, by businesses, as part 
of media strategies, intended to harvest political preferences. In her critique of the national 
media’s coverage of Assam, Nandana Dutta (2012) argues that only during a violent clash does 
the issue of immigration receive some visibility, and while reporting on an event of violence 
the “media’s representation is more about the media itself than about an event. An event indeed 
becomes the occasion for showcasing the media’s particular style honed on just such 
occasions.” She is particularly critical of the national TV channels’ reporting on the violence 
in Assam. In a way, Assam, as a region, gets national attention only “in the aftermath of 
insurgent/ethnic violence”(Dutta, 2012, p.12) and the frame repeats itself. The exception, 
however, was the ethnic violence of 2012, from which there was a potential threat of a backlash 




India. Nandana Dutta (2012) notes that because of the situation created due to fear-mongering 
through social media, and the resultant “exodus”, the media paid more attention to the issue 
and provided more detail on the event. The national media, argues Nandana (Dutta, 2012), 
covered the violence in Assam, through a historical frame of communalism and reported it 
mostly as communal violence, which is not how these events are understood in Assam, thus  
 
It shows how the media understands the region and its problems within a pre-existing 
framework of communalism—a big theme in post-independence India ever since 
partition—that rarely explains the particular kinds of land and territorial focus of NE 
problems. (Dutta, 2012, p.13). 
 
In Dutta’s argument, the depiction of violence, for Assam, is not just about the violence 
but also about the relationship the state has with the centre. The deep sense of alienation in the 
state, from the central government, is also a consistent theme, while debating the violence. This 
is very evident in the reportage of The Assam Tribune, which is being studied here, in which 
editorials and stories are openly critical of both central and state government, lambasting them 
as being negligent about the situation in the state. The narrative of defining the self has, for 
Assam, been mired in the “feeling of abandonment and of being out in the cold” (Dutta, 2012, 
p.14). The context, Nanda proposes, that is essential to understand any reporting or event in 
Assam, is one of historical injustice starting from “tortures and cruelties by the Burmese 
invader before the British came in as saviour” (ibid) and the sense of being betrayed by the 
British in the nineteenth century through  
 
…their policy of systematically settling Bengalis on its land and forcibly establishing 
the Bengali language in schools and courts. And it develops a strong sense of being 
injured regularly by the perceived threat to its culture and language by the presence on 
its land of a powerful Bengali elite. (Dutta, 2012, p.14). 
 
Reporting Violence: October, 1993. 
 
In 1993, The Bodo Movement, reached a stage where it could have some territorial 
autonomy through the signing of an Accord with both the state and central governments. 
However, the Accord clearly states that villages with 50 percent or more population of Bodos 
would be carved out to make a new territory, hence giving rise to the question of boundaries 
and delineation, which then became a contentious issue in Bodo majority districts of Assam. 




questions of demarcating the lines and including or excluding a “contentious villages” remain 
a major trigger for violence in the region. The villages with a slightly smaller Bodo population 
became a bone of contention, and a demographic change was needed to include them in a new 
Bodo territory.  Poor implementation of the Accord and the claims over these villages caused 
large-scale violence in the region (George, 1994).  These villages had pre-dominantly Bengali 
Muslim and Adviasi ethnic populations. Bodo militant groups tried to cleanse the area of these 
ethnic groups so that such villages could be included in the Bodoland region. Consequently, 
Bengali Muslims and indigenous Santhali people (Adviasi), particularly, became the targets of 
Bodo militant groups. It was an attempt at ethnic cleansing, and it is noted that  
 
…his ethnic cleansing operation has its genesis in the manner in which the movement 
for fulfilment of genuine aspirations of the Bodos is conducted and also in the manner 
in which successive governments tried to solve the issue” (Chakarbarty, 2008, p.166).  
 
In the violence that ensued in October, 1993, in the Kokrajhar and Bongaigaon Districts, “Bodo 
militia managed to kill and displace thousands of people… 20,000 Muslims ended up living in 




The Assam Tribune, whilst discussing the issue of the exclusion of the Non-Bodo 
villages from the new Bodo Autonomous Council (BAC) area and the eruption of the ensuing  
violence, presented its main headline on 8th October, 1993, as “100 non-Bodo houses torched: 
Army deployed” and the report was: 
 
Over 100 houses belonging to non-Bodos were torched in Bongaigaon and Kokrajhar 
districts today by Bodo extremists in a bid to drive away the non-Bodo population from 
these two Bodo dominated districts of the state, even as a tense situation is developing 
… Bodo extremists started their anti-Harsha (non Bodo) operation from early morning 
today in Milan Bazar.  (The Assam Tribune, 1993, p.1, 8Oct) 
 
The news report has the by-line of a staff reporter, and the violence is reported by the 
newspaper’s own journalist rather than by the news agencies. The first report called this 
violence an operation by Bodo extremists to cleanse the area of Non-Bodos. The violence 
continued, and the headline of 9th October read “10 killed in Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon violence”. 





 …torching the villages of non Bodos by armed Bodo militants yesterday … armed 
Bodo militants attacked the minority-dominated villages … Bodo militants also 
attacked shops belonging to minority communities at Balangaon.” (The Assam Tribune, 
1993, p.1, 9Oct) 
 
This news report does not directly frame the incident as a clash or as violence, but as an attack 
by Bodo extremists, in the first report, and by Bodo militants, in the second. The term “minority 
dominated village” is used in reports following the violence against the Bengali Muslim 
community. With reference to the statements of the Chief Minister, the news reports maintain 
that it was a planned attack to evacuate the minority community from their villages. Later, the 
report also framed it as “ethnic clashes between Bodos and non-Bodos”, and the newspaper 
gives its front page to the BJP’s demand that doubtful nationals should not be rehabilitated. 
The report is entitled “BJP wants no resettlement of doubtful nationality”, and it was  published 
on 26th October, it says: 
 
 BJP has demanded that no resettlement and re-sheltering of the persons of doubtful 
nationality should be made in the riot-hit areas of Kokrajhar and Bongaigaon districts 
without verifying their nationality …The BJP has also demanded immediate 
deportation of Bangladeshi infiltrators after proper verification”  (The Assam Tribune, 




The editorial of 9th October 1993 focused on the updated electoral rolls but, on the 10th, 
it interpreted the events of violence with the title “Bodos on rampage” and started by calling 
it  
 
…disturbing and distressing that the Bodo marauders have set ablaze over a dozen non-
tribal villages in Bongaigaon and Kokrajhar districts, rendering over 10,000 people 
homeless and killing at least 13 persons … these villages were inhabited predominantly 
by Muslims, Bengali Hindus, and Koch Rajbangshis, who have been opposing 
inclusion  of their villages in the Bodoland Autonomous Council… the fact that the 
attacks on minority-dominated villages in two districts occurred almost simultaneously 
shows that they were carried out mercilessly. ..  Assam has been traditionally known as 
a land of peace where people of different ethnic groups and speaking different 
languages and following different religions have been living in harmony and with 





The editorial singles out a Bodo militant group for this attack, but does not opine that it is an 
attempt at ‘ethnic cleansing’. Another editorial, published on 30th October, entitled 
“Demarcation of BAC” was critical of Bodo militants and urged the different groups to live in 
peace and harmony. 
 
Reporting Violence: July,1994 
 
In July, 1994, violence broke out between Bodos and Bengali Muslims in Barpeta, and 
this reached its height when Boro Security Force (BrSF) militants attacked the relief camps 
where Bengali Muslims were staying during the clashes, killing over a hundred and leaving 
many more injured. The issue of BAC continues to complicate the situation in the region and 




The news, like that of the violence in 1993, was on the front page of the 21st July, 1994, 
newspaper, with the headline “Group clashes in Barpeta: two dead” and the first report of the 
incident says: 
 
 …Thousands of people being rendered homeless and unspecified number of houses 
torched in a series of clashes between Bodos and Immigrants in the last 24 hours. At 
least two persons were reported to have lost their lives in the clashes while thousands 
of people flocked to Barpeta road ... reports of attack on Bodos by immigrants and 
razing of several Bodo villages … around 2 am a mob of immigrants attacked Katajhar, 
a Bodo village, and razed to the ground at least 20 houses… An official source here 
said that prior to the attack on the Bodo village, a mob of Bodo miscreants attacked 
Bokuwamari, Metenga, Dhekiajanix, Pathar, Bormuza and Narsinghbari, villages 
inhabited by the immigrant community … an irate mob of Bodo people attacked a few 
immigrant villages about 20 kms. from Barpeta Road, and … officials here suspect that 
the main cause of the current phase of violence lies in the death of two persons 
belonging to the immigrant community on May 12 at Chouraguri. Both the persons 
were allegedly killed by the Bodo miscreants at Chouraguri area and buried … It was 
from that time on that palpable tension prevailed in the area with a section of the 
immigrant community looking for retaliation. (The Assam Tribune, 1994, p.1, 21Jul) 
 
The first report gives some detail about the incident and while identifying the ‘immigrant’ 
responsible for this violence, provides some background for their deed. Unlike 1993, the first 




the ‘immigrant’. On the next day, 22nd July, the front page of the newspaper was, again, 
dedicated to follow up news on the violence, with the headline “Curfew in Several Barpeta 
Towns: Death Toll 7” and the report outlines: 
 
 … death toll rising to seven and about 20,000 people being rendered homeless … 
miscreants burnt down five more villages taking the toll of affected villages in the riots 
to 30 villages ... six arsonists belonging to the minority community who were picked 
up yesterday from the custody of the police forcefully. (The Assam Tribune, 1994, p.1, 
22Jul) 
 
In this report, there is a change in terminology and, unlike the previous report,  the 
‘immigrant’ here is exchanged for the term ‘minority community’, which gives a sense that the 
immigrant community is a minority community; essentially the Bengali Muslim one. The 
report uses the standard term ‘miscreants’ for the rioters or attackers. The report does not 
specify the number of casualties or of homeless people in relation to the Bodos and the 
Minority, separately. While the ‘arsonists’ of the minority community are identified, the 
identity of the miscreants is not revealed, in this context, it must be members of the Bodo 
community, however, the newspaper does not specify this.  
 
On July 23rd, the front page was again dedicated to the reporting was of violence, 
starvation and death in the relief camp On the second  page of the paper, a report, with a 
statement from the Chief Minister, is published, accusing the Bodo militant group, the BSF, of 
being responsible for the attack. The news report frames the incident as a clash between the 
‘Bodo and [the] minority’ and does not mention ‘immigrant’. On 25th July, the front page again 
carried a big news story about a violent attack by BrSF militants, with the headline “BrSF 
attacks relief camp: over 100 dead, 300 injured”, and the report by the newspaper 
correspondent continued: 
 
Over 100 people were killed and about 300 others injured in Barpeta district last night 
when in a daring attack the militants of the outlawed  Boro security forces (BrSF) 
swooped down at a relief camp in the Basbari area about 20 km from here and 
massacred the inmates... death toll could be much higher and has been placed  at 120 
in last night’s  violence. Three truck loads injured people brought over to Barpeta road 
… about 40 militants belong to the BrSF armed with sophisticated and automatic 
weapons swooped at the Manas ME school which was being used as a relief camp after 
the riots. Though about 5000 people were taking shelter at the camp only about 400 
refugees were actually present inside the school … According to an eye witness report, 
over 120 people, including about 20 to 25 babies, 10 to 12 children and about 30 to 40 




correspondent that seven members of his family died. (The Assam Tribune, 1994, p.1, 
25Jul) 
 
The news report does not specify to which community the hundred people belonged, 
although by identifying the attackers as Bodo militants, it is implied that members of the 
minority community were killed. The report, for the first time, directly quotes one of the 
victims, giving his name. The newspaper followed up on the episode of violence very regularly. 
It also gave prominent space to any statement or news that was related to the AASU (All Assam 
Student Union). One of the reports, published with reference to the AASU on 26th July, links 
the violence with the ‘foreigner issue’ and maintains that: 
 
 …govt faulty decision to allot land pattas to the immigrant people, rehabilitation of 
riot affected people of Kokrajhar district in Goalpara and the CM’s repeated declaration 
that there are no foreigners in the state, have created tension resulting in the ethnic riots. 
(The Assam Tribune, 1994, p.1, 26Jul) 
 
In another front-page report, published on 26th July, with the headline “Minority communities 
were warned beforehand” the report reads:  
 
A section of the Bodos had warned the people of the minority communities to move 
out of the Bodoland Autonomous Council areas about a few months back, said several 
victims of the ethnic riots in Barpeta who are now undergoing treatment in the 
Guwahati Medical College Hospital… their houses were burnt down on July 20 in 
broad daylight and all the people of the village escaped to the Basbari Camp … Ali 
revealed that the people of the nearby Bodo villages had assured them that they would 
protect them, but when they were attacked no one came forward. He said that all his 
property, including the cattle, were gone, and they have decided not to return to their 
villages after losing several of their family members. (The Assam Tribune, 1994, p.1, 
26Jul) 
 
This corresponds to my own interviews with people who were affected by this violence, which 
is discussed in the last chapter of this thesis. Some voice has been given to the victim in the 
report, unlike the reports in 1993, where there is an absence of victim voices. The ‘immigrant’ 
is dropped after the first report of violence, and it is replaced with ‘minority community’ in 







On 23rd July, an editorial entitled “Stop this madness” was published, looking into the reasons 
for the violence and interpreting the chain of incidents. The editorial maintains that: 
 
 The ethnic violence rocking the district is clearly the result of the simmering discontent 
and frustration of the Bodos who find that their demand for inclusion of 3085 villages  
in the Bodoland  Autonomous Council (BAC) has not yet been  fulfilled  and they  may 
have to be reconciled  to accepting  the 2570 villages  already constituting  the BAC . 
Not only that, they also find that their lands have been grabbed by non-tribals, mostly 
immigrants, and that has been a score point leading to ethnic violence, as happened in 
Bongaigaon and Kokrajhar districts a few months ago … The situation is aggravated 
by the immigrants retaliating by torching Bodo villages and the Bodos counter-
retaliating by increased violence … At the moment the riot is confined to two groups 
only because they are in direct confrontation, but it has all the potentials of developing 
into a wider scale. (The Assam Tribune, 1994, p.4, 23Jul) 
 
Here, the editorial identifies land grabbing by non-tribals as the primary cause of 
violence, and, unlike the case of the 1993 violence, the editorial takes a position on this violence 
as being caused by immigration. The editorial does not specify different, non-tribal groups, but 
categorizes the immigrant as the principal land grabber and, once again, does not mention the 
identity of the immigrant, nor the nature of the land grabbing. It does not provide any data or 
facts about the claims in its report. Since the violence took place between Bodos and Bengali 
Muslims, the title ‘immigrant’ is naturally conferred upon the Bengali Muslim. On 26th July, 
another editorial, addressing the BrSF attack on the relief camp, is published with the title 
‘Massacre and after’, and it continues: 
 
These victims, all religious minorities, originally immigrants, came to the relief camp 
at the Manas ME School either driven away by the militants or out of fear of attack 
...The massacre has sent shock waves throughout the country reminding one of the 
Nellie massacre of 1983. (The Assam Tribune, 1994, p.4,26Jul) 
 
Here, the identity of the immigrant is linked to a religious minority and no distinction is made 
in categorizing the immigrant. However, the usage of the term connotes that the victims are 
Bengali Muslim, specifying that they are originally immigrants to assert their non-nativeness. 
At the end, the editorial questions the timing of the Bandh called by the AASU, but agrees with 
its demands and position which, as I mentioned above, stating the relationship between 






Reporting Violence: July/August, 2012 
 
In July, ethnic violence broke out in the Kokrajhar District and rapidly spread to the 
BTAD (Bodoland Territorial Area Districts). The impact of the violence went beyond Assam 
this time, and it captured the eyes of both the national and international media. The violence 
spiralled to different zones and life did not return to normal for months. The violence in 2012 
was perceived to be a national event. Social media and fake news played a vital role in this 
event, perhaps it would be safe to say that this was the first event of violence in which the 
social media were widely used to create and stir psychosis among people across the country 
(in all of the major metropolises of India, North-eastern people were threatened through social 
media messages creating a nation-wide panic ). Local incidents of violence and inter-ethnic 




The newspaper first published a small news report on 8th July, 2012, with the title 
“Kokrajhar tense after killings” and it reported: 
 
Brutal killing of two innocent persons by unidentified gunman last night in Kokrajhar 
turned the situation tense today as suddenly all shops were closed, plying of vehicles 
came to halt and the normal life of people was disrupted. (The Assam Tribune, 2012, 
p.1, 8Jul). 
 
This news is reported more as a local criminal incident, with no ethnic or political implications. 
The usage of words like “innocent persons” and “unidentified gunman” makes it a banal 
incident of violence which has no bearing on the multi-ethnic fabric of the region. There was 
no follow-up news after this report until 22nd July, when the violence took hold of the Kokrajhar 
District. The headline on the 22nd was “9 Killed, Curfew Clamped in Kokrajhar” and it 
continues: 
 
Tension prevailed here as indefinite curfew was imposed in Kokrajhar town following 
sporadic group violence since last night left at least nine persons dead in Kokrajhar 
district…It may be mentioned here that, according to police sources, last night around 
8.30 pm four Bodo youths were coming from Bhatipara in two motor bikes on the way 
at Joypur under Kokrajhar Police station when unidentified miscreants attacked them 
with sharp weapons killing all the four youths on the spot. The dead have been 




(24) … In the retaliatory attack, this morning, some unknown miscreants opened fire 
indiscriminately at Duramari village under Kokrajhar Police Station, killing one, 
Sahadad Ali (60), on the spot and injuring Hafijuddin Sk (10), Ahad Ali (13), Kadija 
Bibi (36), Monjira Begum (20) and Fulija Begam (12). In another incident, armed 
miscreants shot at Abdul Rezzak (35) at Kodaldoha village under Fakiragram Police 
Station. Miscreants also killed a menial labourer, Jakir Hussain (22), at Narabari under 
Kokrajhar Police Station today morning at about 6.30 am, police sources said. (The 
Assam Tribune, 2012, p.1, 22Jul) 
 
The attacker’s identity remains as ‘unidentified miscreants’ and ‘armed miscreants’, while the 
miscreant remains a consistent signifier, the victims of violence have been named in the first 
report as well, unlike the reporting in 1993 and 1994. Various pieces of news that are related 
to violence on the other pages of the newspaper can be found. On July 24th,the front page 
carried the headline “shoot-at-sight order in Kokrajhar” and reported: 
 
An alert has been sounded in ten districts of Assam following communal violence in 
the Bodoland area … Miscreants exchanged fire with security forces and torched two 
villages near Ouguri” (The Assam Tribune, 2012, p.1, 24Jul) 
 
The long report provided an update from each district and continued to use the term 
‘miscreants’, while not giving much information about the targets of the miscreants. The report, 
unlike reports on the other two events, framed the violence as ‘communal violence’, while 
other news stories called it ‘ethnic violence’. The violence continued to capture the headlines 
of the newspaper in the last week of July, and reports of dead bodies being found, without 
much information about the identity of the dead, continued. On July 27th,BJP’s statement was 
printed on the front page of the newspaper, with the title “BJP blames illegal migrants for 
violence”. The visits of the Prime Minister, Chief Minister and the Union Home Minister, 
found the headline too. On 1st August, front page space was given to L.K. Advani’s (the 
prominent leader of the BJP) statement that “Influx root cause of violence”. On 3rd August, 
front page news with the title “Demographic aggression” was published, stating the BJP’s view 
that “illegal Muslim infiltrators” were responsible for the violence, and the people of Assam 
would be united in fighting them. While some news of normalcy was reported on 6th August, 
the headline “Fresh incidents in Chirang, 4 killed” and reports that dead bodies were found, 
naming the dead, showed a different picture. On 8th August, the front-page headline said, 
“Fresh clashes rock Kokrajhar, curfew clamped”. The newspaper dedicated a lot of space to 




the violence. The 10th August front page carried the statement of the Home Secretary, G.K. 
Pillai, as its headline, and reported: 
 
 The Government should expedite the process of updating the National Register of 
Citizens (NRC) and photo identity cards should be given on the basis of it to remove 
suspicion and apprehension from the minds of the indigenous people so that ethnic 
clashes like the recent one in BTAD can be prevented. (The Assam Tribune, 2012, 
p.1,10Aug). 
 
Here, while referring to the Home Secretary, links were created between immigration 
and violence and advocacy for a quick update of the NRC14, and this was consistent throughout 
the newspaper. It also gave prominent space to the AASU and its views. Front page news, on 
13th August, with reference to the AASU, made a connection between illegal immigration and 
violence. On August 17th,the news of the exodus appeared as the headline, ‘Exodus of NE 
people from Bangalore on’ and it reports: 
 
Fear struck people from the North East continued to flee the city for the second day 
today as the Karnataka government assured them safety and launched confidence 
building measures … (The Assam Tribune, 2012, p.1,17Aug) 
 
Several pieces of news in the newspaper on that same day talked about the exodus and 
the spread of rumours; as another news report says, on 13th August: 
 
The fear factor following the backlash in many parts of the country has triggered this 
exodus. With rumour mills running strong, panic has struck the people based outside 
the state. (The Assam Tribune, 2012, p.1,13Aug) 
 
The exodus became a standard term with which to define the situation, and it entered 
the semantic field of violence with other standard terms,  like ‘miscreant’. The usage of the 
term ‘exodus’ is selective for North Eastern people fleeing different parts of India, rumour and 
a climate of fear driving them, however, the flight of people from violence in Bodoland to 
different states, was not labelled as an ‘exodus. Navine Murshid notes that these “reports did 
not discuss about exodus from Assam but an exodus to the northeast” (Murshid, 2016, p.582). 
 
14 This electoral roll, which includes the names of ‘legitimate’ citizens, is a battleground for citizenship. The 
inclusion of names in the electoral roll and the National Register of Citizens (NRC) has caused anxiety and 
despair in an individual’s life and protest and backlash in social life. To date, the updating of the register of 
citizens is the most critical political issue of the region, causing a great sense of anxiety for those that are not 
included. As per the updated list published in August, 2019, almost 2 million people have been left out. They 




According to government reports, there were 270 relief camps for over a half million displaced 
people in 2012. Many in the Kokrajhar region ran en masse to West Bengal to escape the 
violence; their departure in fear and panic escaped the particular qualification required for an 
exodus.  
 
 The link between infiltration and violence speaks to the audience of the newspaper. On 
August 17th, the “Letter to the Editor” section of the newspaper was entitled “Assam: A future 
district of B’desh”, and one of the letters read: 
 
The greater Assamese race today is in danger of being wiped out totally in our own 
homeland, in this context we can see BTAD as the first round, if we allow influx to 
continue Assam is soon going to appear as one of the districts in the map of Bangladesh. 
We, the general citizens of Assam, cannot let this happen.” (The Assam Tribune, 2012, 
p.4, 17Aug) 
 
The fear was well channelled in the reporting and framing of the problem. Exodus news 
captured the front pages of the newspaper, and the follow up reports about violence and 
violence-ridden districts slid into the corner and the inner pages of the newspaper. The hate 
messages and rumours which led to the exodus were then attributed to “Pak elements”. The 
Pakistan angle then makes the phenomenon of the exodus a twisted entanglement of North-
Eastern people, being a target of the revenge of Pakistan. The news about tracking IP addresses 




Several editorials were dedicated, during the period of violence, to issues that were 
inter-connected with this event of violence. The first editorial on this matter, published on 23rd 
July, was entitled “BTAD violence” and blamed the gun culture in the region for the violence. 
It found fault in the administration’s inadequacy in maintaining law and order and curbing the 
culture of kidnapping and extortion, and it also characterized the BTAD region as one with a 
culture of violence. The editorial asserted that: 
 
The overall situation in BTAD areas is characterized by a growing cult of violence and 
fratricidal killings. The progress in that the creation of the BTC was supposed to usher 
in will remain a mirage unless there is an end to the prevailing gun culture. (The Assam 





The violence, in the editorial’s view, was seen as being a local event, prompted by the 
incapable administration of the Bodoland region. The editorial on 26th July,  entitled “Bodoland 
burns”, urged the government to be swift in controlling the situation, and while reflecting on 
the reason for the “communal clashes” concluded that: 
 
… the burgeoning immigrant Muslim population – a fallout of large-scale cross-border 
infiltration from Bangladesh over the decades – and the resultant demographic changes 
are also creating a complex situation with adverse socio-political implications for the 
indigenous populace. (The Assam Tribune, 2012, p.6, 26Jul) 
 
The immigrant and indigenous binary shaping the conflict and the demographic future 
became the interpretation of the event of violence, it moved from the local to the question of 
borders and citizenship. In the subsequent editorial on the 27th July, was entitled “BTAD 
lessons” the cynicism towards the Bodoland administration and the Bodos returned. The 
editorial maintained: 
 
The BTAD area has a history of violence beginning from the Bodoland movement, and 
all-pervasive cult of the gun in the area is having a disturbing impact on the peace and 
stability of the region. (The Assam Tribune, 2012, p.6, 27Jul) 
 
The editorial maintained a tone of criticism towards Bodo autonomy and the Bodo Movement. 
Both groups involved in the conflict throw different challenges at the polity of the state and the 
dominant Assamese society, one challenges the limited autonomy, while the other is seen as a 
demographic threat. The Editorial on July 29th again criticized the BTAD administration for 
being incompetent, and it blamed the discriminatory practices of Bodo authorities towards non-
Bodos as reasons for the conflict, but concluded by saying: 
 
Tension between the Bodos and the non-Bodos in BTAD stemming from 
discriminatory practices of the authorities, and the burgeoning immigrant Muslim 
population and the resultant demographic changes and pressure on scarce resources” 
(The Assam Tribune, 2012, p.6, 29Jul) 
 
Editorials, along with many of the news reports, repeated and asserted that the growing 
number of Muslim immigrants was the primary reason for conflict in the region. ‘Muslim 
Immigrant’ become that anomaly which exposes the limits and weaknesses of administration 




infiltration from Bangladesh was causing demographic changes, leading to violence. Similarly, 
the August 10th editorial, “BTAD crisis”, raised the similar issues of fencing the Bangladesh 
border and the rising number of infiltrators in the region. When fall out violence reached the 
stage of rumour and exodus, then the editorial “End this strife”, on 18th August, maintained 
that: 
 
By terming it as a war between illegal Bangladeshi settlers and the indigenous people 
– a generalization too simplistic to be convincing – many are actually adding fuel to the 
fire. (The Assam Tribune, 2012, p.6, 18Aug). 
 
While subsequent editorials took notice of rumours and the exodus, with the issue 
subsiding, an editorial appeared on 24th August, entitled “BTAD probe”, and it stated: 
 
Another area of concern relates to the possibilities of illegal migrants getting settled 
during the rehabilitation process. It has been alleged that an abnormally high number 
of immigrants are staying in the relief camps, and the presence of illegal migrants 
cannot be ruled out. (The Assam Tribune, 2012, p.6, 24Aug)  
 
Reporting Violence: May, 2014 
 
The violence or massacre by the NDFB(S) Bodo militants took place during the 
national election of May, 2014. During the election campaign, the then prime ministerial 
candidate of the Hindu BJP, Modi, warned immigrants living in Assam that their time to leave 
had come, as the BJP was coming to power. Urdu newspapers see an obvious link between the 
killing of Bengali Muslims and Modi’s speech, but AT does not talk of an obvious link. There 
is a history of violence which takes place during elections in the Kokrajhar region. During 
election periods in 2005, 2006 and 2009, violence erupted in the region. In 2014, the reason 
for violence, discussed in the newspapers, was the instigation, by the local Bodo political party, 
the BPF, which polarized Bodos and non-Bodos, on speculation that non-Bodos would not vote 




The front page on May 3rd, 2014, carried the headline “Violence erupts in BTAD, 20 killed” 





The orgy of violence has reared its ugly head once again in the Bodoland territorial 
Autonomous Districts (BTAD) with unidentified miscreants gunning down over 20 
persons, including children and women, … heavily armed miscreants attacked two 
villages near the Manas National Park and opened indiscriminate firing … BTC chief 
Hagrama Mohilary has strongly condemned the killings … he held the NDFB(S)faction 
responsible for the violence. (The Assam Tribune, 2014, p.1, 3May). 
 
The news report identified the ‘unidentified miscreants’, in the first report of violence, 
while, in the same news report, with reference to the BTC Chief, the NDFB(S), militants were 
the alleged attackers. Another news report, appearing below this one, and filed by the staff, 
reported in its headline “Gogoi calls for firm handling of situation” whilst quoting the Chief 
Minister of Assam, and continued: 
 
Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi today instructed the Assam Police to deal firmly with the 
situation in the wake of the gunning down of innocent people by the suspected 
NDFB(S) militants at Narsingbari and Balapara Tulsibil under BTAD last night. (The 
Assam Tribune, 2014, p.1, 3May) 
 
While the government believed NDFB(S) militants were behind the attack, the 
newspaper proceeded with the standard term ‘unidentified miscreants’, instead of naming the 
group, and did not reveal the ethnicity of the village or of the villagers attacked. The May 4th 
front page was also dedicated to the violence, and the newspaper revealed the names of some 
of the victims, along with a report of ‘no fresh violence’. A front page follow-up piece of news, 
was published on May 5th and it talks about the situation and reported the “exodus from 
minority-dominated areas” which, according to the paper, was denied by the newspaper. So, 
the ‘exodus’ did not become either a headline or a media event. On May 6th, the front page 
carried news entitled “No Fresh Violence in Kokrajhar, Baksa” and reported that: 
 
The law- and – order situation continued to improve in the two trouble-torn districts … 
where 31 people lost their lives in a terror attack by the cadre of NDFB(s)” (The Assam 
Tribune, 2014, p.1, 6May) 
 
This piece of news carried a rare term, if compared to the reportage of the last three events of 
violence, in which the reporter called the incident a ‘terror attack’, as the news about violence 







The editorial following the incident called this a repeat of the 2012 ‘communal clashes’ and 
viewed speeches by Narendra Modi as “a simplest accusation at best” and returned to the theme 
of immigration. The editorial, entitled ‘Blame game’ on 6th May, stated: 
 
It is a repeat of the communal clashes of 2012 when over 100 people were killed and 
lakhs disappeared, some of whom even today live in the refugee camps. …. The 
congress in turn is castigating the BPF-run administration even as it blames speeches 
made by Narendra Modi to be a catalyst to renewed violence, a simplistic accusation at 
best … More important long-term measures centred round the core issue, that of 
pressure upon the available resources including agricultural land due to excessive 
increase in population. The issue of migrants, mostly illegal ones from Bangladesh, has 
been a bone of contention for a long time, with ruling entities like the Congress doing 
nothing to tackle the problem. (The Assam Tribune, 2014, p.1, 6May). 
 
The Editorial claimed that the better implementation of law and order was the short-term 
solution to the violence, however, the long-term issue which needed to be resolved remained 
immigration. The region exploded due to illegal migration from Bangladesh, but this editorial’s 
position did not detail the conflict that the Bodos harboured with other communities, i.e., the 
non-immigrant communities. Several other editorials around this period of violence maintained 
similar positions, wanting to be tough on militant groups, but demanding tougher action on 
immigration.  
 
Analysis: Reporting violence from 1993/1994 to 2012/2014 
 
 Paul Brass (2003) underlines the significance of labelling or naming a communal/ethnic 
incident to have control over its interpretation. He notes that: 
  
…the post hoc labelling of incidents of collective violence is an important aspect of the 
political struggle to gain control of their interpretation. The planners, organizers, and 
perpetrators of collective violence want all such events to be labelled riots, expressions 
of the spontaneous and justified feelings of people outraged by the actions of victims 
who allegedly precipitated the violence. (Brass, 2003, p.387). 
 
In the case of the Assam Tribune, the interpretation of violence is not performed from 
the perspective of the aggressor as a planner or organizer but, rather, from a higher Assamese 
cultural location, placing the violence in a certain context and giving the aggressor meaning 
for their own politics. By not using the terms ‘ethnic cleansing’ or ‘terrorist attack’, and 




controls the interpretation of the event. Since it ultimately holds immigration responsible for 
the violence, it cannot then interpret such targeted attacks as well-organized attempts to wipe 
out the population. By calling the attacks ‘communal clashes’ and attacks by ‘unidentified’ 
miscreants, the newspaper, locates the violence as a law and order lapse and as spontaneous 
violence. The narrative of violence then creates a hierarchy of pain in which the immigrant is 
both involved in violence and is the ultimate reason of it. The militant act of aggression is not 
justified, but it is understood as a natural reaction to the growing number of immigrants in the 
region, thus the pain and suffering of the two groups cannot be likened. The abundant reporting 
of violence (less in 1993 and much more in 1994, 2012, 2014) is also an opportunity to remind 
society that immigrant numbers are growing and are causing the violence suffered.  
 
Since these events of violence did not take place between Assamese (Hindus) and 
Bengali (Muslims) but, rather, between Bodo tribes and Bengali Muslims, the reporting of the 
violence was less emotional. One of the early works on the role of the press in conflict in 
Assam, by Surendra and Indira Gupta (1990), through the study of ‘The Assam agitation 
movement’ shows that the regional press, like the Assam Tribune, “tried to evoke the emotional 
feelings of two linguistic groups, i.e., the Assamese and the Bengalis. … By biased reporting 
the regional newspapers gave more importance to regional identity than to national 
identity.”(Gupta and Gupta, 1990, p.166). In her work, comparing The Assam Tribune’s and 
Amrita Bazar Patrika’s coverage, of three incidents of violence involving Assamese and 
Bengalis in Assam (in 1980), Makiko Kimura, portrays the regional and linguistic bias of the 
newspapers. She notes that the newspapers are selective in using ‘facts’, as such ‘facts’ are 
defined by their agenda. She notes, with regard to the choice of words in characterizing the 
‘victims’ and ‘offenders’ by the Assam Tribune, that it describes: 
 
…the victims of the incidents as: indigenous people, students, youth, peaceful picketers 
and local Indian citizens. As for the offenders, it mentions miscreants, police, army, 
foreigners, Bangladeshis, immigrants, linguistic and religious minorities and foreign 
elements. (Kimura, 2001, p.155) 
 
She confirms Gupta and Gupta’s findings about the role of the press, and she emphasizes that 
the “reporting of the newspapers is concerned with defining the boundaries between ethnic 
groups and nations – the Assamese and the Bengalis, and the Indian nation and the foreigners” 
(Kimura, 2001, p.157). In slight contrast to both these findings, the AT’s reporting of conflict 




miscreants for attackers from both the communities. It is critical of the Bodoland 
administration’s handling of law and order and there is an undertone of cynicism towards 
Bodoland and its autonomy. The newspaper frames this demanded autonomy as a problem for 
regional stability, and since this demand involves a tribal group which does not necessarily 
identify with Assamese cultural nationalism, the newspaper does not use the ‘offenders’ 
characterization solely for one group. It should be noted that not enough Bodo voices are given 
space in press reporting. However, the method of reporting on the violence is used to draw 
boundaries between the immigrant and the non-immigrant. Reporting on Bodoland violence is 
used to question the ‘illegal immigration’ and to frame the immigrant as the root cause, if not 
the immediate cause, of the violence, without necessarily siding with the Bodos. The 
newspaper does not contribute to the tension between the two communities, however, it 
categorizes the immigrant as a threat for all.   
 
In narrating the violence, the newspaper’s reference to the immigrant, and its 
substitution for minority, creates ambiguity but, in an unambiguous manner, connects the two. 
It does not refer to the group as Bengali Muslim, rather, it calls the group ‘immigrant’ or 
‘minority’. In referring to the group of people as immigrant, and then only rarely adding 
‘illegal’, this denies the distinction between the immigrants from different time periods. Since 
the cut-off date for the recognition of immigrants as citizens is 1971 in the region, and 1951 in 
the country, the constant reference to the immigrant, conflating it with illegal, and then with 
minority, underlines the entanglement of immigrant with time in the narrative. In the larger 
plot of violence, the narrative about the immigrant delineates their time from the time of the 
‘indigenous’ people. This is a particular feature of cultural nationalism which fixates the 
identity of one group in time and history and thus makes it permanent, Identities in narratives, 
like ‘indigenous’ or ‘immigrant’, are made timeless and unchanging (Thapar, 2014). Referring 
to people as ‘immigrants’ without making a distinction between those who migrated during the 
various decades of colonial rule and those who came during partition, and yet others during the 
1970s, makes the identity of the ‘immigrant’ unchangeable, and it is always teetering on the 
outer limit of (Indian) citizenship. One of the problems of modernity is that “time is no longer 
a simple classificatory principle, but rather an agent, the operator of a historical process – the 
other name, or rather the true name, for progress” (Hartog, 2013, p.124). The sense of time is 





Udayon Misra (2017) argues that Assam is “caught in a time warp”(Misra, 2017, 
p.146), as the sequence of events seem to repeat themselves, He finds that there is striking 
similarity between the 1940s and the 21st century. He notes that the issue of the ‘Hindu refugee’ 
was discussed in the press in the 1940s and it is being debated again today with very similar 
observations and statements. With reference to the Assam Tribune and Dainik Asom, he notes 
that on the issue of the ‘Hindu refugee’ the press, both then and now, emphasizes Assam’s 
plight, in that it has alimited capacity to accommodate more refugees (Misra, 2017). In various 
editorials about infiltration and immigration, the Assam Tribune insists that immigration must 
not be encouraged on religious grounds, and it is critical of both Congress and the BJP on the 
question of the ‘Hindu refugee’. However, the ‘Hindu refugee’, in contrast to the ‘Muslim 
immigrant’, is to be accepted, and should then be taken in, not just by Assam. One of the 
editorials, entitled ‘Bangladeshi infiltration’, was published on 8th September, 2012, and noted 
that: 
 
And if at all the Hindu refugees are to be accepted, the burden should be shared by other 
states and not Assam, which has already borne the brunt of cross-border influx. (The 
Assam Tribune, 2012, p.6, 8Sep). 
  
The events of violence and their interpretation is intricately linked with the questiond 
of immigration, infiltration and borders. In a newspaper there is no possibility of understanding 
and controlling the violence without dealing with immigration. In the kaleidoscopic space of 
the newspaper, events of violence share the border with news and views on infiltration. In that 
small space of a newspaper, each event neighbours another and each fragment, in relation to 
another, creates a whole. Since editorials identify the root cause of violence as immigration 
and infiltration, the discussion about borders and the infiltrator gets prominent coverage in the 
print media. The violence in the newspaper’s narrative is tied to demographic change caused 
by immigration and, in particular, the Muslim component of it. In its diagnosis, the newspaper 
suggests that it is not only cross border infiltration from Bangladesh which is responsible for 
the high number of Muslims, but the higher birth rate among them also creates a demographic 
crisis. Consequently, violence is entangled with cross-border infiltration and the Muslim 
immigrant. Editorials regularly discuss the urgency of this situation and the need to control the 
birth rate at a systematic level. So, a tougher border at territorial level and organized family 
planning for Muslims are two solutions that are regularly advised by newspapers’ columnists 





The Demographic Fear: Border and the Muslim Infiltrator 
          
The events of violence and its interpretation are intricately linked with the question of 
immigration, infiltration and the border. In the newspaper, there is no possibility of 
understanding and controlling violence without dealing with immigration. In the kaleidoscopic 
space of the newspaper the events of violence share the border with news and views about 
infiltration In that little space of a newspaper each event neighbours another and each fragment 
in relation to the other creates a whole. Since the editorials identify the root cause of violence 
as being immigration and infiltration, the discussion about the border and the infiltrator gets 
prominent coverage in the newspaper.  
 
In the 1990s, when the border with Bangladesh was mostly unfenced, the debate about 
immigration was largely about infiltration through the unprotected border. The Indo-
Bangladesh border is one of the most dangerous borders in the world, where all kinds of human 
rights abuses are practiced. The highest number of deaths at the hands of India’s border security 
forces (BSF) were reported at different crossing points. It is noted that between “2000 and 
2015, the BSF killed more than a thousand Bangladeshi civilians along the border” (Jones, 
2016, p.56), while the most inhumane case of brutality was witnessed in 2011 when Felani 
Khatoon was shot dead by border police and her body “dangled on the barbed-wire fence for 
several hours after she was shot” (Ibid.. p.61). There is no doubt about the significance of the 
border for a nation state and of it being an integral project for nation building, but the danger 
of it being weaponized by public discourse poses a serious threat to lives. As David Ludden 
notes “Communities imagine nationality in maps. All of the external margins of national 
territory fall inside national geography in order to confirm national coherence.” (Ludden, 2003, 
p.1064) A border is not only protected by security apparatus but also by the public opinion that 
is regulated and controlled by media which, in its anti-immigrant narrative, attempts to make a 
nation more coherent and more clearly demarcated from the other. Territoriality and mobility, 
are in constant contention with each other, in an attempt to narrate the nation through 
boundaries. While border cruelty is not much of a discussion in the newspaper, there is another 
aspect of border discussion which instils the feeling in readers (and citizens of the region) of 
being at the frontier of the nation and being perpetually vulnerable, with not enough policing 
and fencing of the border.15  
 
15 There is lot of discussion about borders and its significance. Some may argue that legitimizing the border can 





The demand for a stronger border continued even in 2012 and 2014, and in all of the 
events of violence the newspaper brings the question of the border to the fore. An editorial in 
2012 accuses the government of making the situation worse and concludes that the violence 
may even lead to a proper civil war, however, towards the end it raises the question of migration 
“Be that as it may the porous Indo-Bangla border warrants immediate sealing with adequate 
floating outposts and manpower on the riverine stretches. Along with infiltrators, there is every 
chance of fundamentalist elements entering Assam to foment trouble in a sensitive situation.” 
It ends with the note that “Infiltration induced demographic changes are a grim reality in 
Assam” (The Assam Tribune, 2012, p.6). Two years later, in 2014, while discussing the 
violence, the newspaper editorial discusses the porous border and demographic change as being 
key to the problems of the region (The Assam Tribune, 2014, p.6). 
 
The structural and systemic violence perpetrated through border patrolling or policing 
is not a cause of concern for AT. The border is where the question of rights splits into two: 
rights as a citizen and rights as a human being, and then mobility becomes the most suspicious 
activity taken up by any individual. This is where “mobility is violently restricted through laws 
that prioritize citizens’ rights over human rights, walls that funnel migrants to dangerous 
crossing points, and a border security infrastructure that results in thousands of deaths every 
year. The direct and structural violence of borders forecloses the opportunity for many people 
to move” (Jones, 2016, p.163). 
 
 Editorials and news reports in the 1990s consistently called for an even tougher border. 
A 15th November, 1993, editorial, for example, suggested:  
 
We feel that the immediate and most urgent task before us is the sealing of the border 
by human barricade as suggested by a noted economist from Assam…or by erecting 
barbed fencing, etc. The border with Bangladesh is still open and the influx of 
Bangladeshis is continuing unabated. (The Assam Tribune, 1993, p.4, 15Nov) 
 
finalized thus causing several problems. The issue of an enclave between India and Bangladesh was resolved only 
in August, 2015. For more than six decades after partition the demarcation could not happen. One territory of a 
sovereign nation was found in another, showing the complexity of borders in the region and the inefficiency or 
unwillingness of the state to resolve the issue. Shewly (2016) notes that “By the time of the exchange, there were 
an estimated 53,000 enclave residents in total, about 38,000 Indians in Bangladesh and 15,000 Bangladeshis in 
India. Over time, each country occasionally demanded full access to its enclaves on the other’s territory, but was 
unwilling to allow reciprocal access in turn.” After the deal between both countries they allowed the people to 






Everyday news reporting about border breaching and uncontrolled infiltration lacks objectivity 
and journalistic investigation. The newspaper largely relies on anonymous sources to discuss 
the border issue, but it is quite consistent in advocating a tougher border. It not only suggests 
that it should be barricaded by barbed wire, but also, where possible, through human barricades. 
People (or legitimate citizens), acting both as border and border patrol, are frequently 
discussed. The newspaper’s position is clear regarding migration, as it repeatedly demands or 
discusses the need for tougher action against those who are undocumented citizens. Jones 
argues that most of the theory related to migration and borders focuses on the practice of the 
state and not on the role of boundaries: “Walls, borders, maps, properties, identity documents, 
and enclosure laws are technologies of governance that are fundamentally about controlling 
and excluding” (Jones, 2016, p.65).  
 
The newspaper, while reporting on violence and migration, also draws an ethnic 
boundary through mediated communication. By constantly identifying the other, it draws the 
border of distinction to delineate the infiltrating other from the native self. Roberto Esposito 
(2013) talks about the emergence of ‘immunity’ in opposition to ‘community’ in a modern 
political world. For him, communitas is affirmative, while immunitas is negative, despite being 
derived from the same term munus. Immunity, for Esposito, implies the exemption from the 
law of caring for the other. The idea to be protected has been central to all society but, at the 
end of the modern period, Esposito argues that this “need become the linchpin around which 
both the real and imaginary practices of an entire civilization have been constructed” (Esposito, 
2013, p.59). In debates on migration and protecting one’s society from it, the idea of immunity 
seems to be at work. The immunity question becomes central, as “everywhere we look, new 
walls, new blockades, and new dividing lines are erected against something that threatens, or 
at least seems to, our biological, social, and environmental identity” (Esposito, 2013, p.59). 
Looking into the news reports and opinions, or the conceptual landscape of the AT, we can see 
how the fear of contamination is at work and a great urgency exists to be protected from it. The 
newspaper’s question of borders not only demands the fencing of the physical area across two 
nations, but it also asks for a tougher imaginary border which cannot be infiltrated. Central to 
the newspaper’s question of migration is the infiltration of Bengali Muslims from Bangladesh, 
and the demographic change caused, not only by the infiltrators but by the population growth 




containing them are also positions which the newspaper pushes forward. Only by controlling 
the growth of infiltrators can the society (or immunitas) be protected.  
 
The growing number of Muslim immigrants is the subject which repeats itself and, with 
it, the fear of demographic change repeats itself. The demographic change caused by 
immigrants and ‘high fertility’ among Muslims are the two factors that are seen to be 
responsible for the violent situation in BTAD, along with the government’s incapacity to 
address these problems. The editorial ‘Influx: myth and reality’ discusses the high birth rate of 
Muslim immigrants, widespread poverty and illiteracy, and urges the government to popularize 
birth control among immigrant Muslims. Similarly, the editorial ‘Mumbai violence’ talks about 
the growing immigrant Muslim population having serious implications for violence and unrest. 
The newspaper also carried news items referring to the Chief Minister, stating that birth control 
needs to be popularized and that illiteracy is the reason for the growing Muslim population. In 
2015, the government proposed a two-child policy (not enacted as of now) to control the 
population among Muslims. The proposal is the debarring of anyone with more than two 
children from being elected as head of a village council or of any local body, and not being 
entitled to any government job: a policy which might further marginalize a community which 
is already extremely marginalised.  
 
Figure 4.2: Variation in the percentage of the Muslim population in Assam, 1901-2001. No census was conducted 
in 1981. 
 
Source: Murshid 2016 
 
The narrative of migration also carries the conflict-ridden history of the region. The 
“immigrant” question is mired with the question of the border and is also entangled with the 




success and failure of economies since partition, forcing people to migrate. The violence and 
displacement are also a manifestation of economic insecurity, since SAARC countries do not 
allow free movement in the region, unlike ASEAN16, migrants looking for livelihood become 
a security threat. Meanwhile, the other context is undermined in the newspaper and the history 
of religious conflict in South Asia determines the contextualization of the immigrant debate. 
In this context, the immigrant is produced and linked with other characterizations which 
produce certain meanings of the term. One opinion, in the newspaper, talks about rising 
immigration and, Bezboruah highlights different categories of immigrants having different 
objectives for migration and argues about the category of “Muslim infiltrators”, who are:  
 
…the land hungry hordes, silent insidious invaders from the neighbouring country. 
They are not refugees. They find easy sanctuary in the districts of Assam already 
infiltrated in earlier decades by their compatriots... Islamic fundamentalism is a 
resurgent cascading force. It gathers momentum and mass support as it progresses… 
Today the population pattern of Assam is such that it will require only a small effort on 
the part of Bangladesh to initiate demand for self-determination for large tracts of 
Assam… Large scale demographic changes in a border state like Assam will nourish 
political ambition in neighbouring Bangladesh. (Bezboruah 1993, p.4, 6Oct).  
 
Another characterization, in an opinion piece, suggests: 
 
For Assam it is Muslim immigrants – peasants, wage earners and petty traders posing 
a host of socio- political problems to the demographic pattern of Assam … to convert 
Assam into a Muslim majority area by pushing hordes of Muslim land grabbers to this 
region. (Kakati, 1994, p.4, 23Aug).  
 
He blames anti-Indian leaders who are trying to push the Bangladeshi population into India, as 
migrants, to take over India. In other news, AT reports that “16,334 fresh Bangladeshis 
including 908 re-infiltrants and fresh infiltrants have been deported. Besides, 68,189 Nepali 
nationals have been deported”, making a clear distinction between Bangladeshi and Nepali 
migrants.  This difference needs a historical understanding, as the Nepalese have historically 
been allowed to visit and work in India without a visa (and vice versa), even after the 
 
16 SAARC stands for South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. It includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, India, Nepal, the Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Except for Nepal, citizens of all the other countries 
need a Visa to enter India, which is very tedious and often draconian (especially for a Pakistani citizen and vice 
versa) to obtain., while the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has ten member countries 
whose citizens can travel without a visa. Countries of South Asia suffer from “cartographic anxiety” and some 






independence of India. However, under a ‘Restricted Area Permit’ of 1976 they were not 
allowed to work in Assam without permission. The Nepalese, despite being living in the area 
since colonial times, were also targeted as foreigners by the Assamese bourgeois press 
(Hussain, 1993) but, in Hussain’s class analysis of the distinction between a Bangladeshi and 
a Nepalese, a Nepalese migrant was not seen to be a threat to the dominant middle class of 
Assam, despite the anti-foreigner movement seeing them as outsiders (Hussain, 1993). This is 
where the word ‘infiltrator’ becomes an exclusive term for a ‘Bangladeshi’ in the news usage 
by AT. Infiltration is quite often linked to the religious fundamentalism of Muslims and the 
stereotypical images of a polygamous Muslim man. Editorial page opinions regularly make 
logical connections between infiltration and radicalism. In an opinion published in November, 
1993, the writer insists that: 
 
… the unholy alliance between the petro-dollar and the fundamentalists freely operating 
in Assam has since assumed a serious proportion, particularly in view of the fact that 
such fundamentalism, expansionism has, of late, become a world-wide phenomenon … 
the process of detection and deportation must be continued, however, slow a process 
may be… the twelve crores of Bangladeshi people will multiply  into more than twenty  
crores by 2001” [ talking about Bangladeshis that might migrate to India]  “ … the 
demographic pattern of the entire eastern sector of the country will per force undergo a 
sea-change let alone Assam … The practice of polygamy prevalent among these 
infiltrators must be curbed. With this end in view alone, a uniform civil code must be 
introduced ...the bullet being ineffective against the ballot, these infiltrators are about 
to accomplish the conquest of a part of our country which Jinnah had failed to do” 
(Bhattacharya, 1993, p.4, 16Nov). 
 
Opinion columns like these not only attempt to characterize an immigrant but also 
attempt to define a Muslim and the threat the ‘other’ poses to the nation in general, and to the 
region in particular. The article is talking about threats from the Muslims of Bangladesh, who 
can network globally to bring a drastic change in India. It is not only Assam, but the entire 
country which is at risk from these migrants, and hence they should be stopped with all 
necessary force. The article does not hide its cynicism towards the Muslim (Bengali speaking 
or Bangladeshi). It clearly invokes the history of the partition of India and tends to suggest 
explicitly that what Jinnah17 failed to achieve, these infiltrators can achieve by turning the 
country into Pakistan or breaking it once again. This rhetoric is very much a part of a Hindu 
 
17 Founding father of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who proposed the idea of the two nation theory and who 




right-wing politics of fear as it constantly suggests that “Muslims’ loyalty is elsewhere, namely 
Pakistan and the Arab world. (Anand, 2011, p.40).  
 
The politics of fear about migrants in the newspaper corresponds with the politics of fear of 
the Hindu-Right wing in India, whose essential argument lies in the demographic threat caused 
by religious minorities. Demography has been linked to communal violence (Bhagat, 2018) 
and Hindu nationalists have effectively used the topic of Muslim population growth for its 
politics of fear and hate. (Devotta, 2002) As has been noted: 
 
…population growth rates, when desegregated along religious lines, provide fodder for 
religious extremists, who may use the figures to fan communalism. This, however, is 
to be expected in polyethnic societies where each group’s growth rate is scrutinised for 
how it may affect politics. (Devotta, 2002, p.54) 
 
The politics of fear was amplified in 2012 as the violence became nationalized, and in 2014 
with the emergence of a right-wing narrative. NRC, influx, Assam Accord, demographic 
change remain the keywords used to make meaning of the context and identity of an immigrant 
in the region. Everyday stories about the various problems of the state are used as an 
opportunity to discuss migration and the urgent nature of this phenomenon. The population 
growth causes discomfort among each ethnic group and, as Esposito underlines,  
 
… the more ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups come into contact with each other, 
invading each other’s respective spaces, the more we find a movement toward a kind 
of exclusive attachment to one’s own nation, party, or ethnic identity – in other words, 
toward a closing-  off of identity. (Esposito, 2013, p.132).  
 
Rodney Benson talks about the humanitarian frame in reporting immigration news, whose 
discursive indicator, he notes is that “immigrants are victims of unjust government policies 
(violations human rights, fair legal process) or business practices; they suffer from poverty , 
lack of access to health care, dangers related to border crossing, etc., or they have difficulties 
in adapting to their host society” (Benson, 2013, p.18), in contrast to this frame, the newspaper 
positions the immigrant as one causing the strain on the resources of the region, and the very 








In this chapter we have explored the coverage of four events of violence and the 
underlying social and political issues relating to  The Assam Tribune. The research does not 
explore the impact of this framing of violence on the viewership of the newspaper, but we can 
perhaps reason that it shaped public opinion about both the Bodos and ‘immigrants’. The 
Assamese middle class consuming the English press might see their identity being constituted 
through this discourse about the ‘native’ and the ‘foreigner’. Since the immigrant and the topic 
of the foreigner dominate the reporting and interpretation of events of violence, the reader of 
the newspaper may find the immigration to be an imminent threat, not just to the territory but 
to their native Assamese identity. 
 
In this chapter, we have explored the concept of the ‘immigrant’ and the politics of 
migration in the newspaper, The Assam Tribune. The chapter has attempted to analyse how an 
event of violence and the news around it (and the failures of reporting to engage in the 
circumstances of the region more fully), come to define the meaning of a key term. I have 
demonstrated how a particular system of name-calling runs through the newspaper that lends 
itself to formulating the meaning of an alien or infiltrator. Here, the ‘immigrant’ is not just a 
simple signifier, but is a product of a very complicated history and context. The newspaper, 
while discussing violence and migration, produces a fear of migrants which is located in the 
history of the partition of India. This politics of fear of the migrant is very consistent with the 
Hindu right-wing politics of the fear of Muslims in India. The immigrant debate is also 
complicated in the presence of the competing ambitions of different identities which the 
newspaper tends to overlook. The key semantic of ‘immigrant’ is tied to other terms, producing 
a specific meaning which is also tied to the very context in which meaning is played out. 
Overall, the coverage and discussion in the newspaper remains very anti-immigrant, and the 
idea of the immigrant is entangled not only with the category of Bangladeshi, but with the 


















This chapter examines the coverage of violent events in two Urdu newspapers – Azad 
Hind and Akhbar e Mashriq, which are published in Kolkata. It explores two intertwined 
aspects of Urdu newspaper coverage, of violence, in the Kokrajhar region of Assam. Firstly, 
the self-perpetuation of victimized Muslim identity by those who have symbolic power in the 
Muslim community in the press. It is a feature of Urdu language reporting in these papers that 
the events of violence experienced by the community are always explained within the pre-
existing framework of the ‘Muslim victim’. These stories are constructed without any 
journalistic investigation or editorial responsibility or any obligation to be objective. They 
constitute a ‘bare moment’, in which any particular event is fitted into the pre-existing narrative 
of victimization. This chapter aims to problematize the reporting of violence in the Urdu press 
by historically locating it in the conflict-ridden history of South Asia. 
 
In reporting the violence in Assam, the Urdu newspapers take a very contrasting 
position to that of the English language press. Coverage in the Urdu press has a different 
trajectory, which originates from a different understanding of history. While the English press, 
in general, creates a discourse of the alien and alienation by making the Bengali Muslim, in 
Assam, a dangerous other, violence, in The Assam Tribune newspaper, is discussed more as a 
regional issue. On the other hand, the Urdu press, contextualizes violence in national and 
international frameworks. The Urdu press alters the discourse of otherness that is produced by 
the English press.  
 
The alterity of the Urdu press produces a different identity for victims of violence, 




projection screen for imaginations, fantasies, wishes, national anxieties and self-exaggerations 
— visions of the unknown, as well as projections onto the alienized, exoticized, or stereotyped 
Other” (Medick, 2017). In this very sense, the Urdu press, as opposed to the English one, 
unfolds the anxiety of those subjects who are seen as outsiders, and as the sole reason for 
violence in the case of Assam. The alterity lies in the interruption of the dominant discourse 
which routinely constructs the other, the foreign, and the alien. 
 
It is not an ‘alternative’ position (or semantic) which Urdu newspapers produce every 
day in reporting violence, but it is a parallel position, a parallel history and a parallel frame, 
one which The Assam Tribune does not consider or use. Hence, there are two histories operating 
over the same set of events, giving rise to discourses of ‘alien’ and ‘alterity’. 
 
 The role played by different language media in constituting their own public is worth 
noting. In the case of Urdu, the Urdu newspapers constitute an Urdu public sphere, the identity 
of which is also hopelessly linked with Indian Muslims. During independence/partition, the 
idea of Pakistan, or the future of the ‘Muslim minority’, was fiercely debated amongst the Urdu 
newspapers of Undivided India. Advocates for the creation of Pakistan used the Urdu press for 
their own ends and were countered by other ‘Muslim nationalists’ in different newspapers 
(Dhulipala, 2015). As elsewhere in India, the Urdu language became a site for defining or 
determining the meaning of the Indian Muslim. Subsequent violent episodes were discussed 
differently in the Assamese local press, if compared to the national media. The larger identity 
category, of a Muslim, overshadows the other subtleties and complexities of the region in the 
Urdu language dailies. Heidegger (1982) theorizes about the ‘essencing’ ability of language, 
in that the true essence of a thing is in the language. Words or language shape our thinking, 
and perhaps make thinking possible. For Zizek (2009), a fundamental violence is actually 
inscribed in this very essentializing ability, but thinking necessitates words or language. Zizek 
sees an unconditional violence in this very non-violent medium of communication. There is no 
doubt that language can simplify things and reduce them into a single feature, as depicted by 
Zizek, drawing on Hegel, however, at the same time, language alone has the capacity to civilize 
and humanize. It alone can heal and hold the complexity, which no other thing can.  
Nonetheless, language is crucial in articulating any identity and in communicating it. The 
essence of something may easily be preserved and communicated in different languages, but 
differently. This is particularly true about the idea of the (Indian) ‘Muslim’ or ‘minority’ in 




essence to the meaning of these events of violence, and they subsequently assign a particular 
meaning to the identity of a ‘victimized minority’.  
 
The History of the Urdu Press in Colonial and Post-Colonial India  
 
The history of the Urdu press is entwined with the politics of identity formation and the 
rise of the public sphere in colonial Northern India. This multifaceted history has been the 
subject of scholarly research in both the Urdu and English languages18. Scholarship, on the 
Urdu press and in the Urdu language, no matter how comprehensive, often misses its crucial 
link between discourses of identity formation and public sphere politics. However, this crucial 
connection has been dealt with by several works of scholarship in the English language19. 
 
 With the introduction of the press, a new world was introduced to the public life of the 
nineteenth century. This would prove vital in shaping the future of the country and the 
community. The divide between Hindi and Urdu also became more evident with the 
advancement of the press in the region, and shaped public discourse about language politics 
and communitarian identity formation. In this regard, Ayesha Jalal, in her seminal work Self 
and Sovereignty, unpacks the mutually constitutive relationship between the role of the press 
and identity formation. She argues that religion became a common social denominator which 
was mobilized in the service of the collective discourses of the community (Jalal, 2000, p.41). 
The public sphere was primarily comprised of newspapers, and it became the site where these 
collective discourses were debated by the self-fashioned public intellectuals of the Hindu and 
Muslim communities. Jalal highlights that, “It was the dialectic between colonialism and the 
self-perceptions of Indians seeking to project their religious identity for political purposes 
through print technology which injected a potent layer of ideological differentiations into 
subcontinental psyches” (Jalal, 2000, p.46). The rise of the Urdu press in Northern India is also 
 
18 For scholarship on the history of the Urdu press, please see: Imdad Sabri, Tareekh e Sahafat e Urdu 
(Delhi:Jamal Press,1983); Nadir Ali Khan, Hindustani Press (Lucknow: Uttar Pradesh Urdu Academy, 1990); 
Masoom Muradabadi, Urdu Sahafat aur Jang e azadi 1857 (New Delhi: Khabardar Publications, 2008); 
Dr.Shearullah Khan Wajeehi,  Uneesveen sadi ke urdu Akhbarat (Rampur: Rampur Raza Library, 2005); Anwar 
Ali Dehlavi,.ed.,Urdu Sahafat (Delhi: Urdu Academy, 2013); Muhammad Siddiqi, Hindustani Akhbar Navisi: 
Kampani ke ahad mein(Karachi: Indus, 1980); Muhammad Siddiqi, Suba e Shimali o Maghrib ke Akhbarat o 
Matbooat (1848-1853) (Aligarh: Anjuman e Taraqqi Urdu, 1962); Irteza Karim,.ed.Urdu Sahafat ke do so saal 
(New Delhi: National Council for the promotion of the Urdu language, 2017) 
19 See: Ulrike Stark, An Empire of Books: The Naval Kishore Press and the Diffusion of the Printed Word in 
Colonial India (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2008); For the pre-colonial link of Urdu newspapers with Persian 
Akhabarat see: Information and the Public Sphere: Persian Newsletters from Mughal Delhi ( New Delhi, Oxford 





concomitant with the rise of the “middle class” of colonial Northern India. This process has 
been studied by scholars like Sanjay Joshi, who have seen how, in colonial Northern India 
especially, respectability was redefined in terms of cultural capital, and how a group of men 
drawn from “service communities” could act as the new standard bearers of social and religious 
conduct which, in turn, empowered them vis à vis the lower classes  and the traditional elites 
(Joshi, 2001). 
 
Warsi (2003) argues that the history of the Urdu press can be divided into three stages: 
The first stage lasted between 1822- 1900 and was dominated by a reformist tone, newspapers 
like Jam e Jahan Numa, Delhi Urdu Akhbar or Sadiq ul Akhbar emerged and played a key 
role, during this period; The second stage took place between 1901 to 1947 in which Urdu 
newspapers actively engaged in the anti-colonial struggle. The press at that time was poorly 
printed and poorly organized, partly due to different colonial laws curbing the freedom of 
expression (against the rulers) and partly from the lack of resources as, pioneers of the time, 
Hasrat Mohani and Abul kalam Azad, were carrying the journalistic burden alone; The third 
phase, according to Warsi, started after the independence of India, in 1947, and continues 
today. This phase brought about the suffering of the Urdu press, since non-Muslim readers 
switched from Urdu to Hindi papers, owing to the legacy of partition. For Warsi, Urdu 
newspapers today are of two kinds: one advocating Islamic thought, and the other offering a 
secular tone.  
 
Since Urdu Journalism started in Kolkata (Bengal), it remained an important centre for 
Urdu newspapers and journalism. Shanti Ranjan Bhattacharya (2003) suggests that the history 
of Urdu journalism in Bengal must be divided into two eras: One is the era of revolution, which 
started with the journalism of Abul Kalam Azad in 1912, and saw ferocious battles against 
colonial administration. New newspapers kept surfacing and changing their names, due to 
colonial laws which banned them, and this motivated people to fight for the struggle of the 
country;  The second era, from 1940 to 1948, was an ‘era of chaos’, a time when Bengal was 
hit by the Second World War, causing regional chaos and the Bengal famine, which caused 
hundreds of thousands of deaths. This era was also an era of intense communal violence, due 
to the partition of India. This period, further, saw a crisis in regard to paper for newspapers, 





Despite the challenges, the Urdu press played a key role, in pre-independence India, in 
creating an ‘Urdu public’, and it helped to forge a sense of ‘Qaum’ and community. It became 
a space in which to contest different versions of nationalisms and to anchor certain ideologies 
of the nation. For David Gilmartin (1991), it is critical to understand the commercial Urdu 
press in order to have any understanding “of an emerging Muslim 'public' that transcended the 
particularistic structure of the colonial state”(Gilmartin, 1991, p.130). As explained above, the 
Urdu press produced idioms of community, not merely to control the community and direct 
them, but also to draw them to these newspapers. There is not only a reformist logic, but a 
commercial logic that is inherently present in the Urdu newspapers of that time. Gilmartin notes 
that  
 
…the rhetoric of 'community' was increasingly deployed in the press not primarily in 
the interest of education or rational self-control of the individual, but in the interest of 
drawing as many readers as possible into the public discourse on which their 
publications, and the dissemination of their own ideas, depended” (Gilmartin, 1991, 
p.130).  
 
Gilmartin sees a commercial logic in the press which went beyond the political, and this 
commercial logic enables a reader or a citizen to make a choice. The autonomy of the individual 
was operating from the perspective of commercial logic, as he highlights that  
 
… central to the 'imagined community' of the new press was not a community bounded 
by a discourse of rational control over individuals, but a new realm of public 
community rooted in a discourse of individual autonomy. (Gilmartin, 1991, p.130). 
 
The policy of the British administration, to have a separate electorate for both Hindus 
and Muslims and to define through them a ‘fixed and controlled space’, also empowered urban 
leaders to create a new kind of ‘public’,  
 
… defined at the intersection of an emerging commercial press, with its appeals to 
symbols as a focus for Muslim community identity, and an appeal to popular action 
(including voting) as an expression simultaneously of community and individual 
autonomy. (Gilmartin, 1991, p.136).  
 
This became particularly vital in the conceptualizing of ‘Muslim nationalism’ in British India. 
It was, for Gilmartin, a public in a Habermasian sense, which was not encapsulated by the 
State. He underlines that there was less of an immediate benefit to this but, in the long term, 




nation was imagined through this new public, which “‘imagined' both in the world and in the 
individual heart” (Gilmartin, 1991, p.137). This new imagination shaped Muslim identity and 
politics for the long term, giving them the sense of a transcendental community whose location 
was in India, but that belonged to the horizon of the entire Muslim world. Ansari rightly notes 
that it was:  
 
… the remarkable growth of the Urdu vernacular press that brought Indian Muslims 
into contact as never before with the wider Muslim world. There developed an 
increasing awareness of how the expansion of European power was increasingly 
subjecting Muslims to Christian rule. (Ansari, 1986, p.510).  
 
The emergence of Muslim ‘Qawm’, an important term in the definition of the Muslim 
community, which we will look at in more detail later, owes itself to the emergence of the Urdu 
press. The term, however,  is also associated with the emergence of a certain Muslim elite 
which critically shaped the identity of the community, and that was captured insightfully by 
Ayesha Jalal’s work Self and Sovereignty, which notes that:  
 
…examining the role of the vernacular press and poetry in the forging of 
communitarian identity shows how epistemological certainties can lead to the erasure 
of distinctions between an elite discourse and the complex, and often ambiguous, 
existential dynamics at the social base. (Jalal, 2000, p.86).  
 
The category of Muslim, as an epistemological category, that is produced by the Urdu press, 
has undermined all the complexity and heterogeneity of the community. In forging the identity 
of the Muslim, in twentieth century India, the vernacular press exploited the idea of nationalism 
and communalism. As Jalal notes, the “natural site of competing discourses on the language of 
communitarian identity” (Jalal, 2000, p.124) was print media, and the attempt was made by 
different vernacular newspapers through undermining all contradictions, to “invent a language 




The growth of the Urdu and Hindi presses bear significance for the modern politics of 
India and the shaping of identities. In his work, Press, Politics and Society, Kirti Narain 
demonstrates the role that the Hindi and Urdu presses played during the period 1885 to 1914. 
His historical work highlights the oppositional role that was played by the non- English press 




censor them, like the famous ‘Gagging Act’ or Vernacular Press Act of Lytton in 1878. His 
work underlines the impact of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan’s reformist writing and journalistic 
venture on the development of the Urdu press, post 1857, in Northern India. He also notes that 
“Urdu journalists objected to the growing Hindi journalism” (Narain, 1998, p.22). Chandrika 
Kaul notes that the colonial administration also published newspapers in Urdu and Hindi for 
its ‘native’ Indian employees, like the Akhbar -i-Jung, a weekly Urdu paper for the ‘native’ 
“troops of Indian expeditionary forces on the subcontinent” (Kaul, 2003, p.127).  
 
So, the emergence of the Urdu press, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
and its instrumental role in shaping identities and constituting the public sphere, cannot be 
accounted for in isolation . The rise of the Hindi press and the antagonism it felt towards Urdu 
was born out of the Hindi or Nagri script, which emerged as a counterpart to Urdu in claiming 
the Hindustani language. Jalal notes that,  
 
What gave extra flight to resentments against Urdu was the sense of anticipation with 
which a segment of educated Hindus looked upon the new political dispensation. Now 
that Muslim colonialism was a thing of the past, they could revitalize Sanskrit, refine 
Hindi and reassert their distinctive religious identity. (Jalal, 2000, p.126).  
 
The Urdu-Hindi divide, despite claims that they share a common origin, remained an important 
and determining aspect of Hindu-Muslim politics in colonial India. As Akshaya Mukul (2015) 
notes, in his work on the Gita Press which not only played a key role in popularizing the Hindu 
world view, but also in shaping a Hindu Idea. The founder of the press, Hanuman Prasad 
Poddar,  asserted that “The effort is to turn Hindi into Urdu, Urdu into Persian so that Hindi is 
killed forever. This should not be allowed to happen” (Mukul, 2015, p.283). He notes the 
staunch resistance to Urdu by the new, emerging Hindu educated class, and its insistence on 
making Hindi a language for Hindus. Finding a language for a distinct community or religious 
group communalized the language and created the politics of the Hindi-Urdu divide.   
 
Urdu and the Muslim Minority  
 
The Independence of India, and its partition, did not make the situation better, as the 
question of language was already entangled with the question of religious identity. A 




Urdu as the language of Muslims, and explores the common genealogy of Urdu and Hindi20, 
but not all agree. Omar Khalidi (1986) argues that there is an inextricable link between Urdu 
and Muslims in modern India. He sees it as a common language which ensured the 
solidification of Muslim identity and the strengthening of unity amongst them. For him, 
“Preventing Urdu speakers from learning the lingua franca of Muslims” is, then, a strategy to 
divide Indian Muslims into different linguistic groups and to break its ‘all-India’ personality, 
and thus the solution begins with ensuring that every Muslim child learns Urdu. Syed 
Shahabuddin puts forth a similar view about Urdu and Muslim identity, so intertwined 
(especially in North India) that, “it is impossible to separate them” (Shahabuddin, 2006, p.169). 
Linking Urdu with Muslims has been a key political aspect of the Muslim Ashraf and has been 
criticized by Pasmanda Politics. The Pasmanda criticism holds that this linking is detrimental 
to Urdu and is an instrument of Ashraf Politics in India21. (Alam, 2009). 
 
 So, this view of the ‘inextricable link’ is not uncontested, as it is largely shared by 
Ashraf  Muslims and has also been seen as the main propeller of Ashraf  Politics in Northern 
India, even before partition. Rafiuddin Ahmed (1988) has shown how the Ashraf, in Bengal, 
rejected Bengali as a Hindu language, not proper for Muslims, he reflects on the Bengali-Urdu 
divide of the early 20th century, which shapes the character of Muslim politics in the region. 
The constitution of ‘community’, by the Ashraf, whose lingua franca was Urdu, included those 
who were part of the Bengali ‘speech community’ and have not acquired enough knowledge 
of the language to be included in that community (Ahmed, 1988). A similar argument has been 
put forward by Papia Sengupta in his work, Language as Identity in Colonial India, which 
highlights the Ashraf’s (who migrated from the Western region of India to Bengal) attitude to 
the local Muslims of Bengal as being very discriminatory. The Ashraf class spoke Persian or 
Urdu, and did not consider Bengali Muslims to be their equal (Sengupta, 2018, p.19). 
 
 
20 Please see: Alok Rai and Shahid Amin, A debate between Alok Rai and Shahid Amin regarding Hindi (The 
Annual of Urdu Studies, 2005) 
21 Pasmanda is a term used by the Muslim lower caste to define themselves, and their politics has been critical 
of the Ashraf class of Indian Muslim. For more on Pasmanda’s critique of Ashraf politics and the assertion of 
the Urdu language as a question of the Muslim minority, see Arshad Alam, Challenging the Ashrafs: The 




The dilemma and tension of ‘minoritization’ goes deep into history and society and so 
does the reciprocal relation between ‘Urdu’ and ‘Muslims’ in India22. The condition that creates 
a minority lies in its victimization and oppression (Tripathy and Padmanabhan, 2014). The 
ontological being solidified by ‘repeated acts of minority performance’ (Tripathy and 
Padmanabhan, 2014) can be traced back to the narrative of ‘minoritisation’, which speaks of 
its own oppression. Arguably, the question of a ‘Muslim Minority’ in India is tied up with the 
question of Urdu, and the marginalization of Urdu is an indicator of the minoritisation of Indian 
Muslims. At the same time, the Urdu language was also used as a tool by Ashraf23 leaders for 
minority politics. As most of the mainstream Urdu newspapers were run by this class, they 
exercised power over shaping opinion and constructing the identity of Muslims. In this way, 
Sikand notes, the Muslim upper caste, “like their Hindu counterparts, they control Muslim 
opinion, head most Muslim religious and community organisations, and thus claim to be 
natural leaders of the community as a whole” (Sikand, 2004, p.13). 
 
 The two Urdu newspapers’ coverage of violence in the Bodoland region of Assam and 
of the conflict between the Bodos and Bengali Muslims there, produces the narrative of a “real 
minority”. The violence is the event which brings the narrative of victimization as a single 
definer of Muslim identity in India. The newspapers do not acknowledge the ambivalence of 
Muslim identity, nor articulate what defines these subjects and the violence, apart from their 
‘minority’ statuses. It objectifies the subjects to represent the minority in an unequivocal 
fashion as a product of injustice that is cast in hopelessness.  
 
Reporting Violence in the Bodoland Region of Assam 
 
The coverage of violence in 1993 is almost negligible; there are few news reports in 
Azad Hind and Akhbar e Mashriq on the subject. News of violence in both Urdu newspapers 
are translated from the news agency PTI (Press Trust of India Ltd.). The most extensive 
discussion of violence was during 2012, as that event spiralled into a national Event and it 
coincided with the Rohingya crisis in Burma. Since Azad Hind’s 2012 files could not be found, 
 
22 During my schooldays, for instance, Muslims were allowed to have a break for Friday prayers, in every class 
a teacher, before the prayer time, would announce ‘Urdu students can take a leave’ which effectively meant that 
Muslims could go for prayer. 
 
23 Ashraf is referred to as the Muslim elite belonging to the upper castes of Muslims in India and holding key 
community positions as political leaders, religious scholars, community leaders, etc. The medieval Ashraf scholars 




we discuss 2012 in light of  the Akhbar e Mashriq coverage of the Event. During the violence 
in October, 1993, little news space was given to the coverage, and Azad Hind called it ‘Racial 
violence’ (“Nasali Fasad” in Urdu), the most likely translation of ethnic violence from the 
news agency. There is no editorial interpretation of the events of violence. 
 
However, in 1994, more coverage of the topic may be found in both newspapers. The 
editorial in Azad Hind on 23rd July, 1994, interpreting the event of violence says  
 
Assam mein chahe jis qism ki tehreek aur shorish uthe aakhir uska rukh musalman ki 
taraf mud jata hai. Khoonkhar darindon ko khoon chahyie aur jab koi unhen koi doosra 
shikar aasani se nahin milta to kamzor aur laachar musalmanon par bhooke bhedyon 
ki tarah toot padte hain. 
 
Whatever movement and crisis erupts in Assam, eventually, they are directed against 
Muslims. Blood thirsty monsters need blood and when they can’t find anyone else then 
weak and helpless Muslims are attacked by them like a pack of hungry wolves] (Azad 
Hind, 1994, p.3, 23Jul).  
 
Akhbar e Mashriq also reported and opined about the events of violence in October, 
1994, and in one editorial, entitled ‘Ethnic Cleansing of Muslims in Barpeta’, it argues that “so 
much hatred against Muslims has been propagated in the region that every wall and door is 
bloodthirsty… and since the government of Assam itself hates and calls them Bangladeshi, 
then no wonder there is a genocide” (Akhbar e Mashriq, 1994, p.4, 25Jul) 
 
Both Urdu newspapers use the words ‘Muslim’ and ‘Minority’ interchangeably’, 
Muslims are framed as a helpless minority who have no agency and who survive on the 
memory of violence and oppression. The Bodos are largely represented as murderous and as 
being instrumentalized by Hindu right-wing forces to eliminate Muslims.  
 
 In 2012, the episode of violence in Assam was internationalized by the newspaper, as 
it coincided with the ethnic violence against Rohingya Muslims in the Arakan region of Burma. 
Akhbar e Mashriq abundantly elaborated on the plight of these communities, drawing a parallel 
between them. The conjecture is that their miserable life is essentially due to their identity as 
Muslims. In both cases, the hope of help from the State is minimal in the newspapers’ 





 An article by the Magazine Desk of the newspaper in the supplementary edition of 
Akhbar e Mashriq on 2nd September, entitled, “Mass killing of 20,000 innocent Muslims in 
Burma” starts off by talking about the dismal situation of Muslims in Palestine and Syria, then 
moves onto the state of the Rohingyas in Burma, and claims that between 3rd June and 12th 
June, 2012, 50,000 Muslims were killed by Buddhist terrorists. The contradiction in the 
headline and the first few lines of the article is obvious. It lacks objectivity and moves to the 
glorious history of the Muslim arrival in Burma during the time of Caliph Haroon Rasheed. 
The article concludes by comparing these stateless citizens of Burma with the Muslim citizens 
of India, it says: 
 
Hindustan mein azadi ke baad se ab tak sainkdon muslim kush fasadat mein hazaron 
begunahon ki jaanen talf ho chuki hain. Lakhon lut put ke barbad ho chuke hain. Lekin 
aaj tak na mutassereen ki baaz aabad kaari ka koi mansooba banaya gya aur na 
qasoorwaron ko saza mili. 
 
[In India, since independence, hundreds of anti-Muslim riots have taken place, in which 
thousands got killed and lakhs displaced, but no plan has been carried out to rehabilitate 
them or to punish the guilty]. (Akhbar e Mashriq, 2012, p.5, 2Sep) 
 
The article suggests that victims of the 1984 anti-Sikh riot obtained justice, but Muslims 
cannot expect justice in this country [i.e., India] and have to live at the mercy of the majority 
community. It is not the unique suffering of the Assamese or the Indian Muslims that is 
focussed upon, but the universal suffering of Muslims in the world, as the world has turned 
against them. The victimization is perpetuated, not only in the local or regional sense, but in 
the international sense of seeking a kind of solidarity with persecuted Muslims, globally.  
 
Another opinion writer draws similarities from around the globe of Muslim persecution. 
It starts with Palestine and goes on to Iraq and Afghanistan, then comes back to reflect on the 
Muslim situation in India, reading it through ‘global Muslim history’. In a nostalgic tone it 
boasts and bemoans: 
 
Jis hindustan  mein babri masjid shaheed ki gaye, usi Hindustan par aath sao baras 
tak muslim hukmuranon ne hukumat ki hai..kabhi musakman is haisiat mein the ke 
europe,asia, aur afirca mein jo chahte the karte the, lekin aaj  muslim qaom sari dunya 
mein qatl o gharatgiri aur har qism ke mazalim ka shikar hai”  
 
[In this India where Babri Masjid was demolished, in this very India, Muslims once 




wanted in Europe, Asia and Africa, but today the Muslim nation is a target of all kinds 
of killing and injustice, it is a victim of all kinds of tyranny] (Agha, 2012, p.14, 2Aug)  
 
Ummah Politics: From Local to Global 
 
The framing of violence in the Kokrajhar region shifts from regional to national and 
then global. The reference to a glorious past, and a nostalgic overtone is characteristic of this 
newspaper. The only solace for the oppressed community is the memory of a wonderful past; 
the question of Muslim identity is tied to this idea. The international or trans-national outlook 
of Muslims makes them distinct as an ‘Ummah’ or global nation. Their plight in India is not 
independent of their suffering in the Middle-East, or elsewhere. Editorials in Akhbar e Mashriq 
during this period of 2012, assert this point relentlessly. Beyond caste, class and ethnicity, the 
category of Muslim is monolithic, as it were, and their fate and misery are unique and universal. 
By connecting two different local issues, it tries to connect two out of joint, times and create a 
sense of a common time of the community it is imagining.  
 
This is perhaps the most consistent feature of Urdu newspapers for a long time: 
Overwhelming coverage of international news, conflating it with the local situation and thereby 
rendering a sense of a unified global Muslim community. In 2012, while reporting the situation 
in Burma and the violence in the Bodoland region of Assam, the newspaper links the two events 
together and presents it as one, creating a strong sense of ‘ummah’ and connectedness. In his 
work, ‘The Politics of Self-Expression,’  Daeschel notes this feature, even in news coverage, in 
Urdu newspapers before partition. He highlights that “The Urdu media world of late colonial 
North India was segregated along religious lines. Muslim papers like Inqilab or Zamindar 
constructed their imagination of world space with the help of locations that did not feature as 
prominently in their Hindu equivalents”, and the most unsurprising feature was the paramount 
importance given to the “events affecting Muslims worldwide” (Daeschel, 2006, p.135). He 
notes that the “Events affecting the Muslim ummat inside India were often reported with the 
same sense of closeness as Muslim affairs in other countries”. Daeschel’s work shows how the 
politics of self-expression created its conceptual space through the Urdu newspapers which 
shaped the politics of middle-class Muslims before and during colonial times. Linking the news 
from Burma and Assam together by a press which was situated in Kolkata, which has no 
correspondent in the actual field where the event was happening, creates a space where the 
world looks like a singular entity, with events connected to each other, giving a sense of a 




juxtaposition of news on a single page establishes a certain form of temporal-spatial grid” and 
the “events in India and events in the world are all located on one and the same”. The headline 
on 12th August in Akhbar e Mashriq proclaims: “The Blood of Muslims in Mumbai boils over 
the Violence in Assam”. This, and many other headlines like it, bring ‘Muslim’, a 
heterogeneous and abstract category, together with different locations and delivers a sense of 
a coherent whole which stabilizes and essentializes the identity ‘Muslim’.  
 
It is worth noting that the two recurring terms invoked in these Urdu newspapers are 
‘Ummah’ and ‘Qawm’. These terms owe their meaning to the Quran and emergence of Islam 
and their usage was meant to create an ‘imagined community’ by the Muslims of South Asia 
during the colonial times. Faisal Devji sees the genealogy of this term in the emergence of the 
Muslim community as a “new kind of social category”, which is “derived at least in part from 
the new forms of enumeration and classification put in place by the British in India” (Devji, 
2015). The word ‘Qawm’ has been used in religious terms for a community, but its usage here 
in a very historical sense, is for a nation as well. The usage of ‘Qawm’ is meant to create a 
sense of a Muslim community, with no difference. Devji notes that the term was used and made 
intelligible by the Muslim Ashraf who tried “to overcome the ravages of colonialism by 
exploiting that space opened up by the destruction of the Mughal empire to emerge as a separate 
nation; a group which could only have meaning in terms of Islam” and hence this new Muslim 
nation, or Qawm, he notes, is “dominated by the shurafa as a unified, pan ethnic entity for the 
first time”. The ‘Qawm’ was seen as being ethnically exclusive and distinct from the religious 
term ‘ummah’, which implies a Muslim community worldwide to which a Muslim feel 
associated.  In Jalal’s words, it is the “spiritual bond with the ummah or the worldwide 
community of Islam meshes with associations to family and the larger kinship group. A 
Muslim’s identification with a non-territorial community of Islam, and the sense of belonging 
to a territorially located community means that space is both infinite and finite at the same 
time. It is this dialectic, inherent in their religiously informed cultural identity that has lent 
historical complexity and depth to the Muslims’ relationship with the watan or homeland.” 
(Jalal, 2000, p.10). The role of the Urdu press and Urdu language can hardly be 
overemphasized. Qasmi and Robb opine that,  
 
…the cultural shaping of the Muslim qaum owed much to figures like Iqbal who, 
through the powerful medium of Urdu and Persian poetry, helped enrich the concept of 
the Muslim Qaum with cultural and ideological content drawn from multiple 





In these newspapers’ discussion of the Muslim minority, the idea of a Qawm and the 
Ummah, is always present. The Indian Muslim, or the victim minority, is an exclusive Qawm 
and part of the global Ummah as well. Minority, Qawm, and Ummah belong to one semantic 
field which determines the identity of the Indian Muslim. The 2014 general election in India, 
and the victory of the, right-wing, Hindu Nationalist Party, the BJP, has further deepened the 
fear within the ‘minority’ community or the ‘Qawm’. The coverage of violence in 2014 makes 
direct reference to Narendra Modi and the coming oppression of Muslims in titles like ‘Assam: 
Anti-Muslim violence a new glance at Modism’ (Azad Hind, 2014, p.5) and ‘Is anti-Muslim 
violence in Assam the beginning of the Modi mission’ (Azad Hind, 2014, p.5) 
 
The fear of Majoritarian Nationalism 
 
The violence in Kokrajhar, in 2014, took place during the national election. The 
coverage of violence in both newspapers is contextualized within the ‘Modi Phenomenon’, 
which is seen as a threat to the Indian Muslim. Akhbar e Mashriq’s 4th May front page headline 
was “In Assam: Mass Killing of Muslims, 33 Dead” and Azad Hind on 4th May gave its front 
page, but not the main headline, to an article entitled: “In Assam Once Again: Ethnic Cleansing 
of Muslims, Dozens Killed”. On May 5th, it carried the news of violence as main headline with 
very emotive photos. An editorial in Azad Hind on 8th May, 2014, interpreting the event of 
violence suggests: 
 
Musalmanon ke qatl e aam ke peeche ek munazaam sazish kaam kar rahi hai. 
Musalmanon par hamla narendra modi ki us taqreer ke baad hua jis mein narendra 
modi ne Bengali musalmanon ko warning dete hue kaha ke woh 16 may se qabl assam 
se nika jayen … narendra modi ko poori ummeed hai ke mulk ke aaenda wazeer aazam 
wahi ho rahe hain aur 16 may ke baad hi unki taaj poshi jo jayegi. .. Narendra modi ke 
dil mein musalmanon ke khilaf zabardast nafrat bhara hua hai. Is ka andaza is se 
lagaya ja sakta hai ke unhone parlemani intekhab mein sewae char panch musalmanon 
ke kisi aur ko ticket nahi dia. … Gujarat ke assembly intekhabat mein bhi modi ne kahin 
kisi musalman ko ticket nahi dia. Woh musalmanon ko Hindustan ka shahri nahi 
samajhte . narendra modi maujooda daur ka firaun hai jo ek allah ka naam lene walon 
ka khula dushman hai.  
 
[There is a well-planned conspiracy behind the killing of Muslims. The attack on 
Muslims in Assam happened after that speech of Modi in which he warned Bengali 
Muslims and asked them to leave before the 16th May. Narendra Modi is certain about 
his victory and he will be crowned as the Prime Minister of India. His heart is filled 
with hatred for Muslims. One can figure this out through the fact that he only fielded 




never gave a ticket to any Muslim in the assembly election. He does not consider 
Muslims citizens of India. He is a pharaoh of our time who is openly against the 
worshipper of one god] (Azad Hind, 2014, p.5, 8May)  
 
Narendra Modi, the Hindu nationalists’ choice for Prime Minister, is seen as a 
democratic threat and his brand of nationalism is characterized, by the Urdu press as non-
democratic. It is also seen as a threat to the religious identity of Muslims in India. The violence 
is not only ideologically read but also theologically framed by using the Quranic (and Biblical) 
tale of Moses and Pharaoh. The Gujarat pogrom of 2002, in which thousands of Muslims were 
killed during the Chief Ministership of Narendra Modi, was one of the predominant reasons 
for the Muslim community to be frightened of his candidacy.  
  
The fear of Hindu majoritarianism dominates the coverage (and opinion) of violence. 
The fear and insecurity are intrinsic elements of the language which communicates the events 
of violence and the future which grows under the shadow of violence. The reminder to the 
‘Urdu public’ is of their doubtful citizenship and sheer worthlessness. The reference to 
Pharaoh, a Qur’anic tale about a tyrant and his subjects, is overtly religious, and constitutes the 
imagination of Muslims as essentially being a religious community. The religious references 
to explain every day politics suggest that the identity of a religious minority escapes the secular 
–political imagination and it can build or represent itself in the language of its religious 
experience.  
 
 “The worthless blood of Muslims”, an article (without an author) in Akhbar e Mashriq 
on the same episode of violence in Assam, concludes in utter helplessness that: 
 
Assam ho ya phir koi doosra ilaqa aakhir musalmanon ko hi kyun eejad e sitam ke liye 
apni tajurbagah  tasawwur kia jata hai? ... kya yeh nihatte musalmanon ki takhleeq isi 
wajah se hue hai ke unko karb pahunchaya jaaye aur surat e haal is qadr alam angez 
ho ke koi dilasa dene wala bhi na ho. 
 
[Whether it be Assam or some other region, why are Muslims, alone, considered the 
only subject to be tormented with new experiments of violence? Were innocent and 
unarmed Muslims created only to be tortured and the situation be reduced to such that 
there is no one to console us.] (Akhbar e Mashriq, 2014, p.6, 9May) 
 
  The bare narrative of victimization and helplessness that is produced in these two Urdu 
newspapers unveils the complex history of the concept of a minority, entangled with the 




narrative in the fractured history of South Asia. He draws a parallel between the “German Jew” 
and the “Indian Muslim”, seeing them not simply as social groups, but as ones carrying the 
“entire cultural and political problematics and trajectories” which emerge to represent the 
“torments of European and Indian modernity” (Mufti, 1995). The formation of the identity of 
a ‘minority’, of a Muslim or a Jewish one, is of a paradoxical nature. Just as a Jew in a liberal 
European state is both a Jew and not one, the Muslim in a liberal-secular universe has to be a 
Muslim and not to be one.  The identity of the ‘Muslim’ within an Indian nation is very much 
constituted in its otherness; as Mufti says, “the representation burden that falls upon the figure 
of the Muslim is precisely that of being the other within the modern nation, the continually 
repeated, negative reminder of the national(ist) self’s modernity” (Mufti, 1995, p.84). This is. 
then, not the problem of ‘minority’ to begin with, but of the ‘majority’ which defines Indian 
nationhood and “seeks to place “the Muslims” in the place of the national minority” (Mufti, 
1995, p.85). The dilemma perpetuated by the project of nationhood incessantly asks Muslims 
to explain themselves, to declare their identity, what they are “out rightly”: Muslim or Indian? 
For Mufti, the partition of India is, then, not just the culmination of a ‘separatist impulse’ but 
is a “necessary development for the discourse of nationhood itself” and turning the one–third 
Muslims left in the country into a “national minority” (p.86). Urdu newspapers, also a site of 
Ashraf symbolic power and a conceptual space, own this responsibility of speaking for this 
“national minority”. By undermining the complex history of immigration and tribal struggle 
for self-determination in Assam, Urdu newspapers self-perpetuate the monolithic identity of a 
victimised Muslim minority in India. The absent voices of actual victims of violence and the 
dominant voices of those seizing the moment to speak for the entire minority, characterise the 
meaning-making project of the ‘victimised minority’, in these two newspapers. If history is not 
the product of ‘ancestral memory’ and it is made by educated people (Seaton, 1999), then by 
narrating and articulating the reasons for violence, the Muslim Ashraf take total control over 
the question of the identity and meaning of history. Faisal Devji refers to this as a “siege 
mentality”, which has emerged in modern India due to the lack of autonomous Muslim politics, 
in the country. While reflecting on the coverage of the Gulf War in the Urdu press during the 
1990s,  Devji notes that,   
 
…when pro-Saddam feeling was high, a Delhi Urdu newspaper, Nai Duniya (New 
World), carried on its front page a portrait of the Iraqi president at prayer surrounded 
by daggers representing the allied forces - including other Muslim countries but 




aspect of their victimhood: widespread paranoia - or a “siege mentality,” as the Indian 
press would have it. (Devji, 1992, p.15). 
 
 Fear of a majority, a majority which is not only arithmetically superior, but that 
dominates the power structure, defines the idea of a ‘minority,’ not only today, but even before 
partition when Jinnah was leading his cause for a country separate from India and only for the 
Muslims of India. Jinnah championed the cause of ‘Minority Muslims’ in British India which 
formed the core mission of Muslim League (Jaffrelot, 2015). The ‘majority Muslim’ and the 
‘minority Muslim’ were both present at the time of colonial rule, and Jinnah tried to address 
both and later gave way to the ‘majority Muslim’ in the leadership. The ambivalence of Muslim 
identity did not evade Jinnah, but he turned the ‘minority’ question into an existential question 
in order to advance the aim of a new nation that was carved out of India.  
 
 The fear of numerically powerful Hindus constituted the idea of the ‘Majority’ which 
would not let the ‘Minority’, comprised primarily of Muslims, live in peace and equality. 
Jinnah, in his speeches and writings, transformed the ‘fear’ into the concepts of minority and 
the two nation theory24. One may underline the following points, as key definers of Jinnah’s 
idea of minority, gathered from his speeches and writing (Ahmad, 1960) : 
 
Security: The most prominent aspect defining the ‘minority’ is the presence of a threatening 
and hegemonizing majority. In the case of India, the Hindu majority represents a 
permanent danger to the Muslim minority.  
 
Muslims as a distinct minority: Although numerically a minority, Muslims are a distinct 
minority, they are a nation and should not be reduced to a minority. This nation is distinct 
as an Ummah or Millat25 
 
The Muslim minority as indivisible: the Muslim minority is one and caste, class and region 
disappear behind this unity. This elitist position denies privileges (such as the privilege to 
define 'minority') and trans-communitarian hierarchies (such as caste) within the minority 
and delegitimizes the diversity of thought and action (determines this minority and 




24 According to two nation theory, Hindus and Muslim are two distinct nations which cannot live together. This 
theory serves as the basis for the movement of Pakistan 
25 Not bounded by territoriality but by religion, law and greater ambition. For more on this nation in the Indian 
context, please see Ayesha Jalal’s book Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam 




Bare Life or Bare Moment? 
 
The Urdu newspaper, thus, is a site of becoming: becoming a minority, becoming a site 
of minoritisation. The original condition of the emergence has changed, but the ‘minority’ 
continues to live in fear. The very tension of the meaning of Indian Muslim (or of a national 
minority) transforms and reinvents (or repeats) itself in the Urdu newspapers. Despite the claim 
and promise of Urdu newspapers’ editors and journalists that this is a language for all, a 
language of the nation, a language of national integration, and that the festival of Holi should 
be covered as much as Eid (Farooqi and Kazim, 2000), the reality remains contrary  in the face 
of the lack of both resources and skills. The Urdu press thus remains a site of the “bare victim 
narrative” as it is the process that is unfolding the minoritisation. 
 
The emergence of modern-day nationalism and the rise of the press are intricately 
linked. These are  key features of Western modernity, which has generated the idea of an 
“imagined community”, as shown by Anderson (1991), who argues that the homogenous empty 
time of the nation holds the ‘simultaneity’ of the past and the future in an instantaneous present. 
The simultaneous experience of reading newspapers helped to imagine individuals as a 
community, united and bonded in one single narrative through narrating the nation as 
‘homogenous’; what is excluded, and how the exclusion creates its own time in order to assert 
equal citizenship and to threaten the ‘homogenous time’ of the nation. The minority, which is 
frightened and insecure, is also imagined by the majority as frightening and threatening to 
security. Appadurai (2006) discusses the case of Muslims, in general (and Indian Muslims in 
particular), to demonstrate how this modern category of ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ produces the 
‘anxiety of incompleteness’. The presence of a minority is a constant reminder for the majority 
that there lies a gap “between their condition as majorities and the horizon of an unsullied 
national whole, a pure and untainted national ethnos” (Appadurai, 2006, p.8) prompting the 
eruption of violence against minorities by the majority. The narrative of a global war on terror 
was effectively used by the BJP government at the beginning of this century to reduce 
“Muslims to a humiliated and ghettoized minority” (Appadurai, 2006, p.95).  
  
 The increased coverage of violence, in 2012 and 2014, in Akhbar e Mashriq26, bears 
 
26 Azad Hind’s archive for 2012 could not be found. The newspaper management was going through a turbulent 
time due to the Saradha chit fund scam. They were changing offices constantly and were publishing intermittently 




this very anxiety, which is multiplied by the post-9/11 narrative of global war on terror. The 
violence is not only placed in a global context, but it is also framed as anti-Muslim rather than 
as ethnic or communal. The headlines carried by the newspaper on their front pages were, 
"Fresh wave of anti-Muslim violence in Assam” (Akhbar e Mashriq, 2012, p.1) or "The Blood 
of Muslims of Mumbai boils over riots in Assam – 2 killed in violent protest” (Akhbar e 
Mashriq, 2012, p.1) or "Nation-wide prayers for the Muslims of Assam and Burma” (Akhbar e 
Mashriq, 2012, p.1), which does not report anything objective about the violence, but quotes 
from a Friday sermon about the teaching of the Prophet Muhammad in such situations and 
about how to defeat the enemies of Islam by following Islam more strictly. The press does not 
talk about the suffering of the Bodos, or their lives in relief camps, or the lives they have lost. 
It emphasizes, instead, that Muslims as the only sufferers in these cycles of violence.  If the 
original question of modernity is “are you an Indian or a Muslim?” then, at the site of Urdu, at 
the determining site of minoritisation, one is ‘outrightly’ Muslim. The possibility to be 
‘something else’ ceases firstly in experience and then in language, opening the space for a 
certain kind of communication in which existence lies unadorned.  
 
The bare narrative of victimization that is produced in these newspapers is made 
possible by the events of violence and the very communication of this bare narrative is 
conceivable in the bare moment. In those bare moments, made possible by a rupture in normal 
time that is caused by violence, history, fact and fear, all collapse into one single narrative of 
victimization. In this bare moment, the life of Muslims in India is presented as a ‘bare life’, a 
life which is not a “simple natural life, but life exposed to death” (Agamben, 1998, p.88). The 
newspaper editorials, reports and columns constitute this bare moment by projecting this ‘bare 
life’, which is characterized by certain exceptions. If in a camp, as a state of exception, 
underlined by Agamben, “fact and law are completely confused” (Agamben, 1998, p.170), in 
the ‘bare moment’, the Urdu press constitutes the situational site of minority as a camp, where 
journalistic objective and fact is completely confused with fear and angst. While a ‘bare life’ 
has no identity except that it is facing death, and in this bare exposure to death it is freed of all 
identities, its identity is one that is counter-posed to the sovereign power (Samaddar, 2010, 
p.xxii). Urdu newspapers’ ‘bare life’, captured in this ‘bare moment’, is just reduced to its 
Muslim identity and is exposed to sovereign power and protected by nothing in facing death. 
One Urdu commentator, Suhail Vahid, deliberates upon the charge against Urdu newspapers, 
that they fanned communal fire, and asks whether the language they use is divisive. He then 




absolute objectivity, defending the language of Urdu newspapers and its perceived lack of 
journalistic ethics by retorting that “ if the community they represent, if the minority they speak 
on behalf of are victim of communal politics, which is oppressed by communalism then how 
can its language not reflect this?” (Vahid, 1996, p.50). The sensational language in each 
headline amplifies the fear of the community which these newspapers claim to represent, or— 
by articulating this fear— the Ashraf politics is enacted through the Urdu press.  
 
In narrating the violence from a remote site (and not from the site of violence), 
newspapers try to underline the exception in which this community lives and dies. On the 
question of arming the minority community in Assam, a 1994 editorial criticized the 
police/security forces, for attacking the oppressed instead of the perpetrators, arguing that, “if 
innocents are armed and they can hit back then perpetrators might restrain from the violence. 
Since the government cannot protect its weak and minorities it should arm them at least” (Azad 
Hind, 1994, p.3, 11Jul). The newspaper’s editorial position reflects an understanding of the 
Muslim minority in India as an exceptional state, where law cannot protect them and justice 
can never be served. In 2012, Akhbar e Mashriq, in its editorial, does not directly ask for the 
arming of Muslims but instead suggests: 
 
Hindustan mein ab tak jitne bhi firqa warana fasadat hue hain ya hindu muslim 
tasadum ki naubat aaye hai un mein humesha musalmanon ka ektarfa nuqasan hua hai. 
Uska sabab yeh hai ke woh ghair munazzam aur ghair musallah hote hain. Unke haath 
mein lathi danda bhi nahi hota jab ke doosri taraf fasadyon ke paas hand grenade aur 
bomb hota hai hai. Wahshat mein baaz awqat musalman police aur intezamia se bhi 
takra jate hain jo bandooq aur rifles se musallah hoti hai aur inhen thikane lagane 
mein koi kasat nahi chorti. 
 
Whenever there is communal violence, in India, only Muslims have suffered it. It is a 
one-sided loss because Muslims are not well organized and well-armed. They do not 
even have sticks, while the other side has hand grenades and bombs. Sometimes, in 
desperation, Muslims confront the police and they (the police) are well armed with guns 
and rifles and do not hesitate to kill them. (Akhbar e Mashriq, 2012, p.7, 17Aug) 
  
This is one of the key features of the ‘bare moment’ in which the life of Muslims is narrated 
outside normality, perpetually exposed to death. Law is enforced, to ensure not their protection 
but their destruction.  
 
Here, it is important to note that cynicism or mistrust in the Police, discussed in Urdu 




opinion of the police, especially during riots. Various reports by civil society, scholars, 
government and non-government committee reports have highlighted the communalism of the 
police. Their controversial role, during the riots, is perhaps a constant feature of most of the 
reports on communal violence. Asghar Ali Engineer points out that the  
 
…local police, SRP and the PAC in Uttar Pradesh and the BMP in Bihar have acquired 
notoriety in the eyes of minorities. In riot situations, the PAC and BMP behave very 
violently and even kill innocent people. (Engineer, 1994, p.18).  
 
He highlights the case of the 1987 Meerut riots during which:  
 
…the PAC constables under the command of Tripathi, pulled out 3+ young boys from 
Hashimpura and shot them dead by the side of a canal. Also, on May 23, they shot dead 
67 Muslims coming out of the mosque after Friday prayer in the village of Malyana six 
kilometers from Meerut city. No one was punished for this heinous crime. (Engineer, 
1994, p.19).  
 
A commission appointed by the Gujarat government to investigate the causes of communal 
violence, a committee headed by Justice Jagmohan Reddy, in 1969, found that: 
 
We have already mentioned in another Chapter suggestions made in cross-
examinations against Hindu officers that because they were Hindus, they showed anti-
Muslim attitude; to officers other than Hindus or Muslims, the suggestions were that 
because they wanted to please the government, they showed anti-Muslim attitude. It is, 
in our view, not unnatural for the Muslim community which has suffered a great loss  
of life and property in the riots and felt helpless in most cases in not obtaining relief 
and protection in time, to  view the matter, with a sense  of suspicion, grievance and 
frustration and feel that everything that could have been done had not been done 
because the officers and men, a majority of whom were Hindus were partial. (Engineer, 
1994, p.18-19) 
 
 This was also noted in the case of the Nelli massacre in Assam, where thousands of 
Bengali Muslims were killed in a single day, and this remains an important reference point in 
talking about violence in Assam, in both the English and Urdu newspapers. The police 
remained indifferent to Muslims and provided protection to the group of Hindus who filed a 
complaint to the Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) on 15th February, Chopra notes that 
“There is thus, a strong contrast between how the police in Morigaon responded to Assamese 
Hindu residents expressing fears about being attacked, and Bengali Muslim residents who 





This very space, outside normality, makes an exclusive language of victimization, 
plausible. In this very moment, the experience of marginalisation speaks without any pretence, 
or promise. Only in this space, defined by the narrative of marginalisation, does one feel 
disassociated from the world outside and held within a narrative that is packed with the distant 
memory of glory and the proximity of total destruction. A disassociation which is based on 
disgust, fear and insecurity. A narrative of historical victimization thus unfolds itself in this 
space, constituting that ‘bare moment’, and claiming that, “The oppressed Muslims of Assam 
can get the monetary compensation but not justice” (Afroz, 2012, p.3). 
 
On the one hand, in this ‘bare moment’, there is only one historical victim, one sufferer, 
one oppressed, by this repetitive violence laying ‘bare’ and, on the other hand, the perpetrator 
has only one identity, which is marked by an irrational hatred of Muslims, of a barbaric other. 
In this ‘bare moment’, the attackers can be named in the crudest form possible. There is no 
distinction between Bodo militants and Bodos as a community, it is argued that: 
 
Bodo qabayel jo aam par aslahon se lais rahte hain, nihatte musalmanon par bhooke 
gidh ki tarah pil pade aur khoon aasham darindon ki tarah unhen bhambhodna shuru 
kar dia...lag bhag 500 gaon se musalmanon ka wujood is tarah mita dia gaya jaise 
kabhi unka wujood hi na tha…tamam wasail ke bawajood markaz aur ryasat dono ne 
musalmanon ka safaya karne ke liye poore saat din bodo darindon ko mohlat de di aur 
assam ka kokrajhar mukammal taur pe in darindon ke hawale kar dia tak ke woh jo 
chahen karen ...Hindustani musalmanon par charon taraf se yalghar hai, Israel ki 
khufya agency ‘mossad’ ne apne bal o par phail liye hain aur markazi wizat e dakhila 
isi ka homework kar rahi.   
 
[The Bodo tribe, which is generally armed, has attacked defenceless Muslims like a 
horde of hungry vultures, they have destroyed them like ferocious barbaric animals … 
from almost 500 villages, Muslims have been wiped out as if they never existed in those 
places… Despite having all the resources, both central and state governments gave 
seven days to these Bodo barbarians to finish Muslims off completely, and left the 
region in the hands of these barbarians so that they could do whatever they wanted. 
…Indian Muslims are under attack from all sides. Israel’s intelligence service, 
‘Mossad’, has also expanded its network in the country, and now the Home Ministry is 
doing their homework.] (Anjum, 2012, p.5, 6Aug) 
 
 The article ends by invoking the concept of ‘ummat e wahida’, a singular ummah which 
should come together and help the victims in Assam. This is a typical example where the writer 
freely expresses his anger without caring much for fact, and thus instils fear in the mind of the 
reader. The writer simply dismisses the idea of the Bodo as a community, and he does not 




entire community as “Barbarian Bodos” and then sees it not just as an ethnic conflict, but as a 
state lead pogrom which instrumentalizes these “barbarians” for killing Muslims. The article 
then certainly imagines the Muslim community living outside a ‘juridical boundary’ which the 
state protects, their condition is then of exception and their lives areexposed to death with 
nothing to protect them. Typical of Urdu newspaper’s reporting, the writer makes an Israeli 
connection to give it an international twist, but thus also making it a plight of the ‘ummah’, as 
it were, with India and Israel both working to destroy the Muslim Qawm or Ummah. 
 
 Urdu newspapers’ narrative about victimization repeats itself in each of these events 
and brings it together with the memory of a distant glorious past. If “narrative is the guardian 
of time” (Wood, 2007, p.31) then in the narrative of violence and victimization, a certain 
presence is made possible by language, a presence which represents the identity and history in 
a particular way. The narrative of victimisation makes an ethical point by counter-positioning 
the Indian Muslim vis à vis an unjust and immoral enemy. In its evocative narrative of 
victimization and violence, feelings of anger and disgust are the underlying feature of this 




The same language and explanations for events repeat themselves in the reporting 
patterns of the Urdu newspapers studied, which were printed from 1993 to 2014. This owes a 
lot to the history of Urdu and the figure of the Indian Muslim. It has been seen that Urdu (the 
language) came to represent Muslims and thus became a minority subject. Scholarship has 
shown the relationship between the emergence of the Urdu press and Muslim politics but, as 
Datla notes, in her work on Urdu nationalism, during colonial times in the Deccan region of 
India: the “Urdu language in the early twentieth century became a means not only of asserting 
difference but also of imagining a common secular future” (Datla, 2013, p.9). However, the 
politics of Hindu/ Muslim and, later, the partition of India, made the question of Urdu complex. 
The Urdu newspapers, discussed in this chapter, show in their reporting how they remain tied, 
almost solely, to the question of Muslim identity. They do not report or investigate, but rather 
they evoke and repeat. The Urdu newspapers act as the sole voice of Indian Muslims and propel 
the worldview of a religious–elite class of Muslims. Ashraf values are projected in the 




praising Urdu newspapers, claims that “the voice of Urdu journalism represents the inner voice 
of millions of Muslims and it truly reflects the emotion and thoughts of the community” 
(Ahmad, 2011, p.172). 
 
In a recent work on Urdu newspapers in India, Khan and Vats note that the liberal space 
is shrinking in the country, and 
 
 A review of Urdu language dailies on triple talaq, polygamy and halala prove this 
point. Urdu dailies are, directly or indirectly, influenced by Muslim clerics. As a result, 
most of the dailies do not give even an iota of space to contrary opinions when it comes 
to Muslim personal laws. They do not publish anything critical on the violation of 
Muslim women’s rights. (Khan and Vats, 2018, p.109).  
 
The research also highlights that major media houses are now investing in the Urdu 
newspapers, a point about which Farouqui (1995) remained hopeful two decades ago. He 
argues against the overtly emotional tone of Urdu newspapers ‘arousing the Muslim 
sentiments’ (Farouqui, 1995) and hoped that prominent newspapers would one day take over 
the business of Urdu newspapers and change their character, but the fate of the Urdu newspaper 
is entangled with the fate of the community in the country. Being taken over by mainstream 
media houses might not change the language and journalistic ethics of these newspapers very 
much.  
  
The victimization discourse in Urdu newspapers is strongly entwined with the idea of the 
minority, of an endangered community. The language of this discourse carries certain 
experiences of history and whoever identifies with such an experience constitutes the potential 
‘Urdu public’. It is perhaps not only a matter of the lack of resources, which is argued by 
commentators like Farouqui (1995) and others (Ashraf, 2006), which makes Urdu media “non-
serious’ (Amanullah, 2009), but it also shows how a language that is hopelessly tied to a 
frightened minority constructs the character of the Urdu press in India.  
 
Only deconstruction of the category of ‘minority’ would enable the press to escape such 
a discourse and become both professional and objective. Perhaps this is not possible without 
the deconstruction of the dichotomy of the ‘secular’ and the ‘religious’, which empowers this 
category.  The victimization discourse in Urdu newspapers speaks through the events of 




journalistic ethics or balanced language. In this moment, it can only speak of its eternal 
























A Long Time: 






My journey started with a small town named Salakati, in the Kokrajhar district. 
Kokrajhar district, with an area of 3,169.22 square kilometres, is the administrative area for the 
Secretariat of the Bodo Territorial Council (BTC). The district has three subdivisions:  1) 
Kokrajhar Sadar Sub-Division; 2) Gossaigaon Sub-Division; 3) Parbatjhora Sub-Division. 
Salakati is a small town with a police outpost, a population of around 5000 people, and a 
majority population of non-Bodos. The main commercial market is dominated by non-Bodos 
(Bengali Muslims and Hindus), and the Bodos have their small market at the edge of the town, 
but they also shop at the main market. With a majority non-Bodo population, the violence in 
2012 did not affect the population much and all the houses seemed to be standing and 
unharmed.  
 
Since most of the villages affected by the violence in 2012 were still recovering from 
the carnage and people were slowly moving back to their native villages, most of the villages 
I visited had new or makeshift houses, which were donated in some cases by Muslim 
organizations. These houses did not have room for a guest to stay and men also tended to spend 
more time outside their homes in these villages. Houses were small and farms big. I travelled 
to these villages from Salakati town or Bhumrabil village, which was predominantly Bengali, 
and as one informant told to me that Bodos avoided visiting these villages. A small militant 
organization had popped up in this village after the violence in 2012, and it was called the 
Muslim Tiger Force (MFT).  
 
The line between different ethnic groups was very clear. It was in people’s imagination; 
it was not often physical, but everyone who lived there knew where the lines were. The memory 




are a perpetual reminder of the past. In order to live and negotiate this everyday reality, as a 
Muslim or a Bengali Muslim, people devised their own narrative strategy. In memory and in 
stories, they told themselves and others of their present and past. There existed a strong will to 
shape a future that was free of those shadows of violence. The memory also served as an 
alternative to the history which the regional press preferred, to contributing to a wider arc of 
the story of the nation, and to delineating the ‘legitimate’ citizen from ‘illegal’ aliens. Memory 
is the counter-narrative to the winding story which dominates the Assam Tribune’s idea of the 
immigrant. It also often works as a counter-narrative (and seldom as a complimentary 
narrative) to the Urdu press’s re-iteration of the victimization theme. 
 
In looking at their quotidian life and their memory of loss, I examine how victims 
constitute their sense of time to negotiate the everyday politics of categorization. The Urdu 
press uses event of violence to construct an identity politics that refers beyond the nation and 
that feeds a wider international set of common themes, yet in this abstract politics of identity 
the lives of the people – the local Muslim population – are excluded. Such a framing does not 
give local problems, local issues or local people a voice. Indeed, comparing what people on 
the ground said and how the press that is apparently reporting on them narrates events there is 
a startling difference: in the comparative distance between the two one can trace the distinction 
























The Tale of Violence of Duramari Village  
Location One:  
 
 Duramari Village is South of the Kokrajhar District Headquarters, the village falls 
under Kokrajhar District and Subdivision.  Like most of the district, Duramari is an agricultural 
village. The village has two divisions, with two roads at the village’s entrance that lead to the 
two divisions. At the entrance of the village there are some Bodo inhabitants, but the village is 
predominantly home to Bengali Muslims. The village has a school and a Madrasah (a religious 
school for Muslims to learn/memorize holy texts). Most of the people are involved in farming, 
including the women, while some have local businesses. The road to the village is well built, 
as is the case with most Kokrajhar roads leading to villages since the Prime Minister launched 
a special scheme to make concrete roads in villages nationwide (i.e,. Pradhan Mantri Gram 
Sadak Yojna), in2000. The village has a population of roughly 1,800 people. Most of the 




school. These people are culturally Bengali, and the distinction between them and the Bodo 
tribe is apparent. Even the housing structures and decorations are different, and this was noted 
in other villages.  
 
 Duramari village saw violence in 1994 and 2012. In both episodes of violence, people 
left their homes and lost family members. In 2012, it was one of the worst hit villages of the 
region and  nine people were killed in this episode. People had left the village to stay in relief 
camps in other districts for a few months and, once they returned, they found everything razed 
to the ground or turned to ashes. All the houses are newly built. Only the school was left 
standing and an Eidgah (a special mosque where Muslims go for Eid prayers, i.e., twice a year). 
The front part of the Eidgah was captured by the CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force), who 
built a temple over it. However, the villagers could not do much about this, except complain.  
CRPF is still camping in the village, although their interaction with the villagers seems to be 
minimal. The villagers are caught between the law and outlaws, and without the CRPF post 
many feel insecure, but the presence of the CRPF on their sacred site is perceived by them to 
be double victimization. Many see this camp on their site as a betrayal – a cost they have paid 
for the security of their lives. They have now built a new temporary mosque made of tin sheets. 
I felt the fear in the quietness of the village, and in conversation one could sense that the 
memory of violence had gripped the people tightly. They see the 2012 violence as exceptional 
since, in 1994 the fear of violence was not as strong or prolonged. Three years after the 2012 


























Figure 6.3 A rough sketch of Duramari village  
 
 






I met Faizal, who was 24 years old, in his small, tin garment shop,  but we were not 
rendered any privacy, as a few villagers soon gathered to take part in the conversation. Faizal 
owns this shop and this was his business even before the violence. He also teaches at the local 
Madrasah, where forty students are registered. He has a sewing machine in his shop to do 
minor tailoring. He is married and has one child. Faizal could speak in Hindi with a Bangla 
accent, and he seldom paused to find the proper word in Hindi.   
 
While going back a few years in his memory, he portrayed the feeling that everything was still 
too fresh for him. Even his facial expression and tone appeared to dip into the memory when 
he was narrating the events he witnessed. He reminisced:  
 
In 2012, Bodo people burnt our village. I don’t know what exactly happened outside, I 
do not have  much clue, but what I remember is that they fired one night in a house on 
the first day of Ramadan at the time before dawn (the time of Sehri, he said, which 
Muslims use to eat before they start fasting), and an old man died and a kid was injured. 
Police came to get the dead body, but we argued with them that they had not provided 
us with security: give us some security, provide some army for our protection, 
otherwise we will not give you the dead body. So, we blocked the road. But a few army 
men came and took the dead body for autopsy. A few army men stayed here, and in the  
night there was cross fire between the Bodo and the army. It continued for a few nights 
but one night the firing got intense and the army left us. Consequently, even we left the 
village in the early morning, at 4a.m., and while we were leaving an old woman was 
killed by the Bodos. 
 
Faizal remembered the names of the villages and camps he went to after leaving the 
village with fellow villagers:  
 
In the morning, the Assam police came and stopped us at Dibli village (a neighbouring 
village to Duramari) police station. Firing was going everywhere. The police asked us 
to go back. No one gave us any army or protection. We called everyone, from the 
District Collector to the army camp. The army said they didn’t have many men, they 
made excuses like the road is not good, and all. We were all so frightened. We moved 
from village to village, and finally camped in Bilasipara. We stayed there for 6 months. 
But the camp life was painful, we hardly got any relief but somehow we survived. 
 
Faizal went on narrating his memories of that day through raising the issue of 





After burning our houses, everyone published that we are Bangladeshi. Hagrama27 and 
other MPs, MLAs, they all said we are Bangladeshis, but some of his legislators 
themselves were with the militants/terrorists. He was arrested too. Everyone says we 
are Bangladeshis, but we have all the proofs that we are not. We have NRC for our 
grandfathers and father, and we have registry of our lands. 
 
All of the villagers are aware that they are referred to as Bangladeshi, and they consider 
this naming a politicization, a way to usurp their land. They understand that at the core there 
lies the question of citizenship and land. Most of the people, while talking about violence, also 
talked about the compensation which the government promised. Faizal had not received the 
compensation he was promised, like many others, while some had received it and had used it 
to rebuild their houses. The Bangladeshi tag is what they want to resist, both politically and 
legally. There was no trace of any newspaper, but people kept themselves updated with the 
information and rumours through mobile phones and TV. People rely on TV and word of mouth 
for news. Faizal said: 
 
No newspaper arrives here; we watch news on TV. At the time of the violence everyone 
said we were Bangladeshi, but we showed everyone the proof we have. Even Sonia and 
Rahul Gandhi came when we were in the camp. We showed it to the journalists.   
 
The politics of identity, which determines the migration debate in the state, is well identified 
by the people. In their narrative the question of identity, the question of belonging, goes back 
to the land. The question of entitlement to land remains central to the battle over resources 
among the different ethnic groups of the region.  Faizal makes the point: 
 
The local administration cancelled a lot of our land registry when we were at the 
Bilasipara Camp ... other men also joined in this complaint… for the last few years, the 
government has not been registering the land under our names… even when we buy 
the land from someone, it does not get registered in our names … and this is only for 
us, although when a Bodo buys land from us they get the registry done. 
 
The question of identity is linked to the question of land, the loss of entitlement to land 
makes it difficult to prove your identity. Landlessness makes matters even more precarious. 
During his stay in the camp, during the 2012 violence, land registry was cancelled and as was 
made clear by him, a few others had also found themselves in a similar situation of 
landlessness. The land is not registered in their names when they buy it from someone, which 
 
27 He is the elected head of Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC). Kokrajhar is headquarter of BTC and one of the 




may also be due to new land laws, which define certain land as being only for Bodos. Whether 
the land registration dilemma is caused by the law, which protects certain land for scheduled 
tribes, or in the general attitude of the Bodo administration towards Bengali farmers  was a 
point that was not made very clear by Faizal. Violence drives people from their homes, and 
repetitive violence does not make it easy to retain control over the land. 
 
He first witnessed the violence in 1994. Although he was confused about how old he 
was then, he remembered the violence quite well. The memory of violence was fresh, or every 
episode of violence made the marks of the previous one deeper.  
 
I first saw the violence in 1994. Houses were burnt then as well, and it was all very 
bloody… 30-40 people died during the attack and shooting… Not all of them are now 
in this village... Compared to 2012 it was many more, as 9 people died in the recent 
episode here. Not all the houses were burnt in 1994, like this time in 2012, but there 
was a lot of firing. We camped in Kashipara then for a week. 
 
Most of the informants consider the term ‘Bangladeshi’ to be mere name-calling, a 
signifier of a kind of politics which tends to alienate them, and that aims to exclude them 
socially and politically. Being trapped in the cycle of violence and being a member of a 
religious minority in India, they articulate their resistance to the ‘Bangladeshi’ identity tag by 
pointing to the politics who demonized them and consistently referred to the identity 
documents as proof of their citizenship.  While the politics might question their citizenship, 
their narrative tends to question the politics with the legal (documents they hold). Their 
explanation of violence underlines two combined factors – land and identity. Wali, who was 
sitting behind me on a bench interrupted us to make his point:  
 
We have everything but still they call us Bangladeshi. I really feel sad about it. We have 
inherited 40 bighas of land from my father … agricultural land was also captured by 
them during the violence, but after the District Collector’s intervention it was partially 
resolved. Initially, Bodos warned us against carrying on any farming activity, but now 
it seems to be fine.  
 
Faizal continued to narrate the violence of 2012, whose memory was fresh and the 
marks of the destruction of the psyche, quite evident. He explained how everything from home 
to school, from Madrasah to Masjid, was destroyed and thrown out of the village and what 
was left was taken away, even bamboos. He remembers the attackers were a Bodo mob, but 




answer any question, but without detail; either due to an avoidance of detail or to its 
insignificance. What happened, what it did and what one went through after such an event was 
what gripped his mind and dominated the communication. The government rebuilt the school, 
but the villagers recreated everything else. The fear of tomorrow dominated every conversation 
on violence, and they continued to anticipate a similar event.“I really feel frightened here. This 
is my old land here. This is my village… where will I go from here?” Faizal said: 
 
The question of violence is then the question of reconciliation. The clearly demarcated 
village finds it difficult to cross borders in order to avert violence and create 
conversation. There is some conversation now with the Bodo, but the administration 
told us at that time not to go into Bodo villages, we didn’t go then, but now we are 
developing some conversation with them. Faizal added, with some degree of doubt..  
 
The conversation might have begun but there is a deep distrust and disenchantment. There is 
no apparent cultural exchange between these two ethnic groups at the rural level. There is no 
sustained conversation or dialogue. Is it possible to have it when the violence is more 
predictable than peace when distrust defines the distinction of identities,  “When we came from 
the camp things were quite tense and volatile… they used to tease or frighten us… someone 
was killed when we came back but don’t clearly remember”.  
 
 






“There is no clue when it will happen again… when we will have to run when it will 
burn again. No one knows.”  
 
Duramari has a concrete road and a mobile phone network but it has the sociological 
characteristics of a village in which most of the conversation and interaction happens outside. 
Every stranger is given a curious look, partly because of the history of violence, and partly 
because one does not expect a stranger in such a place. Wali started talking about himself, 
saying he had 9 bigha28 of land, which he inherited from his father, who was registered in the 
NRC29 in 195130, and about having all the records with him. Wali talked about the violence in 
1994, the reason for which was not clear to him, but he remembered staying in the camp at 
Bilasipara, like everyone else. 
 
On Friday, people went to Tinali Bazaar… everyone went for land registry as 
administration has said that they will do all registrations for land for everyone that day, 
only women were left in the village… then they came through Hikaipara and attacked 
the village. 30 people were killed then only, and houses were burnt. As we heard this 
news, we all ran from the village. We had no clue about their plans and actions, we 
didn’t know what they were going to do. The army intervened later and with them we 
went to Kokrajhar. Some stayed at a school in Kokrajhar, and some in Kashipara,  
 
Wali’s house was not destroyed in that episode of violence, however, in 2012, there 
was no sign of his house left, as the entire village was burnt down. He clearly remembered the 
event and the names of places from 1994 and 2012, but he too avoided going into detail. 
Destruction, actual event and expectations capture the imagination more than the vivid details. 
It may also be that extracting details was akin to re-living the detail, while daily life has to 
move on. The question, or the experience, of daily life pushes out the experience of the 
extraordinary, and the ordinary appears to dominate, despite the fact that this ordinary is the 
 
28 1 Bigha = 1,340 m2 in Assam  
 
29 “National Register of Citizens (NRC) means the register containing the names of Indian citizens. NRC updating 
basically means the process of listing the names of citizens, based on Electoral Rolls until 1971, and the 1951 
NRC.” Source: http://nrcassam.nic.in/what-nrc.html 
 
30 “National Register of Citizens, 1951 is a register prepared after the conducting of the 1951 Census, in respect 
of each village, showing the houses or holdings in a serial order and indicating against each house or holding the 
number and names of the persons staying therein. These registers covered each and every person enumerated 
during the 1951 Census and they were kept in the offices of Deputy Commissioners and Sub Divisional Officers, 
according to instructions issued by the Government of India in 1951. Later, these registers were transferred to the 





result of the extraordinary that constitutes the experience of daily life. 
 
The question of citizenship is very much at the centre of the violence, and to this point 
Wali asserts the fact that his father was born here and so was he. He was forty- eight years old, 
at the time of the interview, and had lived here his whole life, not being new to this place, yet 
he was still gripped with fear, “I feel very frightened here,” he said, while his eyes looked 
somewhere else. He then continued to say that he and the villagers have asked for permanent 
police camps. “Without the army we really feel frightened here… there is no clue when it will 
happen again… when we will have to run and when it will burn again. No one knows.”  
 
 Living in a state of perpetual fear and insecurity, they expected the state to protect them 
by providing adequate forces. Despite the distrust of the state, most of the villagers felt safe 
with the presence of the army and felt that the violence would return when these military posts 
disappeared. The trust in the army seemed stronger than that in the police force. This seemed 
to be a nation-wide feature: the Muslim minority, and other minorities, seemed to trust military 
and paramilitary forces. Asghar Ali Engineer has noted that: 
 
..the role of paramilitary forces like the BSF, CRPF etc., and the army is often such that 
the minorities plead for retention of these forces in order to better protect their lives. 
During my investigation of the Bhivandi riots in 1984 many Muslim ladies desperately 
pleaded with me to use my influence with the authorities to retain the army for at least 
a month. They said that, but for the army, they would have suffered much greater loss 
of life and property. Many people told us that in the Ahmedabad riots of 1985, too, the 
role of the army was commendable. This clearly indicates that the victims and their 
relatives and friends do not approve of the role of the local police and the armed 
constabulary like the SRP, PAC and MBP. (Engineer, 1994, p.21) 
 
Reflecting on the difference between the Army and the Police, and the reason that Muslims 
have more trust the in military, Engineer writes:  
 
A police source maintained that the local police are often influenced by the local factors 
whereas the paramilitary forces are not involved in day-to-day affairs of the local 
society. Moreover, the local police are also subject to various local pressures as it is in 
day-to-day touch with the people of the concerned city or town. They develop intimate 
contacts with one section of the society or the other. The police are also often in league 
with criminal elements and especially those who have been politicized. These criminal 














It is very painful. My heart aches every time I think about it.   
 
While we were sitting in Faizal’s shop having the conversation about the violence in 
2012, Nasir Sheikh appeared and expressed his displeasure with such conversations about the 
past that raked up painful memories. When everything was destroyed and nothing much was 
left, why would anyone come here to make conversation? In his language and expressions  rage 
and anger were apparent, as he could not see any reason for such discussions and the opening 
up of old wounds. Nonetheless, when he was convinced that I was not a reporter or a 
Government officer, he opened up. He did not want his life to be a news story, nor the pain to 
be sensationalized. Nasir Sheikh, 56 years old, referred to fate which would defeat all of us and 
which we could never change. Being a religious Muslim, faith and practice were his refuge 
from the memory of violence. It is in the everyday practice of religion that the people found 
their daily refuge from the extraordinary violence and its memory, which determines their 





 Nasir Sheikh’s father was shot dead in the violence which gripped the area in 1994. He 
was overpowered with emotion and his voice was trembling as he started to narrate the incident, 
which was over twenty years old.  “I buried him with my hands.” He said, and paused. The 
trauma was evident. He was not only carrying those memories, but was also well aware that he 
or his son could meet the same fate. He, like others, could not talk about violence without 
talking about the promised compensation in the same breath. “I was compensated partially by 
the government, but in 2012 it was even worse: everything was burnt. And due to some brokers, 
I couldn’t get the right compensation.”  
 
There was not much description of who those brokers were, and of how they had 
mediated the compensation process. Memory of violence was not only constituted by the 
memory of the loss of lives, but also by the memory of loss in general. This was perhaps why 
the deficiency in compensation also became embedded in the narrative of loss. The reference 
to compensation is an important feature of the sense of loss. The sense of loss and the question 
of compensation are entangled together in shaping a narrative that makes life possible in the 
present and the future. Donald E. Polkinghorne explicates how life experience is given meaning 
through narrative plot. He writes: 
 
 … narrative knowledge is not a simple recall of past. Narrative comprehension is a 
retrospective, interpretive composition that displays past events in the light of current 
understanding and evaluation of their significance. While referring to the original past 
life events, narrative transforms them by ordering them into a coherent part-whole plot 
structure. (Polkinghorne, 2005, p.10) 
 
Narrative is an interpretation of life and it helps to shape the past in the light of the 
everyday experience. Nasir Sheikh remembered 1994 as everyone else did and, like everyone 
else, he was unsure of the reason for such an event. He remembered that day: 
 
They came suddenly and started to burn, and everyone left the village. It was May 27 
of 1994.  We stayed in the Adivasi31 village. We found dead bodies of 34 people and 
we buried them all, but a lot of dead bodies were washed away by river.  
 
He remembered the incident or, as he carried with him the memory of it, he further 
 
31 A generic term for the aboriginal people of South Asia, it comprises many tribes. In Assam, Adivasis were 





narrated that most of them were shot with guns. His father was first shot in the hand and he 
tried to find cover in the Bamboo forest, but it was not good enough, as the Bodo militants 
found him and shot him as he attempted to escape, in vain. His body was found there in the 
bamboo jungle. There was a silence. His pitch was high, and eyes filled with emotion with the 
sense of loss and anger.  Violence erupted in 1955 too, as narrated to him by his father, and 
everyone cramped themselves into a room to hide and to find company. They were asked to 
leave the house and the village. There was looting and many died during that episode also.. He 
said he did not have much memory of that incident. Obviously, as he must not have been born 
then. The sense of time is more of an experience than a linear record. There was a lack of 
accuracy in dates, not only with him but also with many others. He quite clearly remembered 
the other incidents, which happened in the vicinity, like in 1998. He had 34 bigha land, which 
he disposed of, and he bought a house in a neighbouring district as he found this village 
insecure.  
 
The labelling of all of them as Bangladeshi was not quite comprehensible to him. He 
argued, “When the British left they gave us the patta, the entitlement to the land. The record is 
still with me. My grandfather has it, my father had it and now I own that.”  He was interrupted 
by a young man, “All this is to harass us as we are Muslims.” Nasir responded by saying, “I 
will not say just like that, but I have all the documents and I have shown them.”   
 
Their narrative carries constant reference to the communal politics and communal 
history of India. The tension is multi-layered and not just religious, as it is the most evocative 
of all, and the history since partition has made it an easy category of identification and of 
violence: a convenient rationale for defining many problems. Nasir did not conform nor 
disapprove of the young man’s interjection, but he referred to the documents he has to prove 
his citizenship as, through documents, the narrative of migration can be contested. It was 
mentioned by everyone that even the state of violence could not be used as an excuse to leave 
documents behind.  
 
The story drifted into 2012 as, like his fellow villagers, he too was one of the eye 
witnesses and victims of this episode of violence. With a bit of authority, he started with the 
exact date, 
 




live not very far from here. They started to fire before dawn that day when were up for 
sehri32. This was a sudden attack for which we were not prepared. A guy called 
Sadaqat33 was killed then. This frightened everyone around and we stayed with the dead 
body.  
 
He confirmed or, rather, narrated, a story similar to that of Faizal, of staying in the 
school and then walking on foot, leaving the village behind, to find himself in the camp for 
almost eight months. Return was possible by showing papers, and by proving the legitimacy 
of their existence. Nasir confirmed that: 
 
Everyone took some paper of identification with them... some school certificate, some 
patta, some registry... it had happened earlier as well... my father and grandfather told 
me if you want to live in Assam keep your papers intact: leave wealth behind but not 
the papers.  
 
This is the most remarkable aspect of this repetitive violence: it revolves so much 
around citizenship, unlike any other form of communal violence in India. Here you carry the 
religious identity of a Muslim/minority as well as of a foreigner or illegal immigrant/infiltrator. 
The paper becomes the defining aspect of their being. The documents of identity and land are 
not only used as proof of citizenship but also as a  historical reference to their long past. 
 
Since 2012, nothing of the sort of violence that was witnessed then has taken place, but 
fear follows as the very shadow of those afflicted; and everyone said, “It can come back at any 
time.” 
 
Nasir steered the conversation in the direction of deprivation and the failure of the State, 
“The government promised a lot but we have got nothing. There is no tax on promises, so they 
promise.” He continued to add that no one was addressing the fear,  
 
We gave application to government saying that Bodo militants destroyed our houses 
and the office responded by asking, ‘Have you seen it? Don’t you Muslims have 
militants/terrorists? Maybe there are terrorists within Muslim community, but question 
here is very different.  
 
Nasir expressed himself in a helplessness way while sharing this anecdote, and he then decided 
 
32 A time before dawn when Muslims wake up to eat and start fasting. 




to leave for home. He came to this village only for his job, as he has sold his property here; he 
had to go back to the neighbouring village. 
 
On the other side of Duramari village lies Jauliapara. Once you enter the village, you 
turn right and the road takes you to the end of the village, which touches the main road, the 
other side of which is inhabited by the Bodo community. In July, 2012, when the violence 
started, Jauliapara was the first to face the firing, as the attackers came from the other side of 
the village. The first casualty was taken in this village, after which people first camped in the 
school at Duramari, and then moved to another district. The Bodo village borders the farm land 
of these Bengali Muslim villagers, where we had gathered to talk about the memories of 
violence  
 
A Long Time … 
 
Mohammad was a 38 years old farmer with five children. He owned 10 bigha of land. 
He could not speak Hindi/Urdu and was a proper Bangla speaking farmer. It was with the help 
of a translator that communication with him, was made possible. He had lived his whole life in 
this village, on his farmland. On the question of origin, like everyone else, he was obliged to 
say that he was from here, and his ancestors belonged here. “Since a long time we are here. My 
father and grandfather died here.” And from where did they come? “Here, only here,” he 
replied with force and conviction. This force and conviction ended the discussion on the past 
and any history of movement to this region. How far does this ‘long time’ stretch? The question 
of origin, not of them, but of the origin that is more accurate or original, was what he was trying 
to answer by the gesture of being forceful and by finding the language of ‘long time’. The long 
time was his time, the time of his origin; its longevity is the beginning of him, who he knows, 
and is what will ensure the future. This ‘long time’ which legitimized his presence, was a time 
that kept his space-time fabric intact, making it liveable for him. This fabric of time-space was 
then altered by violence. 
 
He narrated the violence of 2012 with clarity, as it was fresh in the memory, but what 
escaped his memory was the date, when exactly did it happen – which month? What formed 
the memory, however, was not the calendar month of July, but the holy month of Ramadan. 




anchor the memory and the detail. Mohammed said that it happened on one late night of 
Ramadan, but he did not remember the date from the English calendar. 
 
It was at 1 a.m. in the night when the firing first started in this region. One man 
immediately died in firing and two were injured. We all gathered and left the village 
and camped in the school of Duramari for three days. Bodos had surrounded us from 
all sides. We did not get much help from the police or administration. By firing and 
burning they forced us to leave.  
 
Like everyone else, he moved to the relief camp in Dhubri for eight months and he 
came back to find that nothing was left in the village; everything had turned to ash. He, in his 
lifetime had witnessed three episodes of violence, including that in 2012, but he did not 
remember dates for any of the episodes. He remembered the events quite clearly, but there was 
no memory-archive to bring him the exact date or year. He kept referring to violence in 1983, 
when the Assam agitation reached its peak, and when, in Nelli, thousands of Bengali Muslims 
were killed in the anti-migrant violence. That period, and the event, were integral to his 
memory of violence and the region, but not as much of the details. He recalled the violence of 
the early 1990s, “I remember one in 1991— it was then to remove Muslims from this land — 
the Andolan (agitation/protest) was to force Muslims out. Lot of burning happened but not 
much death.” The repetitive nature of this violence, in their narratives, was owed to the fact 
that they were Muslims, not that they were Bengali. The linguistic or ethnic distinction was not 
creating the subject of violence, but the religious distinction, which is also a meta-category 
with which to determine who are the majority and the minority. A few others added to 
Mohammad’s narrative that, between 1991 and 1994, many violent incidents took place, and 
these were viewed as one single episode or stream by the villagers. However, people who 
suffered in 1994, as was demonstrated by the inhabitants of another part of this village, quite 
clearly remembered the depth of the violence, and talked about 1994 in detail. In the case of 
Mohammad, the reason for violence was not comprehensible to him as a ‘Bangladeshi issue’ 
which, he believed, was created to justify the violence that was based on religious identity. It 
was, for him, a senseless violence, not only, to eliminate them, but to categorize them as 
‘foreigner’ or ‘external’. Violence then serves two purposes; one of categorizing them, and the 
other of displacing them from their place.  
 
Earlier, Faizal, in his conversation, also explicated that the violence was not of a 




Bangladeshi; this is political not linguistic. Bodos do not speak Assamese (if language is the 
logic).” For him, like others, it was not a historical question (but it may be a historical problem),  
it was a question of present, it was the question of his presence. The response to the question 
of being Bangladeshi, and the fact that the region is made up of migrants, is a strong denial, in 
itself, of that version of history: “No one has any connection with Bangladesh… No 
relationship whatsoever... We all are very old here... We have absolutely no relationship... it is 
not about Bangladesh.”  
 
 For most of the people I met during my fieldwork, the history of migration was a past 
that they did not want to preserve in their memory. It was a narrative of identity. Their presence 
constitutes the past and a narrative of ‘long time’ is the guardian of ‘past time’, but it is not in 
contrast with the other Muslims, who had not originated from the erstwhile East Bengal region.  
 
Athiabadi Relief Camp 
Location Two 
 
In Athiabadi Relief Camp, run by Jamiat e Ulema i Hind34 following the 2012 violence, there 
were 187 houses with more than four hundred people living in them. The relief camp had 
Muslims of Bengali and Hindi descent; 56 years old, Ghani Khan was one of them, and he 
lived with his two children in the camp. He articulated his displacement as the result of an 
incident between the Muslim minority and all the others, who constituted the majority:  
 
What was happening before 2012 is not known to me, what I know is that those people 
used to attack our people and we couldn’t do anything about it. We could not hit back 
because we are a minority and they are a majority. Suddenly some clashes happened, 
and we saw fire all around and we could hear lot of firing as well. There are good and 
bad in their side as well. So, we got a call from them giving us advance warning and 
asking us to leave and save ourselves. I don’t know the exact and deep reason for this 
violence in 2012, but I believe the main reason for this violence is Bodoland, and this 
is not new, it is since ‘83, and the government is not giving them -- prompting them to 
resort to violence. 
 
The narrative of the victimization as Muslims and as a subjugated minority is made 
possible by the other belonging to a majority, which is powerful, despite the fact that the other 
 
34 This is a century old organization of Muslim scholars who took upon themselves to bring social, educational 
and religious reform. Founded in 1919, it also actively participated in the anti-colonial struggle. It is one of the 




is a minority too. However, Ghani Khan’s narrative would tell us that the other is the one that 
has power to act against this minority. It is an ethnic construction as well as a structural reality. 
The majority, which is operating against this very minority, is not only a majority in terms of 
numbers, but one that has access to vast resources. Returning to the question of history and 
time, which is in contrast with the narrative of ‘long time’, Ghani Khan owns his past with a 
very clear memory:   
 
I was born here. My father was born in Jharkhand. He came here before his marriage. 
He must have come before 1947, I think he moved here in 1942. He came here in search 
of some kind of labour job. Some old people came from Jharkhand here and started 
some business. There was peace and harmony in those days. So, they decided to stay 
here, and then we spread and our number grew. My father is very old, maybe 100, but 
he is not here. In our village, people with land are very few. We are mostly workers, 
but we don’t do any labour work on agricultural land. We haven’t heard about the 
Bangladeshi issue here. No one has called us Bangladeshi. I know that Bengali- 
speaking Muslims are often dubbed as Bangladeshis, but they don’t call us that as they 
know that we are from Jharkhand.  
 
Before analysing Ghani Khan’s account, which tells us about the politics of time and 
the variation in the formation of subject position, let us look into a similar account from Momin 
Ali, aged 30, who was also a small businessman living with his four children in the camp: 
 
I have never met any Bangladeshis in my life, not even one. In our village, some read 
newspapers and they do say in newspaper reports that there are Bangladeshis. We know 
when they call out ‘Bangladeshis’ or talk about it, it’s referring to us, a shorthand for 
Muslims, and it hurt us. Bodos sometime call us Bangladeshis too, and we can’t respond 
to them fearing that they might harm us. I am also from Jharkhand, but we speak Bangla 
here because in the market where I do business everyone speaks Bangla but here 
amongst family, we speak Hindi and our children go to school and study in Assamese. 
 
There were a few important issues underlying these narratives. One of time, the second 
of subjectivity and the third of victimization; but let us begin with the question of time. There 
was a clear contrast between people who speak Bangla narrating their time, and those who 
spoke in Hindi. Any relationship to the past, to a history, is based on the experience of time, as 
Agamben argues,  
 
…every conception of history is invariably accompanied by a certain experience of 
time which is implicit in it, conditions it, and thereby has to be elucidated. Similarly, 
every culture is first and foremost a particular experience of time, and no new culture 





The migrant’s experience of time is directed towards the future, it is the anxiety of the future 
which shapes the experience of time and formulates his/her narrative of the past. If we take 
into account Ricoeur’s philosophical work on narrative and time, which tends to suggest that 
“there can be no final theoretical answer to the meaning of time, only practical ones like those 
that make use of narrative to tell the story of human action, and of the world in which it occurs” 
(Pellauer, 2007, p.71), then we might see that in the narrative of long and old time lies the 
anxiety of the future and the experience of the past. It also becomes the narrative strategy for 
dealing with certain politics of time and citizenship. The very narrative of ‘long time’ acts as a 
narrative strategy with which to fend off any questions about belonging.   
 
Ranajit Guha wonders about the temporal dilemma of the first migrant who arrives in 
a foreign or strange land, one in which he wants to participate in the now, the everyday life of 
the host community, yet that very participation in their life can make the first migrant an alien. 
It is s/he, then, who has to live with this dilemma and wait for the next generation to arrive “on 
the scene with its own time, over determining and thereby re-evaluating his temporality in a 
new round of conflicts and convergences” (Guha, 1998, pp.160). In the narrative of Faizal and 
Mohammad, we saw this re-evaluation that is based on the politics around them, and the 
repetitive cycle of violence which tended to subjugate them so that their experience with the 
past becomes a discontinuous one. Most of the people I met, in the different villages, shared 
this very narrative of ‘a long time’, or of being very old here, a reference to their fathers and 
grandfathers, without talking about their point of origin or East Bengali/ Bangladeshi roots. 
The narrative of ‘long time’, which determined their relationship with time, is a discontinuous 
time. This long time began in their narrative to disrupt their origin or the genesis of their 
migration. This very time disconnects them from a period, and it gives them a new sense of 
period. If we take this proposition that a “modern time regime does not need compensation but 
rather correction and complementation.” and “in the frame of memory, the future is directed 
by the past, but the past is also re-evaluated in the light of future” (Assmann, 2013, p.55) then 
we can clearly see how the historical time - a time of their existence and experience - of the 
migrant community, is shaped by this discontinuity or rupture. It is the ‘now time’ which is 
‘long’ and ‘old’, and which operates as a mode through which history is made possible as a 
livable experience. If the papers, as evidence of citizenship, legally make their existence and 
presence possible, then this narrative of a ‘long time’ becomes adequate enough to morally 





This dilemma of time was not faced by Ghani Khan and Momin Ali, as their forefathers’ 
point of origin still lies within the territory of India, and they could legitimize their presence 
by pointing to the past, which corresponded to the continuity of modern India. They did not 
have to legitimize their presence by a narrative which is discontinuous, however, sharing the 
same religious identity as the migrant community might make them equally foreign, which 
they intended to dissociate themselves from by pointing to their own historical origin. It is not 
that these people were unaware of their past, once their relationship with me, as a researcher, 
changed to one of friendship, there were references made to Bangladesh, but their ‘long time’ 
did not tend to disappear. It stayed as a reminder of presence, even if they have belonged to 
this region by living here since birth, by dwelling in their villages from the beginning of their 
time, they did not want to be associated with the term ‘immigrant’ or ‘Bangladesh’. The ‘long 
time’ produces its own presence, and in the shadow of that time a distant past was rendered 
irrelevant. This ‘long time’ serves as a counter narrative to the popular narrative which may 
delineate these people as being alien, infiltrators, intruders, immigrants and foreigners. This 
can be seen as a counter-narrative of resistance, it is a resistance of memory against history, 
and it is a resistance of presence against the past, and it is a resistance of self-definition against 
categorization.  
 
In the narratives of Ghani Khan and Momin Ali there also lies a counter narrative to 
those of the English and Urdu presses’ framing of the problem of violence. While the English 
press focuses on the native and the non-native and reports the violence as a clash between 
Bodos and Immigrants, or Bangladeshi or Bengali immigrants, it does not consider the identity 
of people like Ghani Khan and Momin Ali, who belong to a different ethnic and linguistic 
identity. If the clash is predominantly between Bodos and Immigrants, then Ghani and Momin 
also become part of that immigrant community since they share the Immigrants’ religious 
identity. The Assam Tribune, in this case, does not see the ambivalence in the identity of the 
victims, it is in this condition that my informants would tend to claim that Bangladeshi becomes 
a shorthand for Muslims. Meanwhile the Urdu press that we have studied essentializes their 
religious identity and frames the other (group) as irrational and violent. In the narratives of 
Ghani Khan and Momin Ali, we come upon the claim of their own subjectivity, their distinction 
from the Bengali Muslim, and also the rational or functional relationship that they have with 
the Bodo community, which helped to save their lives. The Muslim subjectivity that is formed 




with the subjectivity that is produced by people on the ground. The discourse of victimization 






In Duramari’s Jauliapara, I met nine-year-old schoolgirl, Manjulika, who was with her 
grandparents in July, 2012, when they were attacked, and her grandfather died on the spot and 
in front of her eyes, from a bullet injury. She did not say much, she was a bit frightened and 
preferred silence, but she showed me her arm, which bore the mark of a bullet wound. Her 
mother, Safoora Bibi, came to narrate the incident on her behalf.  
 
Safoora Bibi, like many others, did not remember her exact age, and with the help of 
others she could tell us that she was twenty-eight years old. “It was during the time of sehri 
(the time before dawn for fasting), there was sound of gunshot, my father in law went out to 
see and he was shot directly. He died. They then started shooting at our houses: my daughter 
and mother in law got injured in that shooting. Then we left this place.” She was quick and 
accurate in narrating the events of that day, as she had witnessed events of violence before. She 
did not remember the dates of any of these episodes, though. What she remembered was the 
loss, the suffering, and the event, which defined who she was. In her narrative, violence is not 
just present in everyday life, but it is to be expected at any moment and this had also become 
normal; as she insisted, “We now have a habit of living with violence. We just wait for another 
episode.” 
 
The mother-in-law of Safoora Bibi joined us near the paddy field, where we were trying 
to recollect the details of that day, and the conversation was punctuated by many silences. Like 
many others, Safoora Bibi, too, questioned the rationality of cyclical violence, “We don’t know 
the reason for the violence.  We just face the consequences. Someone else might get benefit 
from the violence.” Not much detail followed the statement about the reasons for violence. 
Their judgment was that the violence is not rationally justified, and when Safoora Bibi claimed 
that the reason for the violence was unknown to her, she also meant that the true politics of it, 
was not clear to her. In everyday life, when things might be normal, the reason for the violence 




talking about the night that her husband died; she did not divulge her name. After a long silence, 
she just said she remembered everything, and that her memory was full of other episodes of 
violence as well. A few men, returning from the paddy field, joined us, and everyone started to 
talk about the events of violence they remembered best.  One could notice the change in tone 
of the men when they were talking about the violence. A man, with passion and rag,e 
interrupted the way Safoora reminisced in a mild tone, “It enrages us whenever we are dumped 
as Bangladeshi. During the stay in relief camp in 2012 we protested against this labelling and 
representation. These Bodos want to dump us as Bangladeshi.” The young man’s voice, full of 
rage, continued, “We know that it will happen more.” A few others joined in, divulging their 
own anxieties and their expectations of violence, which they believed to be on the horizon. 
Women stopped talking about it, and men started to express their apprehensions.  
 
Everyday life is memorialized by the violence and the mark it has left on the people, as 
does the expectation of those future episodes which keep these people in perpetual anxiety. 
The function of violence, for such a society, is then not only something which pulls them to 
the past, but it is news, always in the making. Its arrival should always be expected. In their 
articulation, violence is without any definite reason, it lacks rationality. It only has the force to 
unleash suffering.  
 
Ricoeur talks about three functions of mind: expectation, attention and memory, which 
results in a state where the future, “which it expects passes through [transeat] the present, to 
which it attends, into the past, which it remembers” (Ricoeur, 1984, p.19). For Ricoeur, the 
mind expects and remembers, and this expectation and remembrance is what appears in the 
present, showing the contrast between past and future. The remembrance of the past also shapes 
the expectation of the future, and as long as the mind remembers it also tends to expect. While 
Ricoeur make this relationship of the present with the past and the future through his 
philosophical reading of Augustine, Reinhert Koselleck, on the other hand, takes a historical 
approach in reading the modern condition of viewing the past and the future together. 
Koselleck argued that “there is no history which could be constituted independently of the 
experiences and expectations of active human agents” (Koselleck, 2004, p.256). For him, the 
‘space of experience’ and ‘horizon of expectation’ are the two historical categories of our time 
and “these two categories are indicative of a general human condition; one could say that they 
indicate an anthropological condition without which history is neither possible nor 




Safoora Bibi and other informants, we see that the space of experience that is shaped by 
imminent violence, has also framed their expectation from the future. There is so much to 
remember and experience, but not much to expect. In their present, their future is merely an 
extension of the past, of the memory of loss and displacement. 
 
There is no social relationship between the women of this village with the Bodos or 
their women; they do go out to farm sometimes, but much less often than before the 2012 
violence. Before 2012, some of the men had some contact with Bodos, but this had ended too. 
“During farming, sometimes, we talk, but it’s not friendship,” a man clarified. This dynamic 
differed from village to village, but in all the villages one could see that the relationship, even 
that which existed pre-2012, was not very deep. There did not exist much of a cultural or social 
exchange, if there was an exchange at all, it was through the medium of the economy. The clear 
demarcation between villages and within a village also made it difficult to have exchanges on 
a daily basis.  In Duramari, there was hardly any conversation between Bodos and Bengali 
Muslims after 2012. Since most of the people have their own land now, they no longer go to 
Bodo land for farming. Earlier, they used to work on their farm on a 50-50 basis (the Bataidari 




“It is to throw us away from our land” 
 
In her fluent Bangla, she started to narrate her experience of violence, most of which 
had already been narrated by fellow villagers. Qaisar Bibi, like many others, was not sure of 
her own age. The 34-year-old was perplexed on the question of age, the only time her 
confidence seemed rattled. The explanation provided by one of the villagers was that most of 
them were illiterate, and they did not exactly remember their age (the one according to the 
paper), and when ever there was a need, they would run to some educated person to cross check 
factual details. Women in the village were largely illiterate, however, girls had started to 
receive an education in the last 10-15 years.  A high school had recently been inaugurated in 
the village, which mobilized families to send girls to school. Factors barring girls from pursuing 
education were child marriage or early marriage.  




Qaisar Bibi remembered three episodes of violence, which she witnessed in 1983, 1994 and 
2012:  
 
I remember from 1994 that houses were burnt and 34 people died in the attack, while 
many were injured. We had camped in Kashipara, which was in the Kokrajhar police 
station; we stayed there for ten days. We returned back to see that all the good houses 
were destroyed and cattle were stolen.  
 
The violence in 2012 was very fresh in her memory, and she narrated it in great detail. A few 
women, sitting at the fence near her house, interrupted once or twice to add details to her 
narrative.  She was quite vivid and elaborate in the detail she gave, unlike a few men who had 
narrated their stories. The details were very much  part of the uniqueness of her narration, but 
the translator merely translated the narrative (it seemed) regarding the periods in which she 
stayed in different places. She narrated her tale of displacement:  
   
In 2012, when it all started, we went to the school, made it as a camp, the MLA35 from 
the ruling party of BODOLAND came and said to us not to worry at all about the 
violence, and that he would help us, but eventually relief camp, i.e., the school, was 
attacked too. So, we were frightened, as after leaving home we thought we were safe in 
school, but it was insecure too. Women and children were separated. In the relief camp 
at school two people died during the shooting. The police that were meant to protect us 
were there too and were attacked. Both sides then indulged in the firing during the night. 
Eighteen people died in this village, including children and women. I lived in relief 
camp for months like everyone else.   
 
The number of casualties, in her account, differed from the account of others, however, 
she detailed the facts about the local MLA and was more expressive about it than anyone else.  
Although she was not making much eye contact, her fluency was impeccable. As a woman she 
had, perhaps, more to say on suffering. She found this occasion apt to reflect on the event and 
her life. Like everyone else, she asserted her belonging to the village and repeated, “We are 
from here ... Our father and grandfather all from this place.”  The experience of time and its 
narration does not change with gender, as both genders experienced similar kinds of violence 
and their perception of the past has been shaped by these events and the politics around that 
violence. The understanding of local politics and the sense of conflict are common among men 
and women.  
 
 




Most of the people had the presence of mind to flee with essential papers, proof of their 
legitimacy as citizens. In 2012, the violence started from this side of the village (where I was 
located at the time) and so most of the people did not get much time to collect all their papers.  
Forty-eight-year-old Mujeeb was one of those who had to flee without getting a chance to 
collect the necessary documents. He said that all his documents were burnt in the fire which 
swallowed the village. He managed to get his documents for land, but was yet to be registered 
on the electoral roll. He further said, “No one says now that we are Bangladeshi but during the 
violence, they used to say we are not from here. We have each and every document, 
Bangladeshi issue is just an excuse to do violence and throw us away from our land.”  
 




For the villagers, these episodes of violence do not start with anything specific. In 
raising the issue of the Bangladeshi tag, villagers asked why it was never explained who the 
infiltrator, against whom voices are being raised, is. As one man, sitting with Mujeeb, said: 
“They never say it clearly pointing to an individual that he/she is a Bangladeshi. They always 
say it very vaguely. They will burn the village and will say that there were Bangladeshis there 
and hence the violence was justified.” 
 




have never found any in our village from Bangladesh. We only hear from others or read in 
news that in x village Bangladeshis have infiltrated,” said another man, sitting on the floor. 
This is another method with which the villagers questioned the reasons for the violence, and 
pointed to the violence being strategized.  They even linked the logic of violence with the 
electoral politics of the State. The fear of its coming back is evident, and so is the anticipation 
that, “The election is around the corner, it will start again after the election.” Despite being 
critical of the State, their commitment to voting and to making the election a success, is very 
dutiful, as through elections they assert their citizenship and do not want to be labelled 
‘doubtful’ people, by missing out on the vote. Hence, everyone goes to vote, as a man from 
another village put it “the voting percentage among Muslims here was higher than 90%, 
because if you did not vote you might become a doubtful citizen (i.e., a D voter).”   
 
Eighty years old, Aleemuddeen, the father of Mujeeb, also joined us, reminiscing about 
his days in this village. Living in this village for many decades, he was the oldest man among 
them. He is a farmer with a meagre land holding of half a bigha. His farmland was where the 
firing first started in 2012, after which the violence spread throughout the village. He had not 
had the courage to return to his field since 2012 to conduct his usual farm work. “I feel very 
frightened as it is very close to the Bodo village, it’s just the other side of the road.” 
Aleemuddeen had migrated to this village from the neighbouring district of Goalpara, seven 
decades ago. He migrated soon after his marriage, when he lost everything in a flood and came 
to this village, escaping natural disaster and settled. For him, the Bangladeshi tag issue is a 
recent one, at least in his memory, as he had never heard of such an issue while living in 
Goalpara. As to how he reached Goalpara, he clarified the position and belonging by referring 
to the ‘long time’: 
 
I lost land in flood and moved here, and I was never harassed in the name of 
Bangladeshi before; but now after each act of violence, they call the event a 
Bangladeshi issue. It was only during 1983 that I heard it for the first time.  
 
Internal displacement due to flooding is very common in Assam, and often the 
movement of people from one district to another is linked to illegal immigration. Goalpara 
District is located on the bank of the Brahmaputra, and has a history of flooding and 
displacement. During my fieldwork, I happened to visit the village of Mayong (also famous 
for black magic) in the Morigaon District, near Guwahati. A few regional newspapers 




bamboo houses upon it. Taking part in a fact-finding group to investigate this issue, I 
discovered that these people possessed permits, issued by the local administration, to stay on 
the land, since they had been displaced by flooding and soil erosion. Since the issue of 
migration mobilizes many sentiments in the region, displacement from neighbouring areas and 
any new forms of settlement creates panic. In Kokrajhar District, I came across many people 
who had migrated from either Dhubri or Goalpara. Both these districts had a common history 
of flooding and consequent displacement. The only difference between Dhubri and Goalpara 
is that Dhuburi has an important entry point used by migrant labour during colonial times. 
Aleemuddeen’s story of migration is one of internal displacement caused by flooding, however, 
his internal migration, combined with the history and politics of migration, generated an anti-
immigrant sentiment against him. It was noted that:    
 
With the flooding of the Brahmaputra over the years, and the subsequent slow-onset 
event of erosion of riverbanks, there has been large displacement of people every year. 
Whole villages have been erased or washed away due to the force of the river. 
Unfortunately, official statistical databases for the number of villages displaced and 
details regarding the relocation of the population - where they move to and how they 
survive - remain vague. (Coelho, 2013) 
 
Table: 6.1 Number of erased villages in Assam 
District  Number of erased villages   
Dhubri 71  
Jorhat 2  
Kamrup 14  
Goalpara 75  
Chars (Riverine area) 181  
 
Source: Coelho, 2013 
 
The table above portrays the number of erased villages, prompting people to migrate 
and find a new home. It should also be noted that most of these Char areas are historically 
populated by Bengali immigrants. The narrative of Bangladeshi migration in the state is 






Location Four  
 
Fakir lived with his four children and wife in a relief camp in Kathalgudi village in the 
Gossaigaon Subdivision. He moved here after the 2012 violence gripped his village, 
Ramphalbil, which is surrounded by Bodo villages: 
 
In 2012, no Bodo came to protect us, in fact, our neighbours said kindly leave because we will 
not be able to protect you. 1200 to1300 people came to attack our village. They were armed 
with gun, knives, sticks, and fire and petrol bombs. There were only four policemen who took 
us to the police station. Bodos were all around us, and we were the only Muslim village in that 
locality. That day, we just ran madly, we took our naked children and ran, but there was no 
escape, we thought we would never survive. The attackers were from our neighbouring 
villages. My mother had a heart attack, seeing all of this, and eventually died in the hospital at 
Bongaigaon, where we took her soon after escaping the village. Children said during the 
violence that “Father, our house is burning”, and I asked them not to look back, just keep 
running. Now when we talk about going back to our village, they say we survived somehow, 
but we cannot survive next time. We will starve here, but will not go back. 
 
Fakir talked at length about his experience of being in the relief camp and as a witness of the 
violence. His memory was shaped not by one big event of violence, but by a series of violent episodes, 
which are an everyday reality for his village. The routine violence he spoke of ranged from smaller 
conflicts between his fellow villagers and the Bodos, to the portrayal of him and his neighbours as a 
Bangladeshi and foreigner. His village had a history of trouble with neighbouring villages, which is 
not being reported or investigated by the media or the administration. These small and regular conflicts 
make the ground for a bigger event more fertile. Fakir, and others accompanying him, articulated India 
as a majoritarian state with a Hindu Identity, one where the media serves the majoritarian sentiment. 
For him, Bangladeshi is a name for Muslims in the state, and anything can be turned into a Bangladeshi 
issue, in order to marginalize them. The media does not represent them fairly and citing an instance of 
such misrepresentation, Fakir referred to a time, after the 2012 violence, when during their stay in 
government camps, a few people were reported by officials as being missing, and then further reported 
in the media as being missing illegal immigrants:  
 
When there is nothing to eat, one will go out to find work. If your name is registered 
with the relief camp and you are out to work when the officers come for enquiry, then 
they go back and make a report that there were Bangladeshis in the camp, and now they 
are missing. They would never ask others about them and give this as news item to the 





According to Fakir’s narrative, it is the distrust of the state, arising from the belief that 
the state does not contribute to their well-being, and that leads people in relief camps to leave 
for different cities or states, to find work, which, to their detriment, allows officials to report 
them as infiltrators. The issue of illegal immigrants, missing from camps, have been turned 
into a political issue by the BJP and are consistently reported on, by The Assam Tribune, which 
synonymises this issue with the violence. Fakir, too, returned to the question of land towards 
the end of his narrative, relaying that the Bodos had attempted to seize his land whilst he was 
resident in his village, which he had reported to the police. He explained, however, that such 
encroachment was now hard to battle, since he no longer lived in the village.  
 
D Voters: The Doubtful Citizens 
 
One of the outcomes of the Assam agitation was The Illegal Migrant (determination by 
tribunal) Act36 (the IMDT act), which was passed by the Indian Parliament in 1983, as a 
mechanism with which to identify foreigners in the country by tribunal, which was especially 
constituted for this purpose. The burden, according to the Act, was upon the local authority to 
prove whether a subject was a citizen or not. With the enactment of this special tribunal, a 
peculiar phenomenon started to emerge in the state, during the 1990s.  During the revision of 
the electoral roll in 1998, the letter ‘D’37 was marked against people whose citizenship was 
doubted by the state. These voters were called D Voters, a short form for Doubtful Voters. 
Such individuals were referred to the tribunal and the authority would investigate their case, 
during which period they would remain doubtful. A white paper, published by the government 
of Assam, in 2012, on the foreigners’ issue in the state, introduced the genesis of D voters, in 
Chapter 2.6, as follows:  
 
In pursuance of instructions of Election Commission of India dated January 5, 1998 
during intensive revision of electoral roll in Assam in 1997, the letter ‘D’ was marked 
against the names of those electors who could not prove their Indian citizenship status 
at the time of verification through officers, especially appointed for the purpose. ‘D’ 
meant that the citizenship status of the elector was doubtful/disputed. Verification was 
done through local verification officers (LVOs). Based upon the report of the Local 
Verification Officers (LVOs), the Electoral Registration Officers took a decision on 
 
36 See more: https://indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1766/1/198339.pdf 
37 This might be considered a bizarre comparison, but in the Imperial War Museum in London I came across the 
collection from the Holocaust, where I saw the passport of a German Jew being stamped ‘J’ by the Nazi authority. 
While ‘D’ makes them doubtful, and a subject who is to be detected and deported, in the case of ‘J’, extermination 




whether a reference to the concerned Tribunal was necessary to ascertain the Indian 
citizenship status of such elector. Once the Electoral Registration Officers confirmed 
in the affirmative, such cases were forwarded to the competent authority (SP of the 
concerned district) for reference to the concerned Tribunal. Such electors marked with 
‘D’ were neither permitted to cast their votes nor contest in Elections. In issuing such 
instructions, the Commission took into consideration various orders of the Gauhati 
High Court, Supreme Court. and provisions of Article 326 of the constitution read 
conjointly with section 16 of the Representation of People’s Act, 1950 and section 62 
of the Representation of the People’s Act, 1951. The cases of such ‘D’ voters were 
forwarded by the Electoral Registration Officers concerned to the competent authority 
(Police Department) for further reference to the relevant Tribunals for determination of 
their citizenship. Based on the judgment /orders of the Tribunals, the letter ‘D’ was 
either removed from against the names of those electors whose Indian citizenship status 
was confirmed or the name of the elector deleted from the Electoral Rolls in the case 

















Cases where no 
opinion could 
be expressed  
231657 88192 143465 6590 44220 37382 
 Source: White paper on Foreigners’ Issue, Government of Assam 
 
In 2005, the Supreme Court repealed the IMDT Act and declared it unconstitutional. In 
the popular case of Sonowal vs Union of India, Sarbananda Sonowal filed a writ petition in the 
Supreme Court of India, to repeal this Act on the grounds that it was unconstitutional and made 
it difficult to detect and deport foreigners. Sonowal, who was the President of the AASU in the 
1990s, later joined the right -wing Hindu Nationalist BJP, and became Chief Minister of Assam 
in 2016. The judgment in the Sonowal case is of great significance in the debate of citizenship, 
in India. The judgment of the Supreme Court in repealing the IMDT Act brought these migrants 
within the scope of the Foreigners’ Act of 1946, according to which the burden of proof to 
prove citizenship, rests upon the person accused of being illegal. The Supreme Court, in its 
judgment, also equated illegal immigration with aggression, detailing in several paragraphs the 
wide-reaching implications of illegal immigration, referring to this form of migration as an 
aggression not dissimilar to war, providing an international precedent of judgments held 
against illegal migrants, and spoke to the economic aggression of migration. This judgment is 




ratio, but also became an aggressor; his act of aggression an act against the state of India. Ratna 
Kapur (2007) stresses that the “Sonowal decision needs to be read within the context of the re-
emergence of the Hindu right”, and that this “case demonstrates how Indian citizenship is 
deeply anchored in assumptions about cultural and religious identity and not confined to formal 
legal status”. She also notes an important aspect in the judgment, for which the Supreme Court 
heavily relied on an army report alleging that “Muslim militant organizations had mushroomed 
across Assam and that the large-scale illegal migration was tantamount to external aggression 
and causing internal disturbance”. This reliance is very telling of the Supreme Court’s 
“approach to the issue of citizenship” (Kapur, 2007, p.557). The emergence of the Hindu right 
since the demolition of the Babri Masjid, in 1992, aims to complete its central project of 
constructing Indian citizens as Hindu citizens.  
 
Anupama Roy, in her work on citizenship in India, has discussed this judgment in great detail. 
She notes that: 
 
It is significant that while declaring the IMDT Act unconstitutional, the court described 
immigration not merely as 'illegal' entry into foreign territory, but as an act of 
aggression, arguing within a discursive framework that makes for a bounded notion of 
citizenship, with the policing of boundaries and the determination of citizenship 
construed as a significant manifestation of state sovereignty. Moreover, the arguments 
that the judges made before identifying migration as an act of aggression placed their 
articulation of citizenship squarely within the framework of an ethnically determined 
membership of the nation-state. In this exposition, the constituent outsider was marked 
out not only on account of being a foreigner, but also on account of being a Muslim, 
the latter inevitably associated with Islamic fundamentalism, as well as a threat to the 
nation (read Hindu) and its security. 
 
Significantly, the judgment's discussion of demographic shifts in Assam, and hence the 
undesirability of the IMDT Act, switches from an examination of the population break-
up in terms of linguistic profile to a religious profile of the state. The examination 
focuses, thus, on the increase in the Muslim population, occluding in the process the 
linguistic specificity and cultural preservation that had formed the basis of 
differentiated citizenship articulated in the initial stages of the Assam movement, 
followed by developmental concern. (Roy, 2010, pp.116-117) 
 
In another observation made by Anupama Roy and Ujjwal Kumar Singh, they write: 
 
While Bengali-speaking Muslims have come to constitute a “suspect community” not 
just in Assam, but in the rest of India, subjected to frequent dislocation, expulsion, or 
excision of their names from the voters list, here has been an ongoing shift in the 




to a predominantly exclusivist ethnic definition of citizenship. While the Supreme 
Court judgment, in particular the justification it gave for scrapping the IMDT Act, was 
one manifestation of the shift, a more enduring change has been taking place, almost 
imperceptibly, in the legal framework of citizenship in India. (Roy and Singh, 2009, 
pp.58-59) 
 
As a result of this judgment, one who is doubted or stamped ‘D’, or Doubtful, has to 
prove his citizenship at a tribunal and, very often, due to lack of paperwork and resources one 
member of a family is separated and detained. Many, who are legitimate Indian citizens, find 
themselves in detention centers for long periods, since Bangladesh is not their home country 
and they have nowhere to go. Most of the citizens living in poverty find this burden of proof 
an unbearable one. In a very well-known case, reported in the national media, a daily wage 
laborer committed suicide, since he was not able to generate resources to free his mother from 
the ‘D’ category.38 This is a form of structural violence, and as Kamil Sadiq has observed, it is 
biased against the poor (Sadiq, 2009).  Siddique (2019), in recent work, note that: 
 
Many of the legal battles to prove citizenship turn into a failure owing to the 
inexperienced handling of the lawyers, for good lawyers are a distant dream for most 
of them. There are instances where the victims of “doubt” are forced to sell even the 
small plots of lands or other properties they ever possessed while pursuing the state-
imposed legal battles. 
This has resulted in the landlessness and homelessness of thousands of families. 





As most of the people I met, in Kokrajhar, denied meeting any D voters, and some even 
expressed their ignorance about the issue altogether, I encountered very few Doubtful voters, 
and I recorded the narratives of these few. Sapkata (literally meaning ‘snake bite’), is a village 
in the Gossaigaon Sub-division of Kokrajhar, a village named for incidents of snake bites by 
flying snakes which, it, is claimed, once lived there. The main road in this post office village,is 
not very well built towards the end of the village. In Matiapara, in this village, I met sixty years 
old Jan Bibi, who did not speak any Hindi, and who was a ‘Doubtful voter’, living with her son 
and his family in a hut made of bamboos with a tin shed. Jan Bibi never learnt to read or write, 
 






and she did not watch Television or follow the news through any other medium. She 
remembered living in this village for over 45 years, while her family was from the Dhubri 
District. Before being profiled as ‘doubtful’ she had not heard about ‘D voters’ or what it meant 
to be named one. She had no clear understanding of the issue or of its implications. She 
recalled: 
 
I did not know about D voters. I have always voted, but since 2005 my name has 
appeared in D voters and I could not vote. I remembered to be ill and was visiting a 
doctor. They summoned us for verification of voters list in the local police station, 
which I missed. My husband could not appear as well (he did not take it very seriously) 
and after that my name was included in D voters list. I was not notified that I am a D 
voter by any direct correspondence. It was during the election in 2005 I went to cast 
my vote and I learnt that I am a D voter at the election booth. I am the only one in that 
list. No one in my house has got the D voter notice, no one is in the list, and everyone 
goes for voting from my family. Since then I get notices and then we have to appear (in 
Kokrajhar) before the court and talk to lawyers and come back. This is what is 
happening since then. After 2012 violence we didn’t appear for two years in the court 
and then we got another notice. 
 
Jan Bibi did not know why her name had appeared on the list. Her son clarified that, 
between 2005 and 2015, he had appeared ten times before the court on his mother’s behalf, and 
he took her to the court once. Jan Bibi remembered the violence of 2012 against Muslims, and 
in 1996 against the Adivasis:  
 
I was here in 2012 when the violence happened. For almost a week since the beginning 
of violence we patrolled our village and guarded it in night, even women, but late,r 
when we saw a village burnt in East, then we left our village for refugee camp. We 
stayed for three months in Kachari Gaon, Dhubri District relief camp. During the 
violence they were shouting at us ‘Bangladeshi hatao’ ‘Bangladeshi hatao’ [Expel 
Bangladeshis]. They were calling us Bangladeshis, I know it. Every one of my 
forefathers is from this country, I know they are calling us Bangladeshis, but my father 
is still alive, and he is in Dhubri, and his family is from there. We have all the documents 
including the NRC of 1951. I have witnessed the violence against Santhal (Adivasis) in 
1996. I saw their houses being burnt and when they ran away they took refuge in our 
village first, and then moved to different camps. We helped them in moving to camps 
as well. 
 
Jan Bibi’s son, Zahoor, wondered out loud why his mother was included in the list 
whilst no one else in the family was. Zahoor, too, did not seem aware of the politics surrounding 
the D voter list, like his mother, and the implication of being included on the list. In Matiapara, 
Bengali Muslims do not have a good relationship with the Bodos and the Adivasis of the village 




violence in which one community is targeted, in one episode, is a typical feature of violence in 
the region. This almost operates as an independent system of ‘detecting’ and ‘killing’ in each 
unique episode. Zahoor’s narrative showed an empathy and care for the Adivasis, despite 
having no cultural exchange or regular communication.  
 
I saw violence in 1996, Adivasis came in night running for life, and they told us that 
Bodos killed our people and burnt our houses, they were targeted in 2014 as well. I 
gave them my house as shelter in 2014 when they ran for life. They lived here for almost 
three years. A lot of people were killed then. 
 
 





Jan Bibi, has been aided, by local volunteers from the Jamiat e Ulema i Hind, to fight 
her case. The Jamiat actively helps any D voters who ask for their aid and ask for a meagre 
compensation of one thousand rupees to help them get through the case. Jamiat’s activity, on 
the ground, helps this Muslim organization to strengthen their ideological base and reap the 




Democratic Front (AIUDF)39 was founded by the State President of Jamiat e Ulema i Hind, 
Badruddin Ajmal. Recurrent violence and the Bangladeshi tag issue have made Jamiat an 
important political actor within the state, and by involving itself in everyday issues of the 
people it has been able to garner popular support. The issues surrounding the Muslim minority 
of the region have strengthened the power of this old Muslim organization, which has 
traditionally only had symbolic control over the Muslims of India, providing it with a platform 
for its narrative of finding prominence in national politics. Athiabadi Camp, mentioned earlier, 
is also run by Jamiat, however, the organisation has made sure not to decree the land to the 
people, rather, allowing them to stay there whilst retaining control of the resource. By involving 
itself in issues of the D-voter list and rehabilitation, such organizations with a pan- India and 
pan-Islamic narrative influence the sense of Muslimness of the people they help. People who 
volunteer on such initiatives articulate victimization differently than those who are remote from 
it. Violence and the question of citizenship opened up new cracks from which religious power 
started to operate in the everyday life of the people. Such charitable initiatives certainly help 
the poor and marginalized to access resources (in, however, a limited way), which may lead to 
ensuring citizenship, however, it also takes away from them the agency to articulate their 
struggle and have a voice – socially and politically. Social actors, like this one, have the power 
to act on behalf of individuals or the community, and in acting this agency can transform their 
(individuals’ or community’s) sense of belonging and identity, from which they become 
dispossessed. If we take into account the narrative of Jan Bibi, who has carried the tag of the 
‘D voter’ for ten years, but remains unaware of its meaning, her illiteracy and the Jamiat’s 
intervention may create a detachment from emerging trends, dilemmas and crises, which make 
human agency evolve, limiting her agency and capacity to act.  
Khadeeja Bibi, of Ballamguri, managed to rid herself of the doubtful tag after appearing 
in court for over six years. She was first barred from voting in 2007, when she appeared in the 
booth with her serial number and learnt that she could not vote, but she got an official letter in 
2009 notifying her of being enlisted as a D voter.  
 
I took all the papers of mine, of my father and my husband, and appeared five times in 
the court since then. Eventually I was cleared of the tag in 2014. The magistrate used 
to ask me about my father and forefathers and whether they were Bangladeshis or 
Indian. Magistrate checked my papers and documents many times before clearing my 
name from the D voter list.  
 
39 Founded first as the Assam United Democratic Front (AUDF) in 2005, and later changing its name to All India 





She witnessed the violence in 2012, and that earlier against Santhalis (Adivasis), like many 
others, and remembered helping them. She made clear her agitation at being called 
Bangladeshi: 
  
In 2012 only 36 houses were left, and rest were all burnt. My house wasn’t burnt. I have 
seen the violence against Santhalis earlier. I saw them running away from their villages 
and we tried to help them then. This is our land and I am not afraid living here. I have 
never seen any Bangladeshi in my life. This is just an issue they have created. No one 
has called me a Bangladeshi, but they call all of us Bangladeshi in general.  
 
Sixty-year-old Sakeena Bewa had a different tale of helplessness to tell as she waited 
for the cloud of doubt to pass so she could resume a life of normalcy. She had been listed on 
the D voters’ list in 2005, and had not been able to free herself of it for ten years. Sakeena, a 
widow, had a thirty-year-old son who now worked in the South of India, and who had also 
been added to the list. Sakeena’s story is one of many which demonstrate the nature of this law 
and its execution. In her own words:  
 
This village is my birthplace. My father was also born here. My father’s name was in 
the 1951 NRC. I have always been exercising my rights as a citizen to vote, but in 2005, 
when I went to cast my vote. they gave me a receipt, I took that receipt to the booth, 
then two policemen saw my receipt and said that you are no longer allowed to vote. I 
was termed a ‘D voter’. Ten years have gone by, but I have not received any notice or 
any letter from the authorities. I have no reason to go to the magistrate or the court as 
the notice is yet to come. I was told that day that my name has got a ‘D’ against it. My 
son and I both were marked as D voters. We don’t have any voter ID card (issued by 
the Election Commission of India) and without an identity it is very difficult to find a 
job in this state, this is why my son migrated to the South of India. 
 
Before 2012, she used to live in a different village, on her nephew’s land. 
 
I moved here after the violence in 2012, which destroyed two of our houses. It was all 
burnt, and our storage of food was burnt too. They shot at us too, that fateful morning. 
I made this house myself with the compensation we got from the government. The 
paper of the earlier house was in my nephew’s name, so he got the compensation and 
gave me my share. But the registration of my land is not done yet officially. I am 
illiterate. I didn’t know about D voters, but since then I went to police station, election 
officer, village authorities, but no one has helped me. They all said ‘everything will be 
solved, don’t worry’ but they haven’t told me how to solve it, or how it will be solved. 
I have all the documents of my father and husband. I have the NRC documents of 1951 
and 1966. I went to the authorities in the last election too, and they repeated the same 





Sakeena Bewa did not want to talk much about her memory of violence and the history 
of her presence in the village, she was looking more desperately at the horizon for a future. 
Anxiety driven Sakeena, also submitted her documents to the NRC, and thought being 
registered would resolve her ‘D voter’ problem, but the officials told her the two were different. 
NRC’s first draft of their citizens’ list, released in July, 2018, has cast doubt on the citizenship 
of four million people (and the second draft released in August, 2019, has excluded roughly 
two million from the citizenship list). Sakeena faced multiple challenges in this situation, which 
include her illiteracy, poverty, gender, her inability to deal with the bureaucracy, and waiting 
for an official notice which might begin her actual legal battle for citizenship. While Sakeena 
waited for the notice, the absurdity and arbitrariness of the Kafkaesque bureaucracy comes to 
mind, which is a prominent element of the immigration story of Assam. Siddique also 
highlights the arbitrariness of the law, and notes: 
 
…the method of marking individuals as D-voters is utterly arbitrary and unsystematic. 
To one’s surprise, the tag of D-voter thus imposed on an individual’s name can only be 
removed through an order by the FTs. In case any FT finds an individual to be doubtful, 
it immediately throws them into jail, officially termed as a “detention camp.” At present 
there are about 900 D-voters, and about 2,000 declared foreigners languishing in the 
jails. (Siddique, 2019, p.26) 
 
 
I recently acquired a copy of a judgment through a lawyer in Assam. This judgment 
deals with a similar case. In the judgment order, delivered by a Foreigners; Tribunal in the case 
of Amina Khatun and others, the judge noted the absurdity of delivering notices which can 
destroy people’s lives and families. In this case, the notice was hung upon a tree in the market 
place. The judge remarked:  
 
The said case was proceeded ex-parte  because the Applicants /Ops were not found in 
the given address at the time of serving a summons, as reported by the PS, and 
accordingly the said notice was hung upon a tree in the market place in the presence of 
Gaonburha40 and the VDP41 President. It would be pertinent to mention herein that the 
process server and the Gaonburha and VDP President are summoned before this 
 
40 The village Headman  
41 The Village Defence Party (VDP) is the primary unit of the organisation called the Village Defence Organisation 
(VDO). A VDP comprises of 20-25 volunteers from a village who are responsible for safeguarding the area of 







Tribunal innumerable times in various Foreigners’ cases, directing all these persons not 
to hang the Notice in any ordinary place like the waiting shade/trees or upon electric 
pole, but to hang the Notices in some conspicuous place, but in most of the cases it is 
repeatedly found that process serves usually hang the notices upon some trees or 
electric pole. 
 
The judge also made a remarkable statement that: 
 
…it is also observed by this Tribunal at the grassroots level, through Tribunal’s own 
reliable source, that Foreigners’ case, at this juncture, have assumed the form of an 
industry, as each and every person involved with Foreigners’ cases has been trying to 
mint money by any means.  
 
The court, dismissing the charges against the applicants, advised them to file an 
appropriate damage suit against the village authorities. Most people complained that the law 
was unfair, and so was its execution. as this whole process of labelling voters D voters was 
very arbitrary. Walter Benjamin, in his critique of violence, does not take a position against the 
law or lawfulness, but saw the law as being instrumentalized to enact violence, and law 
enforcement being emboldened by authoritarian or totalitarian regimes which can become a 
source of violence.  The law, which wants to delineate the ‘doubtful’ from the ‘faithful’ and its 
process, which detects the person living a doubted life, has an element of arbitrariness and 
violence. As most of the people who have to go through this whole process are poor and lack 
resources, the law, then, is not on their side by placing upon them the burden of proving their 
citizenship. The actions of law enforcement agencies, with their arbitrariness, hanging notices 
on trees and dragging cases before a court for over a decade, is not conducive either, leaving 
people in a vulnerable position to be exploited by corrupt authorities.  
 
The fieldwork also threw up a perplexing question by bringing female D voters to the 
fore. There are no clear government statistics separating the number of D voters by gender, 
however, Muslim women seem more prone to appear on D voter lists for two normative social 
reasons: one, changing their surname after marriage, bringing about a change in status; the 
single girl or woman generally has ‘Begum’ (use for a lady) as the last name, replaced with 
‘Bibi’ (one of its meanings is wife) after marriage, and  ‘Bewa’ (literally meaning Widow) 
upon widowhood, which causes confusion and ambiguity, in many cases. The normative 
practice then becomes a challenge to modern name keeping, and it subsequently makes the 
person appear to be doubtful. The other social practice causing ‘doubt’ was revealed by a social 




after being widowed, is quite common, and they often then give their first wife’s identity card 
to the newly-wed second one. The second wife, possessing the documents of the deceased first 
wife, often gets caught and listed as a doubtful citizen. I am unsure of the numbers of such 
cases, but this narrative is suggestive of citizenship dynamics at a very low level. The concept 
of citizenship and doubt conceptually operates from the top, on one level, and on another level, 
this is contested, created and lived upon at the ground level. In a way, the concepts of 
citizenship and identity become fluid, it is not only for the state to ‘doubt’, ‘detect’ or ‘confirm’, 
but it also rests with the ‘men’ who have the power to grant it to their ‘women’. It is on a legal 
and bureaucratic level that the ‘Doubtful citizen’ is arbitrarily picked, but it is also on a very 

















The Road to Balapara  
Location Six 
 
In the first week of May, 2014, Bodo militants, carried out a spree of violence in the 
villages of the Kokrajhar and Baksa districts. Khagrabari was one of the worst hit by this 
militant attack, as 41 people were killed and a fact-finding report by a Guwahati based NGO 
even noted that this militant attack had only been made possible with the “direct assistance of 
BTC administration” (Azad, 2015). Balapara was another village which came under heavy 
attack, leading to the loss of lives. Balapara was CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force) guarded 
after the massacre in 2014, with a post outside the village.  The road to Balapara from 
Gossaigaon was filled with fear and threatening silence as and my guide and I decided to ride 
a bike to the village. Most of the forests on the either side of road are inhabited by NDFB 
militants and no one takes this road, even in broad day light. All this was reported to me when 
I returned safely to Salakati, one student leader claiming that even they do not visit that place 
alone. Not only the villagers, but the entire area, seemed to have a fresh memory of violence. 
The village of 500 houses is predominantly Bengali Muslim and also witnessed violence in 
2012, like all of the others where I did interviews.  
 
Twenty-six-year-old Noor used to work in Kolkata and came to vote in the general 
election of 2014, like many harbouring the same fear -- that skipping the vote might bring 
citizenship into doubt.  He remembered living in the camp across the river with his family after 
the violence in 2012: 
 
We used to shuttle between camp and the house, and this is how we entered in 2014 
from 2012. I came back from work just to vote in 2014, but during the election there 
was some rumour about rigging. There was some issue about that election, and voting 
machines were destroyed at the booth and the voting was postponed. However, I voted 
very swiftly, between 3 and 4 p.m., and there was no issue, but when my father went 
later to vote he learnt from security personnel that after 5 p.m. there might be some 
trouble so better go somewhere safe and hide. My father came back and asked all of us 
to leave. All of my siblings left the village and went to different villages, to our 
relatives. My parents went across the river and one brother stayed back in our home, 
while two other brothers left the village for work. I visited my father from the other 
village, but I felt that situation is deteriorating. My brother called me at night saying he 
had been shot in his hand. I got worried about my father, so I started calling him 
frantically. I also called a friend and he said my mom, sister in law and children are 
killed, please come soon. I was in Dhubri District and it was far for me and impossible 
to come at midnight. I called my cousin, and he said that your sister in law and her child 




forces stopped him from going anywhere. I was relentlessly calling my father, and 
eventually my mother picked the phone said: “I am shot, and your father is shot too”. I 
could hear my mother’s voice sinking. I called my cousins and a brother to immediately 
check home, but by the time they reached my parents were dead.”  
 
Noor had not witnessed episodes of violence before 2012 in his village. He remembered 
in 1996,, when Adivasis were killed, some dead bodies floated in the river next to the village. 
No one was targeted from his village at that time, as the violence was directed towards 
Adivasis, and no Muslim left their home. Noor showed me his father’s and grandfather’s 
documents while narrating the story of living in this village for a long time. His father and 
grandfather were born there, and he showed a great sense of belonging to this land. In his small 
house, he asked me to sit on the bed while he did not. He kept his distance from the bed, as it 
held the painful memory of being his parents’ deathbed. The bed was as part of his memory as 
his narrative. His reluctance to come closer to the blood-stained bed portrayed how memory is 
also the powerhouse of the sacred and profane. Memory is not what one remembers, but how 
one makes sense of remembrance. Memory of his parents’ death had shaped the sense of 
sacredness in his small world.  
 
Noor shared his memory of his father and the day he left, but he was also excited to ask 
whether I saw the news of his father’s death on news channels. He was excited to inform me 
that he news was shared and acknowledged. He could not find that TV report on his mobile 
phone, so he called over a fellow villager to show me the news clip on his smart phone, which 
Noor did not watch. He wanted me to witness the clip and keep a copy of the video. For Noor, 
there existed an anxiety about the future, since the CRPF continued to maintain its post outside 
the village:  
 
CRPF camp is perhaps good for our security but what purpose has it served when we 
needed it the most. The violence happened and we lost our loved ones -- now they have 
to come to protect us and show us they care. BSF (Border Security Force) was here 
when the Bodos attacked, and some of us called them for help, but they never came. 
They ignored our desperate requests and made trivial excuses.  
 
In the day, we come here and work, as my father was a farmer and we have land, but at 
night we leave the village and go across the river.  We all live together at night in a 
common place. I know that the media portray us as Bangladeshis, and when we were 
in the camp, they reported that there were Bangladeshis, but the Bodos around us never 
called us Bangladeshis, but they (Bodo Leadership) exploit this issue quite well. They 
(Bodo) want us to leave so that they can capture our land. They want Bodoland 





For me, it started with 2012, before that we used to work on each other’s land (Bodos) 
and we also used to go to each other’s homes. However, their militant organization 
asked them not to mingle with us, and after 2012 we stopped talking. Bodos are no 
longer allowed to come to our village (CRPF would not let them in, anyway). This is 
all patta land and we have all the documentary evidence for that. We earn our livelihood 
from this land, if we leave this land, where else would we go? This is my 
Janambhoomi.42People talked about Modi in the 2014 massacre, but this has nothing to 
do with Modi. However, Modi is not good for Muslims, he will be harsh on us and will 
cause more trouble. 
 
Noor’s story is indicative of how his narrative of being a religious minority is shaped 
by his own experience of violence and suffering. In working on the memory of violence at the 
partition of India, Butalia notes that,  
 
The suffering and grief of partition are not memorialised at the border, nor publicly, 
anywhere else in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. A million may have died, but they 
have no monuments. Stories are all that people have, stories that rarely breach the 
frontiers of family and religious community: people talking to their own blood. 
(Butalia, 1998, p.52).  
 
Noor’s story, too, hardly breached any borders, since his narrative was one that had a 
sense of sharing the memory with a member of the same community. Are you a Muslim? This 
is the question one encounters before they open the doors of their memory and let you share in 





 This is definitely one side of the story; at the same time there is another side to the story 
reported by newspapers. Due to time and security constraints, I could not stay with Bodos and 
record their narrative. One might wonder how they articulate their pain and narrate their 
memory and identity. With the formation of the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) they might 
feel that their struggle and autonomy are respected. With the tension among neighbouring 
communities, and in a quest to deal with Assamese and Indian nationalism, Bodos are also 
 




trying to re-invent their clock to strengthen their language and culture through this opportunity 
for an autonomous Bodoland. Burdened with apprehension about control over land and being 
turned into a minority among minorities, their narrative may perhaps be dominated by a 
different kind of fear. Reported in the stories of violence and militancy they may, perhaps, be 
searching for better representation and prospects of peace, in a situation in which their identity 
is distinctly acknowledged 
 
However, in these small voices of the people, and in the granular local lived experience, 
there is a defiance of both historical categories – immigrant and Muslim.  The first, articulated 
and re-enforced by the English language newspaper, and the second is proposed and used to fit 
any event by the Urdu language newspaper. The value in ethnography was that it undermined 
any easy assumptions of either the press representing local experience or, and to some extent 
more surprisingly, in undermining any easy explanations by the press of defining and shaping 
local experience. This was not because these press narratives were unavailable, or were not 
present – they were - but they floated above how the people lived. How the people on the 
ground define themselves and find a historical category within which to locate themselves, 
which, is shaped by their own space of experience. Their language and imaginations are the 
product of their own distinct relation with their Now-time. There is a disparity between the 
homogenous Muslim time, or Ummah time, which is conceptualized and projected through 
Urdu newspapers and the experience of Muslimness in these villages. The oral narratives they 
put forward permit one to conclude that, despite the puzzlement of the rationale of violence, 
they are well aware of its reasons. The ‘suffering of the Muslim world’, or the ‘travails of the 
Indian Muslim’, do not enter their own accounts, which is in sharp contrast to the victimization 
narrative of the Urdu newspapers. On the ground, people do not refer to Rohingyas or to 
communal violence elsewhere. They do not fit their experience of 2012, or of violence in 
general, into such larger narratives.  Unlike the accounts in the Urdu newspapers, they do not 
place their own pain into a competing hierarchy with other subjugated people. There is, of 
course, an opportunity in this: their concerns for justice, legitimate legal processes and 
everyday fairness are not, yet, linked to abstract demands. However, they do need attention. 
 
This is not to suggest that these people are unaware of their religious identity and the 
majoritarian Hindu politics shaping India. Their experience of violence and proximity to the 
Bodos have shaped their own subjectivity as Muslims. They are aware of the stress surrounding 




cultivate and to control. Bodoland is for Bodos when they possess more land and grow in 
numbers so that they dominate the demography. While local Muslims recognize the land issue 
on a local level, they identify with Muslim oppression nationally as a reason for violence. This 
sense of Muslim oppression is not constituted by their sense of Ummah, Qawm, or Muslim 
victimization, everywhere, but by their own unique experience with the law and law 
enforcement. This is not hierarchical or imaginative but, rather, a dialectical way of coming to 
this realization of being a minority.  
 
It is their experience of Foreigners’ Tribunals, being classified as doubtful citizens, 
dealing with the arbitrariness of the law and with an unfair bureaucracy that determines their 
idea of belonging to a Muslim minority. Of course, such pressures on this ‘minority’ can be 
shared nation-wide by other members of the group, yet their idea of minority is not shaped by 
the experience of others, or the victimization as imagined by the leaders or communicated by 
the Urdu press. The sense of an unfair law and unfair treatment by someone enforcing the law, 
along with the repetitive cycle of violence, is what makes their sense of ‘Muslim minority’.  
 
These narratives also contest their categorization as being an immigrant or a 
Bangladeshi. For them, Paper (proof of citizenship) and Presence (having lived there for a long 
time) are the legitimate bases for rejecting the category that is used to identify them. These two 
associations (with time and with law) for them make them as ‘Indian’ as anyone else. Self-
identity is shaped by a discontinuous time which has shaped the borders and nationalities of 
South Asia.  
 
Lastly, in the people’s stories, and through the observation of their behaviour, one can 
see a lack of cultural exchange between the two groups, but, also, the complete absence of any 
long-term initiatives, interventions, processes or institutions that might assist conflict 
resolution. The history of interaction between the two communities differs in different villages, 
but the total breakdown of conversation has been a common trend since 2012. Yet the injustices 
they suffer are, in fact, held in common. The Bengali Muslims share a common history of 
suffering with the Adivasis, without having much cultural exchange with them either. Despite 
the lack of that everyday exchange and sharing, there is a sense of solidarity and, through the 
memory of violence, they connect with the Adivasi community. Yet, the violence in the region 
operates as a system. It has a norm of its own, in that alliances shift, and, first, violence is 




another group.  The cycle goes on. In May, 2014, it was Muslim villages that were targeted, 
and in December, 2014, it was Adivasis who were killed and displaced. The story of suffering 





































If you listen and write about stories of violence, not stories of abstract or distant 
violence, but stories from people who have lived through violent events and fear – quite 
realistically – one also becomes a witness of such an act. In writing this thesis, I have oddly 
felt a proximity to these episodes of violence that I rarely had when I was closer physically to 
the conflict zone, but was less engaged with it. This was a story where a complex shifting view 
of ‘the minority’ was shared among groups, all of which also believed themselves to be 
minorities. A story in which all the groups involved felt insecure, felt themselves to be victims 
of politics and history, felt misrepresented. I chose to focus on one side of the story to see it 
unravel in different zones. I have not located the ‘Muslim’ question in the politics of Assam, I 
have, instead, tried to locate the politics of Assam and migration in the ‘Muslim question’. 
Much of the scholarship concerned with Assam has focused on the question of Assamese 
identity, its history and location, and has tried to see other events from that position. I have 
tried to look at it from the other side. I have looked into the narratives which shape the 
experience and expectation of these peoples.  
 
The story, at a very local level, in villages and hamlets, is of conflict between Bodos 
and everyone else who is, at that point, a non-Bodo, for control over land resources. At the 
regional level, it is a conflict between ‘indigenous’ and legal/illegal immigrants. At a national 
level. the conflict becomes a story of who has access to being a citizen, of bewildering but 
powerful changes in the definitions of rights, handed down from the government, and with 
alarmingly arbitrary, but rigorously enforced, shifts in the political ideologies and practical 
politics that shape legal definitions. It is at this level that a narrative of ideas and ideologies 
start to define inclusivity and exclusivity within the Nation’s imagination. All these layers add 
to its complexity and make an understanding of the situation difficult. Nevertheless, they 
should not obscure the genuine particularities of history.  
 
Bodos are particular, the villages are particular, the trajectory of lived experience is 
specific. If we dislocate it from there, then it becomes easy to mobilize emotion and downplay 




historical archive, meticulously collected and created by colonial administrators, but also how 
it resides in newspapers – abandoned, not archived, nearly lost newspapers, discarded as 
insignificant, yet holding within them the trace of the political definitions that formed the 
present, and also how the term survives to shape the contemporary lives of people. How has 
the concept gone through transformation, as each period is marked by its own politics and 
historical change and has contributed to the meaning of this category called ‘immigrant’? In 
the colonial archive one can see the figure of the ‘immigrant’ as labour and a cared for category. 
The archive showed the humanizing aspect of the category of immigrants, which is not without 
its own shortcomings, while the usage of the term by the newspaper in contemporary times 
displaced the concept from its actual historical position and dehumanized it, by connecting it 
to other semantics which make the figure of the immigrant an ahistorical one.   
 
Victims’ narratives and the narratives of victimization are different.  The former is 
based on real experience of violence and is shaped by the memory of it, while the narrative of 
violence   is shaped by a politics of victimhood and is an imagined experience of the Muslim 
subject. In the victim’s narrative, the proximity to the aggressor, and an expectation and 
calculation of the ‘reasons’ for the acts, are present. Meanwhile, the ongoing narrative of 
victimization does not recognize the other and shows no sense of the particularity of history. 
In the victim’s narrative one can trace compassion, a solidarity for the other victim groups and 
a commitment to living everyday life, while the story of ‘victimisation’ evokes, and is 
detached, untethered from the local group solidarity. This victim’s narrative is shaped by its 
local and quotidian experience. It is rooted in the complex, empirical world of topography, 
experience and physicality. By contrast, the narrative of victimization brings the local and the 
global together to create a homogenous time. 
 
The expectation of people trapped in such a cycle of violence is shaped by their 
experiences of the past. They live in the fear and expectation that it may return at any time. In 
their narrative of time there is a politics of time. They want and need to be included in the 
common time of the nation. yet they are excluded. Yet this means that they stay in the present, 
and they orient themselves from the Now-time and not the time of past, which is of migration, 
and this is, hence, contagious. They live in a constant present, trying to evade and ignore the 





The Urdu and English newspapers show two forms of reporting on the same kind of 
problem, they both have different histories to tell, and they reveal two different trajectories. 
While the migration issue is clearly absent in Urdu newspapers, as for them it is a Muslim 
issue, for The Assam Tribune it is an issue of immigration, but their stories and editorials play 
out a certain politics of fear which can be identified with the Hindu nationalists, who exploit 
the fear of rising Muslim numbers in the region, and weaponize various political and social 
issues in order to marginalize the community.  
 
This thesis has used three different methods to investigate a historical problem. This 
method has given a very vivid picture of the present, interspersed with the category of the past 
and the narrative of the present shaping the future. In using conceptual history as a method, the 
semantic change in each period has been revealed, giving us a sense of the conceptual making 
of a category in the course of time. The triangulation of methods gives a very wide frame and 
helps to locate the media narrative into its own genealogies.  The thesis has attempted to 
underline the conceptual history of migration by bringing micro-history together with archival 
material. The theories about force and power, subject and subjugation, need to be rethought, as 
each power relation is produced in its particularity of history, forming its own subjectivity. 
Although managing three different methods has its own advantages and deficits, as managing 
the demands of each method was different, this has still provided richness to the understanding 
of the issue, and I would not have seen it the way I do without this multiplicity of methods.  
 
Although my work draws theoretically from the work of Derrida on Walter Benjamin’s 
critique of violence, which shows that authority legitimizes through law. In reading Benjamin, 
Derrida makes the point about law not being just or justice. People obey law because of the 
authority contained in law, not because it delivers justice. Derrida is thinking through the 
experience of Roman law, and he does not see the importance of law in protecting justice in 
the most remote corners of the world. We might see through the problem of law and its 
arbitrariness, but looking into the empirical material from Assam, we see the desire in the 
victim to be protected by law, and justice delivered through law. In asking for law, they are not 
obeying authority, but expecting justice through lawful authority. Their experience of 
preserving identity papers as their lawful right to stay, and in adhering to these papers and 
being ever willing to share their documents, is the way they see justice being served by the law. 
which needs to be respected. The authority is not only invested in law enforcement, but in one 




and not the law (just one) per se. The theories of violence help us understand a few broader 
themes and issues. but it is not sufficient to understand the unique situation of Muslims in 
Bodoland districts. Gandhi’s idea, or Kapila’s discussion of Tilak about Hindu-Muslim 
politics, are also not enough to understand the conflict, as the conflict is not of identity first, 
but of resources. This is also a peculiar case where the violence is between two minorities, and 
anthropological work like that of Veena Das in the context of Partition, or Ashis Nandy’s 
critique in the context of Hindu-Muslim riots, is insufficient, as the violence in Indian 
sociological and political study generally focuses on majority-minority categories and their 
construction, as we have seen in Gyanendra Pandey’s work on routine violence.  
 
The empirical work in the villages has shown how violence is also very locally 
managed, in a certain sense. It is organized and systematic in choosing the victim group, and 
targets it. People understand it. and they form a group solidarity to defy that. They could survive 
the locally managed violence, as they have an everyday understanding of its working dynamics, 
but what they find difficult is dealing with the neglect and bias of the state. The discrimination 
that is instrumentalized through certain laws, and violence legitimized by a certain ideology, 
are what they find it hard to negotiate with. 
 
To conclude, I would like to recall the spirit of the people I met, who carry on with their 
lives, despite all the threats. There is, in their everyday lives, a compassion and a wise 
willingness to understand why things happen. They understand well enough what motivates 
the people around them. If this compassion and understanding were to be channelized, it would 





























Profiles of Newspapers 
 
The Assam Tribune: 
 
The Assam Tribune is an English daily newspaper published in Guwahati and 
Dibrugarh, Assam. Since its inception in 1939, it has risen from a weekly newspaper to become 
the most popular English daily in North-Eastern India. 
 
The late Naren Deka was the editor from 1993, and was succeeded in 1997 by Prafulla 
Govinda Baruah, who still presides over the daily. It is owned by Assam Tribune Pvt. Ltd., 
which is dominated by the Baruah family who founded it, and members of this family are the 
editor as well as the executive editor. The politics of the paper is inclined towards the BJP, the 
ruling party as of 2019. 
 
It was priced at ₹3 during 1993-94, ₹4 in 2012 and ₹6 in 2014.  
 
Akhbar e Mashriq: 
 
Akhbar e Mashriq is an Urdu daily printed in Kolkata, with its first issue dating back 
to 25th April, 1980. 
 
The founding Editor, Mohammad Wasimul Haq, and his family members, worked 
diligently enough for its circulation to prevail beyond Kolkata in the states of Bihar, Jharkhand, 
Orissa, UP and Delhi. 
 




making it the only Urdu newspaper to have done so. 
 
In a controversial order that was passed in 2012, the Trinamool Congress, a centre-left 
party in West Bengal, banned English and mass-circulation Bengali dailies at state-sponsored 
and aided libraries. They restricted the purchase of newspapers/dailies by public libraries to a 
few, including Akhbar-e-Mashriq. The current Editor, Nadeem ul Haq, is a Member of 
Parliament of the Upper House of the Indian Parliament (Rajya Sabha) on the All India 
Trinamool Congress (TMC) ticket. 
 




Azad Hind, an Urdu daily, was founded in 1948 by Abdur Razzaq Malihabadi, a close 
associate of Indian freedom fighters, who wrote a biographical book on Maulana Abul Kalm 
Azad. 
 
His son, Ahmad Saeed Malihabadi, a Rajya Sabha member, edited and owned the 
newspaper until August. 2010. following his father’s death in 1959. An independent paper until 
2010 (with some congress leaning), contracting revenues forced him to sell it to the Saradha 
Group. When the Saradha Group closed its media operations in 2013, The Trinamool Congress 
was alleged to have seized control of it, albeit indirectly. A newly floated Azad Hind and the 
Kalam Staff Welfare Association runs the paper, whose CEO is Asif Khan Ashrafi, a close 
associate of the All India Trinamool Congress’s (TMC) all-India general secretary, Mukul Roy. 
Azad Hind is now out of print. 
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